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Migration can be a hazardous venture, particularly if carried out clandestinely. Evidence 
indicates that foreigners working without formal authorisation, i.e. ‘irregular migrant 
workers’, are in a particularly vulnerable position primarily because of their irregular 
immigration status. They are more likely to be subjected to exploitative and unsafe 
employment practices in terms of benefits and conditions. This study examines the 
protection available to this category of migrant workers in South Africa, particularly their 
right of access to work-related social protection. 
South Africa is a major migrant-receiving country in Southern Africa because of its 
relatively stronger economy and political stability. However, the employment of foreign 
nationals without work permits, or foreigners working contrary to visa requirements, raises 
a series of policy issues. These issues, against the background of fairness and equity 
discourses pertaining to socio-economic entitlements, become exacerbated. This study 
examines the adequacy of domestic, constitutional and legislative frameworks that offer 
work-related social protection to foreign workers in South Africa. In the context of 
international, continental, and regional instruments that provide similar protection to 
irregular migrants, it could be argued that South Africa’s restrictive legislative framework 
compromises equality in the right of access to social protection for some migrants. 
Although effective migration management depends on careful juxtaposition of 
myriad policies, emerging evidence suggests conflicting interplay between key South 
African policies intended to manage the rights of workers specifically and labour 
migration in the country generally. Critical analysis of relevant national immigration, 
labour, and social security laws indicates inconsistency with international human rights 
principles concerning the equality of opportunity or treatment of irregular migrants vis-à-
vis regular migrants and nationals regarding social protection. Yet, inequalities in the 
actual processes or opportunities (means) embedded in these policies disentitle many 
vulnerable foreign workers from important constitutionally entrenched fundamental rights 
because their presence and/or employment violates existing immigration laws. The study 
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CHAPTER I  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview  
The movement of people from one place to another, or human migration, has become 
topical in the political arena and on social media platforms. The migration phenomenon, 
particularly the clandestine type, poses a number of policy challenges to most countries. It 
requires careful coordination of various concerns, including national security, economic 
interests and human rights. In recent years, policy makers are paying greater attention to 
clandestine migration because the old-fashioned response of prioritising security has 
proven ineffective in stemming irregular cross-border movement.1 The European Union 
(EU) exemplifies a case where strict external border control measures are not enough at 
curtailing clandestine migration. 
 For instance, the 2015 mass movement of refugees, mainly from conflict zones like 
Syria, into Europe sparked fervent debates about a European migration crisis, to the point 
of creating division within the European Union over how best to address the problem. The 
2015 refugee surge in Europe did not only reveal deep-seated political divisions within the 
EU on the issue of migration.2 It also highlighted important challenges in contemporary 
migration discourse, namely migration governance and migrants’ rights.  
 However, this study is not particularly concerned with the kind of migration 
experienced in Europe. The events shaping the EU migration crisis were more politically 
inspired since people were mostly escaping political turmoil, violence and/or persecution. 
This kind of cross-border movement is different to traditional migration where movements 
are motivated by economic difficulties or factors. Thus, this study is primarily interested in 
the type of migration inspired by the prospect for economic betterment rather than for 
personal safety. 
                                                          
1 Pia Orrenius & Madeline Zavodny ‘Irregular immigration in the European Union’ (2016) 2 European 
Policy Analysis 1 at 14. 
2 Pierre Vimont ‘Migration in Europe: Bridging the solidarity gap’ (2016) Carnegie Europe, available at 




 Nonetheless, the challenges posed by the European case remain relevant. 
Migration, particularly irregular migration, seemingly presents a challenging dualism 
between migration governance (immigration law) and migrant workers’ protection (labour 
law) objectives for policy makers worldwide. 
 Since the advent of the democratic dispensation in 1994, South Africa has been 
attracting increasing numbers of foreign nationals, mainly from unstable neighbouring 
countries, given the deteriorating political and economic conditions on the continent 
generally. This increasing cross-border movement has made the rendering of work by 
foreign nationals in the country a highly contentious issue. The primary contention relates 
to the formal reliance on the term ‘employee’ as an eligibility criterion by almost all the 
relevant protective employment and social security legislation. Almost all South African 
protective laws presuppose an existing formal employer-employee relationship that tends 
to affect some workers negatively in accessing certain legal institutions and economic 
benefits. The workers involved, particularly if they do not possess the required formal 
permission to participate in the domestic labour market, can further exacerbate the 
contention.  
 Whether deliberate or inadvertent, there appears to be an inherent discrimination 
embedded in the domestic legal process from the onset, which compromises the very 
opportunities or protection envisaged by these laws. Consequently, domestic protection 
laws compromise opportunities with resultant unequal outcomes, like social or economic 
consequences, due to an existing exclusionary tendency from the inception. This calls for a 
critical inquiry into the legal protection position of foreign workers in South Africa to 
ascertain how their regulation or lack thereof, raises issues of human rights and social 
justice, particularly if the migratory flow in question is of the clandestine type.  
 
1.2 General trends and issues in labour migration in South Africa 
Increasing advancements in information and communications technologies (ICTs) — a 
direct result of globalisation — among other developments, and to some extent rising 
political and economic instability the world over, has led to a significant increase in 
international migration and refugee movement in recent years. 3  The United Nations 
                                                          
3 H. Patrick Glenn Strangers at the gate: refugees, illegal entrants and procedural justice (1992) 1.  
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estimates that the world’s total migration population, that is people living outside their 
country of birth, totals around 214 million people.4 Approximately 105 million of this total 
migrant population constitutes migrant workers; that is, people working in a country other 
than their country of birth. 5  Efforts of individual autonomous states to control these 
movements become great challenges. The biggest of which is the annual cost of enforcing 
immigration restrictions (i.e. border controls, issuing of visas and passports, inspecting 
labour conditions) and eliminating clandestine cross-border movements altogether (i.e. 
apprehending, detaining, prosecuting and deporting unwanted migrants).6 
 South Africa, as a member of the international community, is equally susceptible to 
this growing and challenging phenomenon. Whilst the actual number of unauthorised 
foreign nationals entering, living, and/or working in South Africa is uncertain, there is a 
consensus that clandestine migration into the country has and will persist.7 Moreover, the 
South African labour market, in light of globalisation, has experienced major structural 
changes, particularly with regard to the forms of employment engagement. There has been 
a rise in a trend where employers create varying processes of employment engagements 
that place some workers in an increasingly weak employment relationship. This increasing 
attempt at diluting and camouflaging standard employment manifests in various forms of 
eternalisation, including sub-contracting, casualisation, outsourcing, labour broking, part-
time and fixed-term contracts.8 
 Consequently, these newly constructed processes of engagement have led to 
workers with less job security, little to no bargaining power, worsening working 
conditions, wages, and benefits, as compared to their traditional, more permanent 
                                                          
4 Hania Zlotnik, Philip Guest, Bela Hovy & Sabine Henning Data and analysis: Partnering to better 
understand and address the human development implications of migration (2010) 1. 
5 International Organization for Migration ‘Labour Migration’ available at 
http://iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/what-we-do/labour-migration.html, accessed on 19 August 2015. 
6 Jeff Handmaker & Jennifer Parsley ‘Migration, refugees, and racism in South Africa’ (2001) 20(1) Refuge 
40 at 48. 
7 Darshan Vigneswaran ‘Undocumented migration: risks and myths’ in Aurelia Wa Kabwe-Segatti (ed) 
Migration in post-apartheid South Africa: challenges and questions to policy makers (2008) 97. 
8 Rochelle le Roux ‘The world of work: Forms of engagement in South Africa’ (2009) Development and 
Labour Monograph Series 13. 
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counterparts. These diluted versions of the standard employment form essentially produce 
vulnerable workers who are at a greater risk of labour abuse and exploitation.9 Whilst this 
trend is real for many local workers, foreign nationals operating without legal authorisation 
feel the brunt of its effect. Legislative efforts to curtail the influx of foreign workers have 
raised serious human rights and equality concerns. 
 One important area where the plight of foreign workers, particularly unauthorised 
migrants, presents interest in this study is in the field of social protection. A recent report 
by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) reveals that social protection does not 
adequately cover a significant proportion (over 70 per cent) of the world population.10 This 
piece of data and many like it throughout the report shows the staggering lack of access to 
social protection for a significant proportion of the world’s populace. Here, the precarious 
situations of unauthorised migrant workers are particularly pertinent. They suffer diverse 
forms of marginalisation, discrimination, and human rights abuses in host nations. 
Essentially they suffer doubly as the ‘human problems involved in migration are even 
more serious in the case of irregular migration’.11  
 Whilst social protection is an essential mechanism for mitigating and protecting 
individuals against many shocks, some people do not have this basic opportunity to 
attempt managing risks in order to avoid or even survive these shocks should they occur. 
These individuals trapped in exploitative relationships are unable to move out, so they can 
contribute to or benefit from national economic growth.12  Available evidence thus far 
suggests that there appears to be a direct connection between the immigration policy 
instituted and the right of access to social (and labour) protection enjoyed.13 Thus, the type 
of immigration policies in operation determines, to an extent, the level of social security 
                                                          
9 International Labour Organization Facts on labour migration (2006) 1.  
10 International Labour Organization (ILO) World social Protection Report 2014-15: Building economic 
recovery, inclusive development and social justice (2014) 2. 
11 Preamble of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families.  
12 Abena D Oduro ‘Formal and informal social protection in sub-Saharan Africa’ Paper prepared for the ERD 
August 2010 at 11. 
13 Ockert Dupper ‘Migrant workers and the right to social security: An international perspective’ (2007) 2 
Stellenbosch Law Review 219 at 222.  
5 
 
protection enjoyed by non-nationals.14 So the more tenuous an individual’s immigration 
status is, the more barriers that individual faces in accessing social security benefits.15 
National economies often tend to lock out unauthorised migrant workers, despite their 
willingness and ability to work, and consequently deprive them of much needed social 
protection. Moreover, most foreign nationals, with exception of permanent residents, do 
not qualify for equal treatment with citizens in the field of social protection as far as 
policies in host nations are concerned.  
 Although South Africa has significantly extended its social (security) protection 
coverage in recent years — i.e. increased efforts to offer at least basic protection to needy 
individuals — there is still much to be done as far as the full realisation of the (human) 
right to social security is concerned.16 The South African social security system excludes 
most foreign nationals, with the exception of those with permanent residence status and, to 
some extent, those with valid work permits.17  
 The irony here is that the Constitutional Court has repeatedly recognised these 
workers as a vulnerable minority group whom often lack political power, and have ‘their 
interests overlooked and their rights to equal concern and respect violated’.18 As a category 
of workers, they are highly susceptible to exploitation as they operate in sectors (in host-
nations) where workers’ organisations and trade union movements are minimal or absent 
altogether.19 Yet, domestic law often afford unauthorised foreign workers very few legal 
rights.20 Additionally, they often experience unequal treatment and opportunities as well as 
discriminatory behaviours and sentiments in host nations.  
                                                          
14 Marius Olivier & Avinash Govindjee ‘Labour rights and social protection of migrant workers: In search of 
a coordinated legal response’ Paper presented at the Inaugural conference of the Labour Law Research 
Network (LLRN), Barcelona, Spain, 13-15 June 2013, 1-40 at 9.  
15 International Labour Organization International labour migration: A rights-based approach (2010) 77.  
16 ILO op cit note 10 at 2.  
17 Marius Olivier ‘Critical issues in South African social security: The need for creating a social security 
paradigm for the excluded and the marginalized’ (1999) 20 ILJ 2199 at 2207.  
18 See Larbi-Odam and Others v Member of the Executive Council for Education (North-West Province) and 
Another 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC) para 19. 
19 Paul Benjamin ‘Informal work and labour rights in South Africa’ (2008) 29 ILJ 1579 at 1590. 
20 ILO op cit note 15 at 172.  
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 Despite their acknowledged vulnerabilities, unauthorised foreign workers in South 
Africa have little to no recourse to social protection. The irony is more pronounced when 
considering the fact that social protection measures are intended to safeguard the most 
vulnerable members of society. Therefore, legislative provisions that are from the onset 
unequal and thereby compromise the very opportunities accessible to these migrants can 
account for the prejudicial treatment of these foreign workers in accessing this important 
protection.  
 Seemingly, the exclusion of vulnerable foreign workers from important protective 
legislation exhibit a conflicting interplay between immigration, social security, and labour 
laws in South Africa. The complexity and to some degree the root of the problem lies 
within the relationship between state sovereignty vis-à-vis human rights obligations. On 
the one hand, a state has a primary sovereign responsibility towards its citizens, not 
necessarily to the nationals of another country. In light of this, nation states have the 
prerogative to control the entry and expulsion of foreign nationals.21 On the other hand, at 
the heart of the conception of human rights are principles of dignity and equality. The right 
to equality demands not only equal or consistent treatment, but also a redress of systemic 
and pervasive group-based inequality.22 However, the idea of human rights seems to be 
always in competition with the conception of sovereignty.  
 Whilst the South African Immigration Act 13 of 2002 aims to control the influx of 
‘illegal’ immigrants by criminalising the employers who employ unauthorised foreign 
workers;23 the Constitution will have us believe this democratic state is founded on the 
values of human dignity, equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.24 
This goes to show that state sovereign prerogative, in the form of the immigration law, 
seems to be in opposition to the doctrine of equality enshrined by the Constitution and 
which consequently constitute the bedrock of all other legislated policies. It is within this 
                                                          
21 See article 79 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families.  
22 Saras Jagwanth ‘South Africa: The inequality challenge’ (2000) 15(3) SAR 30 at 31.  
23 See s 38 of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002.   
24 See s 1(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
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theoretical framework that this research aims to look for ways to manage this tension, 
using the plight of unauthorised migrant workers as the case study.  
 In spite of the conflicting relationship, the rapid expansion of globalisation is 
eroding the traditional idea of territorial sovereignty as we have come to understand.25 In 
this regard, international instruments have increasingly become significant in exerting a 
moral and political power above that of the state’s legal order.26 International normative 
instruments are necessary to guide and synchronise various national legislation, policies, 
and practices in order to protect the interest of both migrant workers and the State.27 Yet 
when it comes to social protection rights, relevant international protective instruments, at 
best, vaguely allude to unauthorised migrant workers.28 In effect, the presumed uncertainty 
around the legal protection of unauthorised migrants in international law calls for a 
reinterpretation of whether international instruments are realistic given the socio-economic 
context and current labour migration challenges of a developing South Africa. 
 Whatever the case, the increasing xenophobic or anti-migrant sentiments, and 
rhetoric in South Africa call for a closer look at the internal difficulties foreign nationals 
put up with, particularly in accessing important work-related social protection. Advocating 
for the extension of social protection to this vulnerable group of foreign workers is not 
only beneficial for all foreign nationals (in terms of human rights protection). It has the 
added benefit of ‘boosting human capital development and productivity, supporting 
domestic demand and supporting structural transformation of national economies’.29 Put 
differently, universal access to social protection is vital as these ‘policies play a critical 
role in realising the human right to social security for all, reducing poverty and inequality, 
and supporting inclusive growth’ in any country in any region.30  
                                                          
25 Gyan Basnet ‘State sovereignty vs. human rights’ (2013) available at 
http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2013/others/guestcolumn/feb/guest_columns_05.php, accessed 19 
August 2015. 
26 Ibid.  
27 ILO op cit note 15 at 117.  
28 Jonathan Crush ‘The dark side of democracy: Migration, xenophobia and human rights in South Africa’ 
(2000) 38 International Migration 103 at 104. 
29 ILO op cit note 10 at 2. 
30 Ibid at xix.  
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1.3 Research questions 
The thesis addresses one key question: ‘To what extent do South African laws protect the 
rights of unauthorised migrant workers?’ This major question comprises the following 
specific questions: 
 Do South African laws adequately safeguard the social protection rights of 
unauthorised foreign workers?31 
 Is there any labour migration policy or framework in South Africa?32  
 What is the nature of the existing labour migration policy?  
 What are the realistic options for policy reform?33 
Thus the key question put forward in this research reviews the interplay of immigration, 
labour, and social protection laws; the ongoing tension between their intended aims on the 
one hand, and the effective realisation of the constitutional rights to equality, dignity, and 
social protection on the other. Additionally, it raises a number of issues about the current 
disparities in law and practices in access to social protection between different categories 
of migrant workers which are yet to be answered.  
 
1.4 Significance and scope of the study 
First and foremost, the study proceeds to explore contradictions — by way of comparative 
analysis — embedded in South African immigration, labour and social policies as an 
indicator of inequality in opportunities that could lead to compromised capabilities which 
further lead to unequal outcomes for foreign nationals working in South Africa. It 
examines some legal and administrative barriers to opportunities afforded to vulnerable 
foreign nationals working in South Africa, and the need to address the aforementioned 
dualism in order to overcome these barriers to opportunities. 
 In doing so, the thesis advocates for a nuanced human rights discourse on the rights 
of unauthorised foreign nationals that lends support for an alternate approach to handling 
the rights of migrant workers. Although the research primarily focuses on the extension of 
                                                          
31 This question is explored in detail and answered in chapter 6 of the study. 
32 This question and the one that follows it are explored and answered in chapter 4 of the study. 




the right of access to social protection specifically to unauthorised foreign workers in 
South Africa, many of the arguments made can also apply mutatis mutandis to other 
categories of atypical or vulnerable workers within the domestic workforce.  
 Moreover, the research is expected to contribute to the current debate on what 
aspect of equality should ideally be measured — outcomes or opportunities — by shedding 
light on a practice that already places foreign nationals in South Africa into different social 
strata, which in turn impacts on their level of exposure and susceptibility to exploitation, 
and consequently to xenophobia and poverty. 
 Addressing these issues represents a significant move towards creating an enabling 
environment for all individuals within South Africa and unlocking the economic potential 
of all people living and working within its borders. Thus, the value of this research is in 
prescribing a different approach to addressing the supposed current ‘immigration problem’ 
in order to manage the process effectively to benefit all stakeholders, both migrants and the 
host economy. 
 
1.5 Research method 
The research does not rely directly on empirical evidence. I acknowledge that empirical 
data would have generated some, if not more, significant data. However, this method was 
ruled out as inappropriate given the sensitive nature of the subject matter. It is well-known 
that unauthorised foreign nationals prefer to remain under the radar because of their 
precarious legal position in the host country; so any field research would have been 
problematic and unreliable to say the least. What is more, any official records on 
clandestine migration are conjecture at best, often highly politicised. Therefore in order to 
avoid any ethical hurdles and to ensure information reliability and validity, empirical 
research was ruled out.   
 As an alternative, the study relies on contextual legal and policy analysis, with 
some comparative elements. While the focus is primarily on the South African context, 
comparative analysis is applied to draw attention to any normative or deficiencies in the 
domestic protection offered, and in other instances present relative best practices from 
parallel jurisdictions that offer comparably better protection for this class of workers. 
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 The preference for the comparative legal analysis method is mainly due to its 
ability to expose the potential adequacy of the protection offered to foreign workers in the 
chosen domestic legal framework. The United States and EU jurisdictions are the main 
comparators, also because of accessibility of material. The United States has been chosen 
because it is a migrant receiving country with relative progressive regulation. The EU 
provides comparable best practice at the regional level. 
 This method allows for the measuring of domestic legal framework against major 
international and regional (employment-related human rights protection) instruments as 
well as best practices from parallel jurisdictions, in order to improve on domestic legal 
reform. The method also allows for understanding available relevant international 
protection norms, how other similar foreign jurisdictions have adapted these norms 
successfully, and the need for reinterpretation of these international instruments to fit these 
objectives, while remaining mindful of the socio-economic context.  
 In seeking to achieve this, the study draws heavily on intensive analyses of primary 
(legislation, case law, international and regional instruments) and secondary (books, 
articles and other commentary) sources in putting the arguments together. 
 
1.6 Definition of key terms 
 
Labour migration 
As far as the migration discourse is concerned, no formal definition for labour migration as 
a concept exists. Nonetheless, labour migration is generally conceptualised (and applied in 
this context) as the cross-border movement of people for employment purposes. People 
who engage in labour migration are ‘labour migrants’ or ‘economic migrants’. However, 
none of the international instruments refers to the terms ‘labour migrants’ and ‘economic 
migrants’. In its place, the international community adopts the more neutral term ‘migrant 
workers’.34 
 
                                                          
34 Piyasiri Wickramasekara ‘Protection of migrant workers in an era of globalization: The role of 
international instruments’ in R Blanpain (ed) Comparative labour law and industrial relations in 
industrialized market economies (2010) 245-283 at 246.  
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Migrant (foreign) worker 
The term ‘migrants’ broadly refers to all persons living and working outside of their 
country of birth or citizenship.35 There are different categories of migrants ranging from 
people who migrate for economic, political, and environmental reasons, to family reunion. 
Domestically, South African legislation recognises different categories of foreign nationals 
according to their immigration status and/or reason for entering the country. In this respect, 
migrants in the South African context vary and can include permanent residents, 
individuals holding any of the numerous temporary residence permits in terms of the 
Immigration Act 13 of 2002 (including individual contract migrants), refugees, asylum 
seekers, and irregular or ‘undocumented’ foreign nationals.  
 However, for this research, the more relevant term is ‘migrant workers’, the 
economically active cluster of the total migrant population.36 A migrant worker, in this 
context, is a ‘person who is to be engaged, is engaged, or has been engaged in a 
remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national’.37 This definition 
includes often-excluded migrants such as frontier workers, seafarers, seasonal workers, 
project-tied workers, workers on offshore installations, itinerant workers, specified-
employment workers, and self-employed workers.38 Domestically, the term refers to ‘an 
individual who is neither a citizen nor a resident of the receiving country, but is not 
illegal’. 39  The study uses the terms ‘migrant workers’ and ‘foreign workers’ 
interchangeably. 
 Furthermore, this study divides migrant workers into two broad groups based on 
channels of entry or admission, i.e. their legal immigration status. The first group 
constitutes foreign nationals who are legally employed or self-employed in countries other 
                                                          
35 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division ‘Population Facts No. 
2013/2’ available at http://esa.un.org/unmigration/documents/The_number_of_international_migrants.pdf, 
accessed 19 August 2015. 
36 Wickramasekara op cit note 334 at 246. 
37 Article 2(1) of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families, 1990 (ICRMW).  
38 Wickramasekara op cit note 34 at 246. 
39 Section 1(1)(xvii) of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002.  
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than their home states. This group comprises of a privileged skilled few, who perhaps have 
the potential to legally relocate or become permanent residents.  
 The second group, and the category of particular interest in this study, consists of 
those in an irregular situation. This group comprises semi-skilled and unskilled workers 
with little or no education working abroad without the necessary formal authorisation or 
documentation. At various stages during the migration process — departure, transit, entry, 
and return — irregularities can occur.40 These irregularities may be committed by the 
migrants themselves or against them by third parties.41 
 
Irregular or unauthorised migrant (foreign) worker 
Previously, researchers characterised individuals who enter or work in host countries 
without official authorisation as illegal, clandestine, or undocumented. However, the term 
‘illegal migrant’ is inappropriate because it has a negative connotation that suggests 
criminality.42 Likewise, the term ‘undocumented’ is deficient because it does not capture 
the full picture in special cases such as the migrant who enters legally but later violates the 
conditions of entry, or the migrant trafficked across borders.43 In these scenarios, both may 
possess documents, albeit false. Instead, the study uses the international recommended 
term ‘irregular’. 
 An irregular or unauthorised migrant is a person who is not ‘authorised to enter, to 
stay, and to engage in a remunerated activity in the State of employment pursuant to the 
law of that state and to international agreements to which that state is a party’.44 Another 
available definition of unauthorised migrant worker is a person ‘whose remunerated, 
otherwise lawful employment violates national immigration laws’.45  
                                                          
40 International Labour Organization ‘Towards a fair deal for migrant workers in the global economy’ (2004) 
para 36 at 11 available at http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2004/104B09_110_engl.pdf, accessed 19 
August 2015. 
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid. 
44 Article 5(b) of the ICRMW.  
45 Beth Lyon ‘Tipping the balance: why courts should look to international and foreign law on unauthorized 
immigrant worker rights (2007) 29(1) Journal of International Law 169 at 171.  
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 In the South African context, it refers to an individual who is in the country in 
contravention of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 and/or the Refugees Act 130 of 1998, 
and includes a prohibited person. This study uses the terms ‘irregular’, ‘undocumented’, 
and ‘unauthorised’ interchangeably, unless otherwise indicated, to refer to a category of 
three kinds of foreign workers. The first group constitutes people who enter the country 
clandestinely by crossing the border at a place other than a recognised port or post. The 
second group consists of people who acquire fraudulent documents prior to coming or 
during their stay in the country. The final group constituting people who (after entering the 
country legally) contravene the terms of their entry permit, by staying beyond the allowed 
period, failing to renew, or by working, trading, studying or receiving government services 
in defiance of their permit conditions.46  
 The definition chosen in this thesis is a broad one: it includes all aforementioned 
migrants in an irregular situation, refugees in vulnerable situation, and unsuccessful or 
rejected asylum seekers. The focus will be on men and women migrants and not on 
children. 
 
1.7 Research structure 
The study comprises of seven chapters with each chapter dealing with a specific issue. 
However, equality is the recurring theme all through the thesis. Chapter 1 broadly 
introduces the study, presenting an overview of the research proposal, the research 
question, and definitions for key terms employed in the study.  
 Chapter 2 reflects on the equality discourse generally and in South Africa 
specifically with reference to key legislation and relevant case law.  It does so by 
reviewing historical movement towards equality, and giving an overview of the 
development of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on equality in broad-spectrum. 
 Chapter 3 deliberates on how to measure the parameters of equality. It provides a 
brief discussion of three conceptions of distributive equality (welfare, resources and 
opportunities) in presenting the best-perceived measure of the ideal of equality. The 
chapter argues for addressing the inequity embedded in the actual processes or 
                                                          
46 ILO op cit note 15 at 20.  
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opportunities (starting points) offered to individuals rather than fixating on the resultant 
outcomes. 
 Chapter 4 argues for the need to extend social protection coverage to unauthorised 
foreign workers from migration, labour, and human rights perspectives. It examines both 
the conceptualisation of social protection and the evolution of immigration law in South 
Africa. It provides an understanding of the factors necessitating migration for employment 
and the subsequent need for the extension of the right of access to social security to the 
most vulnerable of all, unauthorised foreign workers. In doing so, it paves the way for a 
more focused discussion in subsequent chapters.  
 Chapter 5 explores the role of international, continental and regional instruments in 
protecting irregular migrant workers. It gives a detailed analysis of the regulatory 
frameworks of the UN, ILO, AU and SADC applicable to the social protection concerns of 
irregular migrants, given South Africa’s membership in each of these bodies. The chapter 
observes that transnational legal instruments are useful in shaping domestic regulatory 
policies. In this respect, the contents of the standards outlined in these instruments are 
important for the evaluation of the adequacy of the South African national framework.  
 Chapter 6 examines the position of unauthorised foreign workers in the South 
African social security system as it pertains to issues of coverage and access to benefits. It 
starts by tracing the judicial interpretations of relevant constitutional and statutory social 
protection provisions and application thereof in order to identify any discrepancies in 
judicial adjudication and relief of cases involving foreign nationals regarding social 
protection.  
 Finally, chapter 7 draws together all the discussions and conclusions in a final 




CHAPTER II EQUALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness.’1  
 
2.1 Introduction  
The equality discourse over the years, generally speaking, has progressed to incorporate 
anti-discrimination ideas intended to eradicate various forms of stigma, stereotyping, and 
prejudices. Equality is without a doubt linked to, if not synonymous with, the principle of 
non-discrimination. Current equality policies supposedly developed as a way to contest the 
negative differential treatment accorded to some groups but not to others in society.2 Still, 
most people ostensibly condone inequality, considering that it emerges in all societies. 
 Essentially, many grounds of discrimination exist: race, gender, disability, age, 
religion, wealth, and so forth. Some forms of discrimination define a distinct group, while 
others are firmly rooted in society. According to Chaskalson P, inequality occurs ‘through 
differentiation that perpetuates disadvantage and results in the scarring of the sense of 
dignity and self-worth’.3 Hence, equality has become one of the most likely principles, for 
which most democratic societies would advocate. Despite this increasing interest, equality 
has become an elusive liberal, universal, moral, and legal concept with myriad 
interpretations.4 Couched succinctly, ‘equality possesses a variety of different meanings’.5 
 Accordingly, this chapter briefly reflects on the equality discourse generally and in 
South Africa specifically with reference to key legislation and relevant case law. Section 
                                                          
1 Preamble to the U.S. Declaration of Independence, 1776 
2 Ockert Dupper ‘The current legislative framework’ in EML Strydom (ed) Essential employment 
discrimination law (2004) 14.  
3 Arthur Chaskalson ‘Human dignity as a constitutional value’ in Kretzmer & Klein (eds) The concept of 
human dignity in human rights discourse (2002) 140. 
4 Titia Loenen ‘The equality clause in the South African Constitution: Some remarks from a comparative 
perspective’ (1997) 13 SAJHR 401 at 402. 
5 Bob Hepple ‘The aims and limits of equality laws’ in Dupper & Garbers (eds) Equality in the workplace: 
Reflections from South Africa and beyond (2009) 4. 
16 
 
2.2 reviews select theories of equality prevalent in the literature. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 then 
proceed to give a broad overview of the statutory provisions and the jurisprudence of the 
South African Constitutional Court relating to the right to equality. Finally, section 2.5 
focuses on equality jurisprudence as it pertains to foreign nationals. Unless otherwise 
stated, unfair discrimination will be conceptualised as ‘the differential treatment of persons 
in a way which impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings’.6 
 
2.2 Selected theories of equality 
The concept of equality straddles diverse disciplines, rendering it a complex ideal with 
more than one connotation. Equality can take many different forms, depending on one’s 
perspective and goal. For instance, an economist may be concerned with income or wealth 
(economic) equality, a political scientist with political equality, whilst a sociologist may 
pursue gender or social equality. The diverse uses of the ‘equality’ concept renders it an 
ambiguous rhetorical device that can split into many other concepts to suit any purpose.7 
For that reason, in order to comprehend fully the progression of the equality discourse in 
South Africa, it is necessary to survey some of the broader theories underlying the concept.  
 
2.2.1 Utilitarianism  
Utilitarianism as a political philosophy predominantly concerns maximising the total 
wellbeing in society.8 Thus, the principal concern for a utilitarian is simply utility. Equality 
in terms of this theory is apportioned an instrumental value; i.e. equality is valuable as far 
as it promotes other values.9 Philosophers who belong to this school of thought analyse 
equality in terms of the degree of the resulting benefits for those concerned or for society 
                                                          
6 Ackermann, O’Regan and Sachs JJ in Prinsloo v. Van der Linde [1997] 6 BCLR 759 (CC) para 31.  
7 Ronald Dworkin ‘What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare’ (1981a) 10(3) Philosophy & Public Affairs 
185. 
8 Martin Hevia & Joel Colon-Rios ‘Contemporary theories of equality: A critical review’ (2009) 74 Revista 
Juridica Universidad de Puerto Rico 131; Victoria University of Wellington Legal Research Paper No 
15/2013. 
9 Nils Holtug & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds) Egalitarianism (2007) 2.  
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as a whole.10 The manner of distribution of welfare among beneficiaries, for instance, is 
not of such great relevance as the ensuing satisfaction.11  
 In a purely utilitarian fashion therefore, all interests of beneficiaries involved are 
equally important as everyone is equally weighted.12 Thus, the outcome of a distribution 
can be uneven if that distribution is the best one from the total amount of overall welfare. 
Thus to a utilitarian, when deciding between two policies or acts for instance, a major 
deciding factor is simply the resulting outcome. Put differently, the act or policy that offers 
the greatest benefits to beneficiaries is of more immediate relevance to a utilitarian, not 
necessarily the process of distribution itself.13  
  
2.2.2 Egalitarianism 
Egalitarianism, like utilitarianism, rests on a similar moral assumption that all human 
beings are fundamentally equal in worth and therefore people should treat or relate to one 
another as equals. 14  However, unlike utilitarianism, equality in terms of egalitarian 
principles transcends simply making people better off overall.  
 In classic egalitarianism, equality is good in itself; it is more than instrumental, it 
has intrinsic value.15 As a result, individuals should, all things being equal, have identical 
shares of welfare or resources or at least the same access to obtain these desired goods by 
virtue of them having equal moral status.16 For egalitarians, when faced with a choice 
between two distributive options, it is sometimes necessary to choose an option that 
amounts to lesser benefits for all beneficiaries if the same allocation results in the 
                                                          
10 Derek Parfit ‘Equality and priority’ (1997) 10 Ratio 202 at 202.  
11 Dworkin op cit note 7 at 185.  
12 Holtug & Lippert-Rasmussen op cit note 9 at 2. Premised on an assumption of moral equality.  
13 Parfit op cit note 10 at 202. 
14 Richard Arneson ‘Egalitarianism’ in Edward N. Zalta (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(2013) available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/egalitarianism, accessed 25 February 
2014. 
15 Parfit op cite note 10 at 206.  
16 Holtug & Lippert-Rasmussen op cit note 9 at 2. 
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process.17 Thus, it is sometimes better if everyone is equally worse off than if everyone is 
better off, though not equally so.18  
 Egalitarianism and the pursuit of economic equality are commonly related; 
nonetheless, egalitarianism varies because there are numerous ways in which people can 
be equal. 19  There have been many attempts by various scholars to classify types of 
egalitarianism. Yet, like the very concept of equality, egalitarianism as a theory is a 
constantly evolving principle. Irrespective of the tenuous nature of the concept, this 
chapter briefly surveys the formal and substantive forms of egalitarian theory for purposes 
of what the study aims to highlight. 
 
2.2.3 Formal equality versus substantive equality 
The notion of formal equality is premised on the Aristotelian principle of equal treatment; 
i.e. likes should be treated alike and vice versa.20 According to this understanding, injustice 
ensues when one treats those who are alike differently and vice versa. Supporters of formal 
equality view inequality as an unnatural and irrational phenomenon because people are 
born free and equal. 21  Thus, the failure to treat people as equally free creates 
discrimination.22 Consequently, inequality can be removed by simply treating all people 
who are similarly situated in the same broad and abstract terms, i.e. in the same manner, 
regardless of personal circumstance, history or any such contextual considerations.23  
 Moreover, the formal interpretation of equality is seemingly neutral, as it rejects 
different treatment of people who may be different from one another socially and/or 
economically.24 Formal equality arguably promotes the notion of meritocracy. Meritocracy 
demands that individuals should be treated entirely on their merit and not based on some 
                                                          
17 Parfit op cit note 10 at 203.  
18 Holtug & Lippert-Rasmussen op cit note 9 at 16.  
19 Arneson op cit note 14 at 13.  
20 Sandra Fredman ‘Facing the future: Substantive equality under the spotlight’ in Dupper & Garbers (eds) 
Equality in the workplace: Reflections from South Africa and beyond (2009) 17.  
21 Pierre de Vos & Warren Freedman (eds) South African constitutional law in context (2014) 421.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Janet Kentridge ‘Equality’ in Chaskalson et al Constitutional law of South Africa (1999) 14.4.  
24 De Vos & Freedman op cit note 21 at 421. 
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arbitrary physical or personal characteristic in determining whether they have a right to a 
benefit or not.25 There appears to be inherent neutrality in this model because individual 
physical or personal characteristics are irrelevant in determining a right to some social 
benefit or gain. Thus, this school of thought is likely to propose the use of standard 
measures in order to ensure the same treatment to all people, regardless of outcome.26 
 Accordingly, those who advocate for formal equality, as do libertarians to some 
degree, primarily seek to address status-based discrimination. However, the neutral 
approach to equality, as premised by formal equality and meritocracy, is problematic in 
that it has the potential to perpetuate inequality. Whilst the removal of supposed arbitrary 
distinctions may advance the attainment of equity to some degree, the use of the merit or 
the identical treatment approach to benefits and opportunities — without taking into 
account the actual social and economic differences between people — can intensify the 
inequality between privileged and marginalised groups.27 As observed by Sandra Fredman, 
‘merit is itself a function of previous advantage rather than an objective characteristic’.28  
 At face value, formal equality appears harmless as it advocates for a mere 
consistency of treatment. Thus, a formal understanding of the right to equality therefore 
‘focuses merely on whether two people have been treated in an identical manner by the 
legal rule or by the institution or individual concerned’.29 This understanding suggests that 
any two people are identical in terms of their capabilities, attributes, or intelligence to start 
with. However, this is not so as people are constrained by economic and other factors to 
different degrees.  
 In this respect, some scholars criticise the formal approach to equality as being 
superficial and reinforcing rather than redressing discrimination because it fails to 
recognise underlying patterns of group-based disadvantage characteristic of inequality.30 
Louis Pojman asserts that formal equality gives a sense of ‘pseudo-equality’ that cannot 
                                                          
25 Fredman op cit note 20 at 17. 
26 Saras Jagwanth ‘South Africa: The inequality challenge’ (2000) 15(3) SAR 30 at 31.  
27 De Vos & Freedman op cit note 21 at 422.  
28 Fredman op cit note 20 at 17.  
29 De Vos & Freedman op cit note 21 at 421.  
30 Kentridge op cit note 23 at 14.4.   
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serve as a sufficient principle of justice owing to its lack of content.31 Peter Westen echoes 
similar sentiments in his claim that equality, and to some extent formal equality, is ‘an 
empty vessel with no substantive moral content of its own’.32 Pojman and Westen agree 
that without moral standards or content, equality as an idea is meaningless. If left to 
Westen alone, scholars will completely strip the concept of equality (the formal 
understanding of it at the very least) from legal discourse owing to its supposed ambiguity.  
 The criticisms levelled against the concept of formal equality prove particularly 
true in the South African context. Given the country’s turbulent history of discrimination, 
sole reliance on a formal approach to equality could exacerbate inequality. Formal equality 
is about treating similarly situated people the same, regardless of personal characteristics 
or circumstances. However, because of South Africa’s legacy of inequality and unequal 
distribution of economic and social privileges and opportunities,33 adopting a formal or 
neutral approach to equality can exacerbate the subordination of those who were 
historically disadvantaged and deprived of their human dignity. Undoubtedly, the need for 
equality in this instance requires a formal prohibition against discrimination. However, the 
quest for procedural justice exclusively is not enough because inequality persists in South 
African society despite formal prohibitions against discrimination.  
 The Constitutional Court has rejected the sole reliance on the traditional de jure 
equality due to its emphasis on the principle of same treatment.34  The South African 
equality jurisprudence began to transition from a formal notion to a substantive 
understanding of the equality right in Brink v Kitshoff NO35 and finalised the test, with a 
substantive focus, for determining whether there has been a violation of the right to 
                                                          
31 Louis Pojman ‘Theories of equality: a critical analysis’ (1995) 23(2) Behavior and Philosophy 1 at 4.  
32 Peter Westen ‘The empty idea of equality’ (1982) 95(3) Harvard Law Review 537 at 547.  
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equality in Harksen v Lane NO.36 Brink set precedent for the court’s substantive approach 
to the equality right, and provided the preliminary contextual structure within which the 
equality jurisprudence was to be developed.37 The constitutional adjudication of equality 
disputes since then has followed an impact-based or context-based approach in giving a 
more substantive meaning and interpretation of the right to equality. 38  This is not to 
suggest that the formal conception of equality is without use in understanding and 
interpreting the right to equality. It merely suggests that the right to equality in the South 
African context ‘must guarantee more than equality before the law’.39 
 In a purely egalitarian society, everyone should ideally get the same measure of 
resources, welfare, gratification, good, evil, and so forth. However, this kind of absolute 
fairness is impossible. Similarly, the notion of equal or consistent treatment is untenable as 
there ‘is a difference between treating people equally and treating them as equals’.40 In 
order to attain true equity, equal treatment will need to be tempered with justice.41 
 Unlike the model of formal equality, there is also the view that equality cannot 
simply be about equal treatment or applying existing ‘neutral’ legal rules to people. People 
are neither the same nor do they enjoy identical opportunities or benefits.42Accordingly, a 
substantive approach to equality does not presume a fair social order.43  
 Instead, advocates of substantive equality recognise that there is a connection 
between status (e.g. race, age, gender etc.) and disadvantage, and a need to break the cycle 
of deprivation linked to status.44 They acknowledge that no two people are identical or 
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43 Kentridge op cit note 23 at 14.4. 
44 Fredman op cit note 20 at 15. 
22 
 
enjoy the same opportunities owing to structural or systemic reasons.45 That is to say, they 
support the redressing of systemic and pervasive group-based inequality, not only the 
removal of it.46 In their view, the need is to create distinctions and apply differential 
treatment accordingly in order to achieve equal opportunity.47  
 Thus, substantive equality accommodates the differential treatment of people who 
differ economically and socially.48 Supporters of this doctrine of equality are as concerned 
with outcomes as with treatment, perhaps even more so.49 Thus, the attainment of remedial 
and procedural justice is of equal importance to them. 
 Although specific provisions of South African legislation reflect the principle of 
equal treatment, the equality clause of the Bill of Rights provides for a substantive 
conception of equality. 50  South African equity laws aims for both recognition of 
individuals regardless of cultural and social status (formal equality) and addressing 
economic and social inequality (substantive equality).  
 For instance, the Constitutional Court, when determining adherence to the 
Constitution’s commitment to equality, takes into account the economic, social, and 
political conditions of affected groups and individuals in resolving disputes of direct 
challenges to discriminatory legislation, policies or conducts.51 This focus on context in 
interpreting and applying the right to equality suggests that the adjudication structure goes 
beyond the formal way in which the law treats people or groups.52 The emphasis on a 
contextual analysis — or more specifically the impact of the treatment instead of the 
treatment itself  — in resolving equality disputes is evident in the approach to the 
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Constitutional Court’s equality jurisprudence.53 Undoubtedly, the country’s political past, 
in large part, shapes this substantive understanding of equality in South African equity 
legislation and jurisprudence.54  
 
2.3 Constructing equality in the South African context  
The equality discourse has been in the international arena much longer than in South 
Africa. Even before South Africa re-entered the international fold, the international 
community had long been grappling with the notion. Other nations had instituted and 
endorsed international standards dealing with specific aspects of discrimination, such as 
the core UN human right treaties constituting the International Bill of Human Rights and 
ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 1958. 
 Despite the delay, South Africa has caught up with the international community in 
the equality discourse. The equality rhetoric is a prevailing aspect of contemporary South 
African politics. However, the equality discourse in South Africa contains an interesting 
and unique development. In a 1998 speech, Thabo Mbeki notably argued that South Africa 
comprised ‘two-nations’ divided by poverty and inequality. He elaborated on his ‘two-
nation’ imagery by expressing that: 
[o]ne of these nations is white, relatively prosperous, regardless of gender or 
geographic dispersal. It has ready access to a developed economic, physical, 
educational, communication, and other infrastructure. The second and larger nation 
of South Africa is black and poor, with the worst affected being women in the rural 
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areas, the black rural population in general and the disabled. This nation lives under 
conditions of a grossly underdeveloped economic, physical, educational, 
communication, and other infrastructure. It has virtually no possibility to exercise 
what in reality amounts to a theoretical right to equal opportunity.55  
 
More than a decade and a half later, Mbeki’s observation still resonates. South African 
society is one of the most unequal in the world,56 recording the highest level of income 
inequality.57 On the one hand, South Africa has experienced growth in household income, 
albeit concentrated among groups at the top or high-income levels.58 On the other hand, 
income inequality has steadily increased because of extreme wage disparities within the 
country. Therefore, although income inequality has fallen in rural areas, it has risen in 
urban areas.59 The present juxtaposition of extreme poverty alongside excessive wealth 
adequately captures the idea of the ‘two-nation’ Mbeki was alluding to in 1998. 
  Oxfam cautions that the ‘strong economic growth in South Africa will not stop the 
stop the number of people living in poverty increasing by 2020 unless inequality is brought 
under control’.60 Addressing inequality in South Africa will aid in eradicating poverty, but 
until then, the situation will be dire. Literature suggests that minimal inequity correlates 
with lower crime rates, stronger social cohesion and trust, as well as better population 
health. 61  Given this country’s high crime rates, strong xenophobic and prejudicial 
sentiments coupled with numerous public protests, inequality not only persists, but is 
presumably on the rise. 
 Moreover, a 2011 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
study on global inequalities identified four driving forces of inequality common to 
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emerging economies, including South Africa: labour force (formal-informal) inequalities; 
gaps in education; barriers to employment and career advancement for women; and spatial 
(rural-urban) divides.62 This OECD finding is only a partial extract of the bigger situation. 
The reality is that patterns of complex and multiple forms of inequality permeate the South 
African society. The complexity ensues in the manner in which current inequality 
intertwines with poverty, economic growth, and race. In South Africa, like the United 
States, the phenomenon of inequality has a unique strong racial undertone.  
  In view of that, contemporary analysis of South African law and 
jurisprudence on equality will be incomplete without considering the historical 
developments that precede and shape existing inequality trends. A historical perspective is 
necessary in understanding the contemporary approach to equality discourse since almost 
all existing and emerging inequalities in the country reach back to the past.  
 
2.3.1 Contemporary historical background 
South Africa has always been an unequal society. In order to comprehend fully 
contemporary South Africa’s stance on equality, it is necessary to examine the historical 
context that shapes the discourse. South Africa’s history of inequality can be traced as far 
back as the colonial period, with the arrival of the first Europeans in the 1600s. Whilst a 
comprehensive account of 350 years of history is beyond the scope of this chapter, an 
attempt will be made to paint, in broad strokes, the historical developments leading up to 
the democratic dispensation and the adoption of existing equity laws. 
 The year 1948 is a good starting point to give a contemporary historical account of 
a complex equality debate. By 1948, the country had survived a great internal struggle for 
dominance (Anglo-Boer or South African war of 1899-1902),63 two World Wars, and its 
first attempt at a unitary state (i.e. the unification of South Africa in 1910).64 Moreover, by 
1948, the formulation of apartheid as an ideology was fully-fledged. Thus, by this period, 
the National Party was in power and began the process of collating and formulating all pre-
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existing racial policies into relatively coherent and comprehensive segregation policies 
under the social and economic engineering project christened ‘apartheid’.65  
 The British imperialists instituted a range of policies intended to gain control of 
South Africa during their control of the Cape.66 The Glen Grey Act of 1894, the Natives 
Land Act 27 of 1913, the Native Affairs Act 23 of 1920, the Native Urban Areas Act 21 of 
1923, the Native Administration Act 38 of 1927 and to some extent the 1936 legislation on 
land and franchise were some of the foundational repressive and ineffective laws initiated 
under the unitary parliament of the British rule.67 These policies may have been mere 
attempts at racial segregation. However, they laid the basis for the evolution for many 
contentious racial policies that would have ramifications to date.  
 Undoubtedly, apartheid played a role in institutionalising racial inequality and the 
disempowerment and large-scale marginalisation of the black population. However, the 
apartheid government cannot be blamed for single-handedly creating all the current social 
inequalities. Evidence suggests that the National Party successfully managed to bring 
racial segregation more comprehensively on to the statute book; a feat the pre-apartheid 
government tried but failed to achieve.68 Apartheid did not happen in isolation; it was an 
extension of colonial conquest and settlement.69 
 As such, apartheid was more than a reiteration of the imperialists’ rhetoric. It was 
an ideology and a system of legally enforceable rules that systematically discriminated 
against black South Africans in all spheres of social and economic activity.70 It sought to 
disenfranchise black South Africans through a series of rules that crudely reserved all 
power to the white population.71  
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 Myriads of successful statutory racial policies helped attain and maintain this grand 
system over time. Instigation of anti-miscegenation laws like the Population Registration 
Act 30 of 1950 succeeded in categorising all citizens into specific statutory racial groups, 
whilst the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949 coupled with the Immorality 
Amendment Act 21 of 1950 criminalised all interracial conjugal and sexual relationships.72 
The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 49 of 1953 eliminated all integrated public 
facilities from public transport to benches to the use of the beach. The Bantu Education 
Act 47 of 1953 racially segregated all educational institutions (schools and universities), 
limiting the level of knowledge and skills transferred to black people simultaneously.73 
The Group Areas Act 41 of 1950, a protraction of the British’s Natives Land Act 27 of 
1913 and Native Urban Areas Act 21 of 1923, created a comprehensive urban residential 
segregation.74 Like its precursors, the Groups Area Act was a restrictive land-tenure policy 
that regulated the ownership and occupation of land to specific statutory groups.  
 On the labour front, the National Party institutionalised discrimination by means of 
laws such as the Group Areas Act and the Native Laws Amendment Act 54 of 1952. 
Together, the two laws worked to establish a dual system of strict influx control of the 
migrant labour and pass systems that curtailed the movement of black people into cities for 
economic purposes.75 Consequently, the law designated non-whites (mainly black people) 
into ‘homelands’, and required them to carry and present ‘pass books’ before entering 
urban areas for employment. The Group Areas Act particularly restricted the mobility of 
black female work seekers.76 Moreover, the Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956 and the 
Mines and Works Act 27 of 1956 excluded black people from collective bargaining and 
reserved jobs for white people respectively.77 This translated into the refusal for black 
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people to hold any skilled or even semi-skilled employment, and the simultaneous 
protection of the economic privilege whites enjoyed in the labour market.78 Finally, the 
Wage Act 5 of 1957 and the Unemployment Insurance Act 30 of 1966 allowed for 
variations in wage determinations based on race and sex, and unequal benefits for men and 
women respectively.79 
 However, the marginalisation and exploitation of black workers by means of 
legislation existed even before its salience by the apartheid state. History suggests that the 
undermining of black workers (and their organisations) started as far back as the 1920s. 
This is evident in legislation on industrial bargaining containing racially discriminatory 
provisions intended to control black workers in the interests of the dominant classes.80 The 
Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924 was the first legislative attempt by the imperialist 
government to establish an ‘industrial relations’ system that institutionalised the power of 
white workers.81 The 1924 Act and its successors (i.e. Industrial Conciliation Act 36 of 
1937 and Industrial Conciliation (Labour Relations) Act 28 of 1956) excluded black 
people from the definition of employee and as a result from its ambit. 82  Thus, the 
imperialist government were the first to initiate racial divide in employment; the National 
Party fostered, reinforced and formalised it into a complete statute.  
 These draconian policies ensured that the majority of the population (mostly black 
people) were dispossessed of their land, relegated to low-quality public education and 
healthcare, restricted from opportunities for employment, and physically confined to the 
most impoverished parts of the countryside and cities, whilst the white minority benefited. 
The apartheid regime not only discriminated against black people by denying them the 
same opportunity to amass any form of capital (be it income, education, land, skills or 
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social networks), it brought about most of the poverty and income inequality existing 
today. Briefly, the apartheid system was extremely unequal, uneven, and unjust.83  
 The policy of exclusion that had dominated the apartheid era began to crumble by 
the mid-1970s. A series of events made it intolerable for the white government to continue 
to govern the country in the old manner, ultimately collapsing the apartheid structure. 
There was a great deal of resistance by the oppressed majority from the mid-1970s to the 
early 1990s. In the labour arena, a gradual move towards equality began near the end of 
the 1970s with the Wiehahn Commission. The result of the Commission’s inquiry into 
labour legislation led to the revision of the Industrial Conciliation Act to include ‘unfair 
labour practice’ provision and the subsequent establishment of the Industrial Court as a 
court of equity and fairness. 84  Van Niekerk contends that the justification for the 
enactment of the unfair labour practice doctrine in 1979 was far from noble — the 
legislature intended for it to maintain racial privilege by protecting the interests of white 
workers who risked losing the statutory protection that job reservation afforded them.85  
 The lifting of the ban on all prohibited organisations, including the African 
National Congress (ANC), and the release of political prisoners in 1990 initiated a lengthy 
process of political negotiation towards the creation of a democratic society premised on 
equality for all.86 Shortly after then State President FW de Klerk’s announcements, formal 
negotiations commenced with the convening of the Convention for a Democratic South 
Africa (CODESA).87 The negotiation process appeared to be making headway when the 
key parties (the ANC and the National Party government) settled on important details 
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about the constitutional structure of the post-apartheid state, with a whites-only 
referendum in support of continuing on the negotiations path.88  
 Some of the initial settlements were a unitary South Africa (with the reintegration 
of the ‘independent’ and self-governing black states) run by a multi-party democracy, and 
a constitution with an entrenched bill of rights to be adjudicated by a constitutional court.89 
However, the CODESA process collapsed as negotiations broke down over several 
contentious issues, chief of which centred on which body would draft the new 
Constitution.90  
 In order for the negotiations to resume, the government had to make concessions. 
The ANC conceded to a five-year period of executive power sharing with the National 
Party government after the first democratic elections91 and the National Party agreed to the 
adoption of a negotiated interim constitution.92 Negotiations resumed and so did the steady 
transition from apartheid to democracy. The year 1994 was a momentous time for South 
Africa for many reasons. The democratic election of Nelson Mandela ushered in political 
transformation and an end to almost five decades of government-mandated separatism, 
racism and high levels of intolerance. 93  Prior to this democratic election, government 
approved the interim Constitution and established the Constitutional Court to give effect to 
the supremacy of the Constitution and its Bill of Rights.94 The interim Constitution began 
the legal revolution.95 
 The varied oppressive and economically inequitable laws passed during the reign 
of the National Party influenced and shaped contemporary anti-discrimination policies in 
South Africa. Thus, current equality policies seemingly developed as a way to contest the 
negative differential treatment accorded to the black majority in this era of white 
supremacy. Whilst this assertion may be true, in large part, race relations prior to this 
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period were far from amicable. Policies from the decades preceding apartheid (i.e. prior to 
1948) entailed many elements of segregationism.96 
 Years of struggle and negotiation were over and revolutionary changes to legal 
system were under way.97 The ANC government introduced a wide range of legislative 
programmes intended to address the legacy of apartheid and create a non-racial society.98 
The adoption of the final Constitution 99  and specific anti-discrimination legislation 
completed the process of attempts at weakening the institutionalised inequality established 
by the apartheid regime. 100  All of these policies tackle the legacy of systematic 
discrimination and seek to correct demographic imbalances embedded in the South African 
society.101  
 Yet, two decades after democracy, there is still a need to redress past inequalities 
among previously disadvantaged groups as South Africa still suffers from wide disparities 
in income, employment and living standards.102 Post-apartheid South Africa still has a long 
way to go if it is to fully ‘heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights….’103  
 
2.3.2 Contemporary statutory approaches to equality  
The legal dispensation of contemporary South Africa addresses the issue of discrimination 
holistically through the Constitution (with its Bill of Rights) and specific anti-
discrimination statutes.104 In light of South Africa’s troubled past, it is unsurprising that 
equality plays a foundational role in the existing constitutional order. The enactment of the 
final Constitution and other anti-discrimination laws is perhaps the first act of commitment 
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by post-apartheid South Africa towards addressing the severe inequalities and 
discrimination inherited from the apartheid era. This section explores constitutional and 
legislative provisions promoting equality in a democratic South Africa. 
 
(a) Constitutional provisions 
The comprehensive piece of legislation that is the Constitution is crucial in South Africa’s 
equality discourse. It contains a strong commitment to addressing inequality in the country 
due to the pre-eminence given to non-racialism, non-sexism, equality, and non-
discrimination throughout its content.105 Like its precursor (the interim Constitution), the 
Constitution embraces a substantive approach to equality.106 It emphasises equality as one 
of its foundational values.107  
 Chapter 2 of the Constitution, commonly known as the Bill of Rights, specifically 
spells out democratic rights of human dignity, equality, and freedom.108 In addition, the 
Constitution compels the State to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the rights accorded 
in the Bill of Rights.109 Moreover, it provides a legal framework to address some of the 
unfairness prevalent in South African society.110  
 Section 9 of the Constitution, the equality clause, enshrines the right to equality and 
non-discrimination by providing substantive protection against unfair discrimination. 
Subsection 1 entrenches the principal equality guarantees to all persons. It explicitly states 
that ‘[e]veryone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of 
the law’. The Constitutional Court has interpreted this section to mean that everyone is 
entitled, ‘at the very least, to equal treatment by South African courts of law’, and that 
nobody should be ‘above or beneath the law and that all people are subject to law 
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impartially applied and administered’.111 Thus, this aspect of the right to equality, i.e. s 
9(1), promotes ‘difference blind’ equality.112  
 Subsection (2) on the other hand takes into consideration differences, as it offers 
opportunity for the attainment of remedial equality (redress) by permitting the state to 
institute positive equality measures. 113  The Constitution prohibits all forms of unfair 
discrimination; subsection (3) promises protection against unfair discrimination by 
prohibiting the use of arbitrary classifications in the allocation or enjoyment of benefits.114 
 Finally, subsections (4) and (5) of the equality provision unambiguously prohibit 
the use of direct or indirect discrimination by the State and individuals on certain listed 
grounds.115 Section 9(4) explicitly provides that national legislation must be enacted to 
prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
The right to equality provided for in s 9 of the Constitution is similar to those 
previously provided for in s 8 of the interim Constitution. It is worth noting that the 
Constitutional Court has developed three different legal tests that apply respectively to s 
9(1), 9(2) and 9(3). Section 2.4 of this chapter provides a detailed discussion of the general 
jurisprudential approach to each of these provisions, as developed by the Constitutional 
Court.  
 The constitutional equality provisions have been heavily scrutinised. The Bill of 
Rights has been pivotal in almost all constitutional equality claims dealt with in South 
African case law.116 However, in order to avoid creating dual systems of jurisprudence 
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under the Constitution and under legislation, the Constitutional Court has affirmed a 
principle that ‘where legislation is enacted to give effect to a constitutional right, a litigant 
may not bypass that legislation and rely directly on the Constitution without challenging 
that legislation as falling short of the constitutional standard’.117 This is the principle of 
avoidance or subsidiarity.118  
 This indirect approach in constitutional interpretation and adjudication requires the 
courts, as a first attempt, to interpret a statutory provision in accordance with the 
underlying values of the Bill of Rights, before testing it against a specific provision of the 
Bill of Rights.119  Thus, in relation to the current discussion, a court must interpret a 
legislation enacted to give effect to s 9 in light of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence 
on section 9.120  
 
(b) Other statutory provisions 
Aside from constitutional provisions, the government has propagated a variety of specific 
anti-discrimination legislation to address current forms of discrimination and inequality in 
employment and the broader South African society in general. 
In the employment context, South Africa labour law examines the notion of 
equality in the labour arena. Although the constitutional right to equality 
fundamentally influences equality in employment law, two specific statutes provide 
for anti-discrimination measures in labour law; namely the Labour Relations Act 
66 of 1995 (LRA) and the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (the EEA). 
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120 Ibid at 429.  
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 The LRA was the foremost piece of workplace legislation enacted by the 
democratic parliament. The primary purpose of the LRA, among other things, is to 
‘advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of 
the [South African] workplace’.121 One of the ways the Act fulfils its objectives is through 
the regulation of the employment relationship generally and the promotion of fair labour 
practices,122 particularly in relation to dismissals,123 as well as trade union organisation and 
membership.124  The ‘unfair labour practice’ provision contained in the LRA played a 
central role in the employment equity jurisprudence, albeit only a small part of the 
jurisprudence related to anti-discrimination or equality issues.125 
 Additionally, the legislature enacted the EEA to give effect to the provisions on the 
right to equality in section 9, primarily s 9(5), of the Constitution.126 As a mechanism for 
addressing the legacy of the apartheid colour bar, which excluded black people from jobs 
above a basic level,127 the EEA aims to ensure the equitable representation of individuals, 
particularly black people, in all employment categories and levels in the workplace.128 
However, it regulates equality and anti-discrimination solely in the employment context. 
Thus, unlike the broader constitutional context, the EEA contains comprehensive 
                                                          
121 Section 1 of the LRA.  
122 Section 185 (substituted by s 40 of Act 12 of 2002) guarantees to every employee the right not to be 
subjected to unfair labour practice. Unfair labour practice include, but not limited to, any unfair conduct or 
omission relating to promotion, demotion, probation, training, benefits, suspension and disciplinary action. 
123 According to s 187(1)(f), in dismissing an employee, the employer may not unfairly discriminate against 
the employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including race, gender, sex, ethnic or social 
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, 
language, marital status or family responsibility. A dismissal based on any of these grounds or any arbitrary 
ground is automatically unfair. 
124 Section 95(6) prohibit a trade union from including in its constitution any provision that discriminates 
directly or indirectly against any person on the grounds of race or sex. 
125 Carole Cooper ‘The boundaries of equality in labour law’ (2004) 25 ILJ 813 at 815.  
126 I M Rautenbach & Elmarie Fourie ‘The Constitution and recent amendments to the definition of unfair 
discrimination and the burden of proof in unfair discrimination disputes in the Employment Equity Act’ 2016 
TSAR 110.   
127 Terreblanche op cit note 69 at 47.  
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provisions intended to eliminate unfair discrimination and promote equality in post-
apartheid South African workplaces.129 As a tool for achieving equity in the workplace, it 
pursues a substantive notion of equality by prohibiting unfair discrimination, as well as 
promoting positive measures or affirmative action to achieve workplace equity.130  
 For the most part, chapters II (ss 5-11) and III (ss 12-27) — the prohibition of 
unfair discrimination and affirmative action — form the cornerstones of the EEA. More 
importantly, the provisions on the right to equality or non-discrimination in employment 
— Chapter II or ss 5 and 6 of the EEA — are noteworthy or relevant for reference 
purposes in this discussion. Section 5 actively calls on employers to promote equal 
opportunity by eliminating unfair discrimination in any employment policies or practices. 
Similarly, s 6, particularly subsection 1, prohibits unfair discrimination against employees, 
directly or indirectly, in any employment policy or practice.131 
 The expressed aims of the EEA are not as problematic as the manner in which one 
goes about achieving them.132 As such, the interpretation of the EEA, and to some extent 
the implementation thereof, has raised some controversy. The debate lies with the 
interpretation of the concept of ‘unfair discrimination’ in the employment discrimination 
jurisprudence. Since the Constitutional Court’s formulation of a systematic test for 
determining the constitutionality of differential treatment in Harksen v Lane NO and 
Others (discussed below),133 many judgments dealing with s 6 of the EEA often heavily 
rely on the interpretations of s 9 of the Constitution.134 
 Some scholars find the superimposition of the Harksen test into the employment 
discrimination discourse inevitable. Cooper asserts that the ‘absence of the term 'arbitrary' 
in the EEA's s 6(1) and the Act's reference to the equality provision now place it beyond 
                                                          
129 Basson et al Essential labour law 4th combined edition (2005) 201.  
130 Cooper op cit note 125 at 821. Also see s 2 of the EEA.  
131 Section 6 of the EEA replaced item 2(1)(a) of schedule 7 of the LRA. Before s 6 of the EEA, unfair 
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doubt that labour law should follow the constitutional approach.’135 Perhaps in reaction to 
criticisms such as Cooper’s, a current amendment to s 6(1) of the EEA includes the phrase 
‘or on any other arbitrary ground’.136 Section 6(1) now reads: 
No person may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against an employee, in 
any employment policy or practice, on one or more grounds, including race, gender, 
sex, pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, belief, political 
opinion, culture, language, birth or any other arbitrary ground (emphasis added). 
 
However, other scholars argue that the insertion of the phrase ‘arbitrary ground’ in the 
amended s 6(1) is confusing and perhaps superfluous. According to Rautenbach and 
Fourie, even without the inclusion of ‘or on any other arbitrary ground’ in the amendment, 
‘the legislature’s use of the word ‘including’ meant that the list of grounds expressly 
referred to in section 6 was not a closed list’.137 This is evident from the various cases 
where the courts considered applications based on unlisted grounds.138 The explanatory 
memorandum suggests that the reason for the amendment is either to clarify that the 
prohibition covers both expressly listed grounds and analogous grounds, or to harmonise it 
with the formulation in s 187(1)(f) of the LRA.139 Whatever the reason, it is obvious that 
the test for unfair discrimination in employment law is similar to that of the constitutional 
approach in Harksen.140 The Constitutional Court has said as much.141  
 On the other hand, some scholars find this transplantation inappropriate, since it 
allows judges to revert to case law dealing with the interpretation of the right to equality 
                                                          
135 Cooper op cit note 125 at 825.  
136 Section 3(a) of the Employment Equity Amendment Act, Act 47 of 2013. 
137 Rautenbach & Fourie op cit note 126 at 117. 
138 For instance, the courts have considered, among others, applications based on citizenship (Larbi-Odam v 
Member of the Executive Council for Education (North-West Province) 1998 (1) SA 1 (CC)); HIV status 
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rather than the EEA. 142  Granted, the prohibition of unfair discrimination provision 
contained in s 6 of the EEA builds on the fundamental protection against unfair 
discrimination enshrined in s 9(3) of the Constitution,143 yet to assume the provisions are 
identical is erroneous. The EEA regulates discrimination in employment and as such all 
work-related unfair discrimination disputes should be interpreted in terms of the EEA, not 
the Constitution. To do otherwise would not only be bypassing a specific legislation 
promulgated to regulate a constitutional right, it would confuse an important part of its 
meaning.144  
 The supposed controversy that arises when adjudicators inappropriately transplant 
constitutional interpretation into the EEA plays itself out in a Constitutional Court’s 
decision on race and equity at the workplace. In South African Police Service v Solidarity 
obo Barnard, 145  the Constitutional Court had to rule on whether the decision of the 
National Commissioner of the Police Service not promoting an employee to the position of 
superintendent on the grounds of her race constituted unfair discrimination.  
 In 2005, the National Commissioner advertised a position for the rank of 
superintendent, to which Captain Renate M Barnard (Ms Barnard) applied twice. On both 
occasions, she was shortlisted, interviewed and recommended as the best candidate. 
However, the National Commissioner failed to appoint her to the position on each 
occasion because her appointment would not enhance racial diversity at that salary level. 
Ms Barnard approached the Labour Court for an order declaring unfair discrimination on 
the ground of race contrary to section 6(1) of the EEA.  
 At the Constitutional Court, the court, albeit via four judgments, unanimously held 
that the decision of the National Commissioner not to appoint Barnard on the grounds of 
her race was fair in terms of s 9(2) of the Constitution and s 6(2) of the EEA. 146 
Incidentally, one of the reasons the Constitutional Court upheld the appeal was that the 
                                                          
142 Darcy du Toit ‘The prohibition of unfair discrimination: Applying s 3(d) of the Employment Equity Act 
55 of 1998’ in Dupper and Garbers (eds) Equality in the workplace (2009) 151; Du Toit ‘Protection against 
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Supreme Court of Appeal erred in employing the Harksen analysis of unfair 
discrimination, instead of approaching it through the prism of s 9(2) of the Constitution 
and s 6(2) of the EEA; 147 thus the lower court based its appeal decision on the wrong 
principle. 148  Some commentators have argued that the court missed an important 
opportunity to develop the interpretation of the EEA within the framework of the 
Constitution, especially s 9.149 
 Du Toit argues, perhaps not directly connected to the Barnard case but not entirely 
unrelated, that the meaning of unfair discrimination contained in the EEA should be 
understood in context of ‘the substantive meaning of ‘discrimination’ on prohibited 
grounds as contemplated by Convention 111’. 150  Thus, ILO Convention 111 should 
equally serve as an interpretative guide to the EEA as far as employment discrimination is 
concerned, not just the Constitutional Court’s Harksen test, or the Constitution generally. 
 He further argues that ‘the broad manner in which the Constitution frames the 
prohibition of unfair discrimination allows for considerably more scope for interpretation 
than the more precise meaning that the EEA, construed in accordance with s 3(d) seeks to 
give’.151 Accordingly, he warns that disregarding s 3(d) could potentially create scope for 
employers to discriminate against employees.152 Still others have criticised the EEA as 
having benefited only ‘the aspirant African petit bourgeois’, who have jobs and belong to 
trade unions.153 
 Outside of the employment context, parliament has enacted the Promotion of 
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (PEPUDA) to fulfil s 9(4) 
of the Constitution. It aims to promote equality, non-racism, and non-sexism by preventing 
and eliminating unfair discrimination, harassment, and hate speech generally. The 
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government envisaged it as a large-scale redistributive programme to effect societal 
transformation.154 Like all of the anti-discrimination legislation in the country, it embraces 
a substantive notion of equality.155 However, unlike similar laws, it has a broader scope of 
application as it applies to those workers precluded from the EEA. Moreover, unlike other 
anti-discrimination legislation, it contains an open list of ‘prohibited grounds’ and a test 
for identifying ‘prohibited grounds’ not explicitly listed in the Act,156 as well as a general 
test for ‘fairness or unfairness’.157  
 These features of the PEPUDA mirror that of s 9(3) of the Constitution and 
consequently the s 9 jurisprudence. PEPUDA also establishes Equality Courts to develop 
in more contextual detail what constitutes fairness or unfairness on a case-by-case basis.158 
These courts are lower level courts so they are more accessible and cheaper alternatives to 
the High Courts. Given the socio-economic and institutional obstacles experienced by 
disadvantaged groups in accessing legal assistance, 159  the Act requires no legal 
representation.160 
 Despite constitutional and legislative provisions promoting equality in South 
African society, inequality still prevails. Therefore, it is asserted that the realisation of 
equality goes beyond simply repealing past discriminatory laws or attempting to curtail 
discriminatory practices and customs by judicial decision.161  
 
2.4 The South African Constitutional Court’s equality jurisprudence 
The South African judicial system has greatly advanced equality discourses in the country. 
South African courts have had a hand in addressing some of the complex and systemic 
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forms of discrimination and inequalities inherited from the apartheid era by means of 
adjudicating equality claims.162  The Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence regarding the 
right to equality is significant in this regard. Note, however, that much of the 
Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence deals with s 8 of the interim Constitution. 163 
Nonetheless, since the formulation of the right to equality in both s 8 of the interim 
constitution and s 9 of the Constitution are relatively similar, so any interpretations of s 8 
apply to s 9.164 
 The South African equality jurisprudence focuses largely on the concept of unfair 
discrimination as it manifests in legal provisions that exclude certain groups.165 Litigation 
that invokes the equality clause dealt with by the Constitutional Court thus far have usually 
focused on the interpretation, protection, and enforcement of the unfair discrimination 
prohibition of the equality provision in the Constitution.  
 However, the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence regarding the right to equality (s 
9) has yielded three different legal tests that apply to three distinct situations in which a 
litigant can lodge an equality complaint. The three legal tests relate to ss 9(1), 9(2), and 
9(3) respectively. Therefore, when attacking the constitutionality of a legislative provision, 
the litigant faces the task of deciding which of the three subsections to base his or her 
attack on. The subsequent discussions examine each of the three situations and the 
corresponding legal tests in turn.  
 
2.4.1 Section 9(1) analysis: mere differentiation 
The Constitutional Court, in its early equality jurisprudence, has established an analysis of 
the equality clause encompassing two separate inquiries constituted of three separate 
analyses.166 Different legal provisions are relied on for each of the analyses, and each 
applies in different cases or situations.  
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 The first of these inquiries relates to instances where a differentiation amounts to 
mere differentiation. In this scenario, a legislative provision or executive conduct may 
differentiate between people or groups of people, but the distinction is neither directly nor 
indirectly based on the grounds listed in or similar to those listed in s 9(3) of the 
Constitution. In this respect, the distinction constitutes mere differentiation and is not 
necessarily discriminatory or unfair.  
 The general idea behind the court distinguishing between mere differentiation and 
other adverse forms of differentiation is that not all forms or cases of differentiation will be 
constitutionally problematic. If that was not so there would be a flood of litigation as some 
people will indeed challenge every conceivable form of differentiation. This could 
potentially create a situation where the courts would be required to review nearly all 
legislative measures. In in Prinsloo v Van der Linde and Another,167 the Constitutional 
Court explicated that: 
In order to govern a modern country efficiently and to harmonise the interests of all 
its people for the common good, it is essential to regulate the affairs of its 
inhabitants extensively. It is impossible to do so without differentiation and without 
classifications which treat people differently and which impact on people 
differently.168 
 
In this respect, the court has distinguished between two types of differentiation: 
differentiation involving unfair discrimination and differentiation without unfair 
discrimination.169 The latter constitutes mere differentiation. This suggests that some level 
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of the provisions of s 84 of the Forest Act 122 of 1984. Section 84 stipulates that ‘when in any action by 
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until the contrary is proved’. The main issue of contention raised was that the form of reverse onus 
embedded in s 84 of the Forestry Act breached the equality promise in terms of s 8 of the interim 
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of differentiation or distinction between individuals or groups of people is expected in any 
given democracy, particularly one as diverse as South Africa.  
 In fact, people are prone to make numerous distinctions between individuals or 
groups of people in their daily interactions that may have no serious or adverse effects.170 
Therefore, the law allows for the state or private individuals and institutions to make some 
forms of differentiation or distinction, provided the differentiation is relatively benign. 
That is, they do not involve unfair discrimination, i.e. should not be based on the grounds 
or similar to those identified in s 9(3) of the Constitution.  
 Cases or situations where legislative provision constitutes mere differentiation are 
dealt with in terms of s 9(1) of the Constitution. To reiterate, s 9(1) has been interpreted by 
the court to mean that everyone is entitled, ‘at the very least, to equal treatment by South 
African courts of law’, and that nobody should be ‘above or beneath the law and that all 
people are subject to law impartially applied and administered’.171 In terms of s 9(1), 
therefore, differentiation not involving unfair discrimination is simply a ‘mere 
differentiation’, nothing more. It is this analysis of differentiation that lends support to the 
court’s adoption of substantive equality.172 
 Moreover, part of the s 9(1) analysis involves a strict rationality enquiry or test into 
the differentiation between individuals or groups of people. A rationality standard requires 
that any distinction made between people or groups of people is neither arbitrary nor 
irrational, but serves a legitimate purpose. More explicitly, the state or other relevant third 
parties ‘should not regulate in an arbitrary manner or manifest ‘naked preferences’ that 
serve no legitimate governmental purpose’.173  
 However, the differentiation infringes s 9(1) if it is illegitimate, i.e. there is no 
rational relationship between the differentiation in question and the purpose given to 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Davies are of the view that the equality inquiry employed was deemed too complex and inappropriate to the 
kind of issue the case triggered. 
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justify it.174 In a rationality enquiry, the court is required ‘to identify and examine the 
specific government object sought to be achieved by the impugned rule of law or 
provision’.175 However, the court is not required to enquire into the availability of other 
methods or the efficiency of the chosen method.176 In this regard, rationality serves an 
accountability and justification function.177 Note, however, that reliance on the rationality 
enquiry of s 9(1) has decreased since the court’s formulation of a general ‘rule of law 
rationality’ test based on s 1 of the Constitution.178 
 In summation, the notion of differentiation is central to South Africa’s equality 
jurisprudence generally and to the s 9(1) analysis specifically. 179  In certain situations 
distinctions made between individuals or groups of people are nothing more than mere 
differentiation. In those cases, the constitutional attack based on s 9(1) will likely fail if a 
litigant is unable to show that the differentiation in question was arbitrary or irrational. In 
any event, before a court rules on the validity of the differentiation, it will first evaluate the 
basis for the differentiation to determine the legitimacy of the purpose of the distinction. 
The court will then consider if there is a rational relation between the differentiation and 
the purpose.  
 
2.4.2 Section 9(2) analysis: remedial measures (affirmative action) 
At times differentiation amounts to mere differentiation, with no adverse effects on the 
people being differentiated. In other times, differentiation is applied with an express aim of 
protecting or advancing previously disadvantaged individuals or groups of people.180 The 
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latter scenario is the second situation in which a litigant can lodge an equality complaint. 
In this instance, a policy or certain provisions of a law may mandate differential treatment 
as a way of advancing restitution or redress. That is, a legislative provision or an executive 
conduct may require the state or private institutions to implement redress measures or 
affirmative action policies or programmes.  
 Affirmative action by design advocates for the preferential treatment for some 
people (typically members of a previously disadvantaged group) over others in the 
distribution of some benefit.181 In the South African context, the bases for the preference 
are predominantly race and gender, but disability is increasingly becoming a factor.182 
 In this regard, the precedent-setting case of Minister of Finance v Van Heerden183 
offers the best illustration for a jurisprudential analysis on the remedial equality mandated 
by s 9(2). The case involved an application for leave to appeal from an order of the Cape 
High Court declaring Rule 4.2.1 of the Political office-Bearers Pension Fund 
discriminatory and constitutionally invalid. Rule 4.2.1 of the pension scheme seemingly 
provided for differentiated employer contributions in respect to Members of Parliament 
(MPs) who joined pre-1994 and those who joined post-1994. Thus, the scheme provided 
post-1994 MPs with more pension benefits for a period of five years, but not to those MPs 
who joined pre-1994 and continued to serve after 1994.184  
 At the High Court, the respondent alleged that the differentiation made by Rule 
4.2.1 was arbitrary, irrational, unfairly discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional. It 
suffices to say that the High Court found in favour of the respondent. However, the 
Constitutional Court unanimously granted leave to appeal. At the Constitutional Court, the 
court explored the constitutional understanding of remedial or restitutionary equality, 
cementing its stance on measures designed to promote or shield previously disadvantaged 
people. 
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 In the event of a constitutional challenge to a restitutionary measure or provision 
(even based on any of the grounds listed in s 9(3),185 as in the case of Van Heerden), the 
impugned measure or provision is first tested under s 9(2) of the Constitution.186 If the 
impugned measure or provision passes muster under s 9(2), then it is constitutionally valid 
and the enquiry ends there.187 However, if the court finds that the disputed measure or 
provision does not comply with the internal test set by s 9(2), i.e. is unconstitutional, then 
the court can further test its constitutionality against s 9(3) of the Constitution.188  
 Since s 9(2) of the Constitution is the first legal provision relied on in cases where 
legislative provision introduces affirmative action, it is necessary to elucidate on the 
section in a little more detail. Section 9(2) expressly states: 
Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To 
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to 
protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination may be taken. 
 
Section 9(2) is an important legal provision not only because it allows for constitutionally 
permissible affirmative action measures; it also encapsulates the notion of substantive 
equality previously discussed. In Van Heerden, the Constitutional Court validated the 
positive measures mandated by s 9(2) when it stated that ‘our Constitution heralds not only 
equal protection of the law and non-discrimination but also the start of a credible and 
abiding process of reparation for past exclusion, dispossession, and indignity within the 
discipline of our constitutional framework’.189 
 Moreover, the importance of s 9(2) is apparent within the broader historical context 
of South Africa. It has been established in this chapter and elsewhere in the research that 
contemporary South Africa is a product of a discriminatory past. The social engineering 
that took place under colonialism and apartheid created a grossly unequal society, with 
black South Africans faring the worse. Decades after democracy and the dismantling of 
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apartheid, deep divisions along racial lines and uneven distribution of resources and 
privileges still persists.  
 There is still work to be done to correct the imbalances of the past, to place 
everyone on an equal playing field. If we accept this premise then we accept that remedial 
measures (s 9(2)) are a means to achieve substantive equality,190 not a form of reverse or 
positive discrimination as some people argue. This premise views affirmative action as a 
composite part of the right to equality, not an exception to it.191  
 As the Constitutional Court put it in Van Heerden, the South African equality 
jurisprudence, unlike the United States, views remedial measures as ‘integral to the reach 
of our equality protection’, and not as ‘deviation from, or invasive of, the right to equality 
guaranteed by the Constitution’. 192  Therefore, remedial equality is neither ‘reverse 
discrimination’ nor ‘positive discrimination’ as some people would argue.193 
 The legal test for remedial measures in terms of s 9(2) practically rests on three 
separate but related questions: 
 Do the measures target persons or categories of persons who have been 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination? 
 Are the measures designed to protect or advance such persons or categories 
of persons? 
 Do the measures promote the achievement of equality in the long term? 
Accordingly, when someone challenges a remedial measure as violating the right to 
equality, the defender must first show that the impugned measure targets persons or 
categories of persons who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.194 The state 
or the institution liable for the affirmative action must prove that it targeted the right 
beneficiaries or the undeserving group will unduly benefit from the measure.195 However, 
in Van Heerden the court was split on this first requirement for a valid restitutionary 
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measure. On the one hand, the majority judgment found that the remedial measure of the 
pension scheme in issue did indeed target the right group, in this case black MPs legally 
excluded from parliamentary participation prior to 1994.196  
 The minority judgment of Mokgoro J, on the other hand, disagreed on the precision 
in defining a targeted class. 197  She contested that based on the facts of the case an 
overwhelming majority of the beneficiaries were undeserving or not eligible for 
affirmative action.198 This meant that the measure in issue could not pass the first yardstick 
of the internal test in s 9(2). Dissenting views aside, the court acknowledged the difficulty 
in precisely defining the targeted class for affirmative action. In fact, it is expected that 
‘within each class, favoured or otherwise, there may indeed be exceptional or “hard cases” 
or windfall beneficiaries’.199 The important factor is that an ‘overwhelming majority of 
members of the favoured class are persons designated as disadvantaged by unfair 
exclusion’.200 
 The second requirement for a valid affirmative action measure is that it be designed 
to protect or advance those disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.201 The premise is that 
affirmative action is ‘justified by its consequences’ and should therefore be directed at a 
desired future consequence.202 The desired future consequence could be an equal society or 
advancing the interests of previously disadvantaged groups. Thus, a court requires the 
defender of the programme to show that the measure in issue is designed to or intended to 
achieve ‘an envisaged future outcome’ or, at the very least, is reasonably likely to achieve 
the desired end goal.203 However, a defendant is not required to show that the measure is 
necessary to achieve or will definitely achieve the intended goals, and/or a ‘necessity to 
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disfavour one class in order to uplift another’.204 Therefore, a litigant attacking the measure 
must convince the court that the measure is not reasonably capable of achieving the stated 
goals, or is ‘arbitrary, capricious or displays naked preference’.205 
 The third and final requirement in determining a valid affirmative action hinges on 
whether the measure promotes the achievement of equality in the end. According to De 
Vos and Freedman,206 this last requirement is perhaps the most difficult and complex to 
deal with since it requires a court to make a value judgment. Nonetheless, it is a key step in 
determining the constitutionality of an affirmative action measure, i.e. whether it conforms 
to s 9(2). 207  This third requirement of the test necessitates a balancing of differing 
interests,208 or ‘an appreciation of the effect of the measure in the context of our broader 
society’.209  
 A court will need to consider, among other things, both the interests of those who 
suffered and may continue to suffer from the effects of past or ongoing unfair 
discrimination, and those who benefitted or continue to benefit from past unfair 
discrimination.210 In order to make this value judgment and achieve an appropriate balance 
of these interests, a contextual analysis (both historical and contemporary circumstances) 
is necessary. Sachs J in Van Heerden, in his concurring judgment, explicates it succinctly 
as follows: 
Courts must be reluctant to interfere with such measures, and exercise due restraint 
when tempted to interpose themselves as arbiters as to whether the measure could 
have been proceeded with in a better or less onerous way. At the same time, if the 
measure at issue is manifestly overbalanced in ignoring or trampling on the interests 
of members of the advantaged section of the community, and gratuitously and 
flagrantly imposes disproportionate burdens on them, the courts have a duty to 
interfere. Given our historical circumstances and the massive inequalities that plague 
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our society, the balance when determining whether a measure promotes equality is 
fair will be heavily weighted in favour of opening up opportunities for the 
disadvantaged. That is what promoting equality (section 9(2)) and fairness (section 
9(3)) require. Yet some degree of proportionality, based on the particular context and 
circumstances of each case, can never be ruled out.211  
 
Thus, remedial or restitutionary equality — protecting certain groups from continued 
social, legal, and political disadvantages — requires the courts to assess equality claims in 
factual, textual, and historical context.212 However, some scholars have argued that this 
balancing of interests required in the final leg of the s 9(2) test subtly imports the fairness 
requirement into the s 9(2) analysis.213 
 In summation, redress is a substantive part of the constitutional right to equality. In 
a society as diverse as South Africa, and one still battling the effects of historical 
marginalisation and oppression, remedial measures are necessary to break down forms of 
misrecognition. However, this does not suggest that the state or other private institutions 
can institute preferential treatment measures under the guise of affirmative action. All 
remedial measures or programmes must conform to the internal test of s 9(2) developed by 
the Constitutional Court.  
 
2.4.3 Section 9(3) analysis: unfair discrimination 
As already alluded to in the above discussions, differentiation is central to South Africa’s 
equality jurisprudence. The Constitutional Court distinguishes between two types of 
differentiation, each dealt with under separate legal tests. The first relates to a benign form 
of differentiation or ‘mere differentiation’, and the second relates to a differentiation based 
on illegitimate or analogous grounds, or discrimination. Although the Constitutional Court 
does not intend separating sections 9(1) and 9(3) into watertight compartments, it analyses 
mere differentiations under s 9(1) and discrimination in terms of s 9(3) respectively.214 
 This second form of differentiation, i.e. discrimination, is primarily dealt with 
under s 9(3) of the Constitution. Section 9(3) expressly prohibits against differentiation on 
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16 listed grounds: race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, 
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, 
and birth. Differentiation or differential treatment based on any or a combination of these 
prohibited grounds is presumed to be unfairly discriminatory unless the contrary is 
proved.215 Thus, s 9(3) primarily deals with instances where a differentiation amounts to 
discrimination but does not form part of an affirmative action measure.  
 Discrimination theoretically is pejorative in nature.216 Given the negative meaning 
or association with the word, a discrimination analysis will intrinsically require a 
fairness/unfairness test to distinguish between permissible (fair) and impermissible (unfair) 
discrimination.217 The premise is that not all discrimination will necessarily be problematic 
or unconstitutional. More importantly, the equality clause only prohibits unfair 
discrimination, not all forms of discrimination.218 Thus, the court further distinguishes 
between discrimination and unfair discrimination. These concepts of discrimination and 
unfair discrimination (discussed below) have come to dominate the Constitutional Court’s 
approach to equality.219 
 
(a) Distinguishing between discrimination and unfair discrimination 
Both discrimination and unfair discrimination are specific forms of differentiation.220 In 
Harksen v Lane NO and Others, 221  the Constitutional Court developed a two-staged 
analysis for determining whether a differentiation constitutes discrimination or unfair 
discrimination, as envisaged by s 9(3). The court summarised the stages in the enquiry as 
follows: 
(b)(i) Firstly, does the differentiation amount to “discrimination”? If it is on a 
specified ground, then discrimination will have been established. If it is not on a 
specified ground, then whether or not there was discrimination would depend upon 
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whether, objectively, the ground was based on attributes and characteristics which 
had the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of persons as human 
beings or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner. 
 
(b)(ii) If the differentiation amounted to “discrimination”, did it amount to “unfair 
discrimination”? If it had been found to have been on a specified ground, unfairness 
would be presumed. If on an unspecified ground, unfairness would have to be 
established by the complainant. The test of unfairness focused primarily on the 
impact of the discrimination on the complainant and others in his or her situation. 222 
 
The first stage of the analysis above primarily relates to the concept of discrimination. It 
requires a court to determine whether the differentiation in fact amounts to discrimination. 
Nonetheless, a finding that there was discrimination does not necessarily conclude the 
enquiry. Discrimination must still be proven to be either fair or unfair.  
 In President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo,223 the Constitutional Court 
(per Goldstone J) explored the idea of ‘fair discrimination’. In this case, the then President 
Mandela granted a special remission of sentences to all imprisoned mothers at the time that 
had children under the age of 12.224 The respondent, a male prisoner with a child under the 
age of 12 at the time, challenged that the presidential order unfairly discriminated against 
him on the grounds of his sex or gender.225 Thus, the court had to decide whether the way 
in which the president exercised his power to acquit prisoners violated the rights of male 
prisoners.  
 The majority of the court found that the presidential order in fact discriminated on 
a combined basis of gender (sex) and parenthood of children below 12 years old.226 Since 
sex or gender was a listed ground, the differentiation was considered unfair discrimination 
unless proven otherwise. However, the court, accepting a generalised view that women 
bear an unequal share of the burden of child rearing in our society as compared to men,227 
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held the discrimination fair because it was against a group who had not historically been 
disadvantaged.228 
 The Constitutional Court’s exploration of fair discrimination in Hugo has not gone 
without controversy. Some scholars applauded the Hugo judgment as being ‘in line with a 
contextual, substantive and group-based understanding of equality’ given its sensitivity to 
the social context of women.229 Yet, some people accused the Constitutional Court of 
adopting pragmatism instead of principle and consequently failed to apply a substantive 
concept of equality in its approach in Hugo.230  Commentators like Kende lauded the 
majority of Hugo for this very pragmatism. In his view, the pragmatic nature of the 
judgment renders the judgment correct and consistent with the ‘fundamentally 
transformative purpose behind the South African constitution’s promise of substantive, not 
formal, equality’.231  
 Scholars like Carpenter and Davis tend to favour Kriegler’s minority judgment that 
asserts that we should not tolerate gender stereotypes, as it is the closest explanation to the 
constitutional ideal of sex and gender equality.232 In his support of the minority judgment, 
Davis argues that the majority reasoning reverted to a process of generalisation and 
adherence to ‘a static concept of equality which refuses to recognise new forms of 
identity.233 Conversely, Kende finds Kriegler’s judgment rather formalistic, preferring the 
majority’s willingness to support preferential treatment that provides concrete benefits to 
women in spite of stereotypes.234 In any event, Hugo offers the best illustration that we 
have for the idea of fair discrimination as developed in equality jurisprudence.  
 Nonetheless, the crux of the s 9(3) analysis rests on the concept of unfair 
discrimination, as s 9(3) read together with s 9(5) specifically prohibits unfair 
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discrimination. Accordingly, a finding of discrimination subsequently triggers the second 
stage of the enquiry, the fairness or unfairness of the discrimination. This part of the 
discussion is concerned with what makes discrimination unfair, and ultimately 
constitutionally invalid. The determining factor in unfair discrimination is the impact of 
the discrimination on the victim.235 According to the Constitutional Court, a court must 
consider the following factors in determining whether discrimination has an unfair 
impact:236  
a. the position of the complainants in society and whether they have suffered in the 
past from patterns of disadvantage. 
b. the nature of the provision/law or action and the purpose sought to be achieved by 
it. If its purpose is…aimed at achieving a worthy and important societal goal.  
c. the extent to which the discrimination has affected the rights or interests of 
complainants and whether it has led to an impairment of their fundamental human 
dignity or constitutes an impairment of a comparably serious nature.  
These factors by no means constitute a closed list, although an objective assessment of 
their cumulative effect helps in ‘giving precision and elaboration to the constitutional test 
of unfairness’.237  
The case of City Council of Pretoria v Walker 238  perhaps best illustrates the 
distinction between fair and unfair discrimination. The case examines the effects of certain 
actions of the Pretoria City Council. The Council was an amalgamation of the former black 
townships of Mamelodi and Attridgeville and the formerly exclusively white municipality 
of Pretoria ('old Pretoria'). The Council was charging residents of old Pretoria on a 
consumption-based tariff measured by meters placed in each household, whilst residents of 
Mamelodi and Attridgeville were charged a flat rate per household due to the absence of 
meters. Moreover, the Council had differing policies for defaulters in the two areas. It 
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instituted legal action to recover arrears in old Pretoria but not in Mamelodi and 
Attridgeville.  
Mr Walker, a resident of old Pretoria, was unhappy with the differential rates and 
subsequently refused to pay the metered rate. The Council sued Mr Walker for outstanding 
municipal service charges for water and electricity. At the Constitutional Court, the 
majority of the court found that the Council’s imposition of a flat rate and the resultant 
cross subsidisation did not constitute unfair discrimination because it neither adversely 
affected the respondent in any material way nor affected his dignity in a comparably 
serious manner. 239  However, the court found that the Council’s policy of selective 
enforcement of debts constitute unfair discrimination based on indirect racial 
discrimination. It held that ‘no members of a racial group should be made to feel that they 
are not deserving of equal “concern, respect and consideration” and that the law is likely to 
be used against them more harshly than others who belong to other race groups’.240 
In summary, unfair discrimination in effect is discrimination with an unfair 
impact.241 Thus, it is necessary to assess the impact on the lives of the people actually 
affected to determine the denial or advancement of equality.242 Consideration of impact 
requires comparators. So in order to establish ‘the manner in which inequality 
systematically forms from patterns of disadvantage, subordination and dominance, which 
may exist outside of the measure under consideration’ 243  it is necessary to examine 
whether the complainant belongs to a group that was subject to past discrimination.244 
Whilst the identification of different groups is seemingly clear-cut given the history of this 
society, classification of previous victims of discrimination can be challenging. As noted 
by Saras Jagwanth, ‘groups can comprise persons who are simultaneously privileged and 
disadvantaged, and individuals who suffer more than one form of disadvantage.’245 
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(b) Listed versus analogous grounds 
The court, in its equality jurisprudence, has set out two categories of discrimination. The 
first category relates to discrimination resulting from differentiation based on one or more 
of the 16 prohibited lists of grounds, and the second relates to differentiation on an 
unspecified but analogous to the prohibited grounds.246 A discrimination enquiry involves 
determining which of these two categories of discrimination to deal with the differentiation 
in issue. However, determining whether there has been differentiation on either specified 
or unspecified ground requires an objective assessment.247  Objectivity in this instance 
means that an intention to discriminate is irrelevant to the discrimination enquiry.248   
 
(i) Listed grounds 
In the first category, the text of s 9(3) provides a list of 16 grounds that cannot be the basis 
of any differentiation. These grounds relate to traits that affect human dignity. 249 
Therefore, differentiation based on any of the grounds listed in s 9(3) is presumably unfair 
discrimination. Additionally, a claimant may bring a case on one or more of the grounds in 
s 9(3).250 Differentiation based on the listed grounds are easy to identify and adjudicate. 
Numerous equality challenges dealt with by the Constitutional Court related to 
discrimination against groups defined by a specified ground in the equality provision, 
predominantly on the grounds of gender and sexual orientation.251 Although there have 
been incidents of discrimination on the grounds of race, age, disability, religion, and birth. 
However, issues around gender and sexual orientation dominate the equality jurisprudence. 
In respect of gender equality, the controversy lies with the term itself. Gender is a 
social construct, meaning social and cultural norms shape male and female roles. 252 
Therefore, differentiation along gender lines can subjugate one gender to the other. The 
judgments of Brink, Hugo, and Harksen all related to gender equality to some degree, with 
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both Brink and Harksen also discriminatory along the lines of marital status. In Bhe and 
Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus 
Curiae); Shibi v Sithole and Others; South African Human Rights Commission and 
Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another,253 the court struck down 
s 23 of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 and its regulations together with the rule 
of male primogeniture as it applies in African customary law of succession.254 According 
to the court, the impugned provision (s 23) ‘created a parallel system of succession for 
black Africans, without sensitivity to their wishes and circumstances’, and was therefore 
unconstitutional. 255  It was further held that the ‘African customary law rule of male 
primogeniture was unconstitutional and invalid because it discriminated unfairly against 
women and children born out of wedlock’.256 
The Constitutional Court has also interpreted and applied sexual orientation as a 
ground of discrimination in six key cases. The court’s jurisprudence on interpreting and 
applying sexual orientation has aided in widening the scope of human rights in a number 
of ways. It has led to the decriminalisation or purging of discriminatory anti-homosexual 
laws and disallowed anti-homosexual rhetoric in the country. In National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice,257 the court unanimously nullified anti-
sodomy laws. It reasoned that the provisions of s 20A of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 
1957, the inclusion of common-law offence of sodomy in Schedules 1 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977, and the Security Officers Act 92 of 1987 discriminated against 
homosexual men on the grounds of their sexual orientation.  
In some instances, it has led to the invalidation of legislation that sought to exclude 
people in same-sex relationships from benefits accorded to married couples. 258  The 
Constitutional Court has dealt with this in four specific instances or cases. In National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs, 259  the court 
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considered the rights of foreign same-sex partners in South Africa under immigration law. 
 The court held that s 25(5) of the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991, which allowed 
only spouses of citizens and permanent residents to apply for immigration permits from 
within South Africa, was unfairly and unjustifiably discriminatory in that it afforded 
preferential treatment to some (i.e. spouses of citizens and permanent residents) and not 
others. The exclusion of same-sex partners from the benefit of s 25(5) constituted 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. As noted by Ackermann J, the use of the term 
‘spouse’ affords ‘protection only to conjugal relationships between heterosexuals and 
excludes any protection to a life partnership which entails a conjugal same-sex 
relationship, which is the only form of conjugal relationship open to gays and lesbians in 
harmony with their sexual orientation’.260  
In Satchwell v President of Republic of South Africa and Another,261 the court 
struck down s 8 and s 9 of the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of employment Act 
88 of 1989 and its corresponding Regulations. The disputed provisions afforded benefits to 
the spouses of judges but not to their same-sex life partners. The court upheld the claim by 
interpreting the Act to include same-sex partners. However, it qualified its order by 
asserting that ‘marriage involves reciprocal duties of support between spouses’262  and 
therefore the law affords marital benefits only in cases where same-sex partners have 
undertaken reciprocal duties towards one another.  
In Du Toit and Another v Minister of Welfare and Population Development,263 the 
lesbian partner of a judge who had adopted twins sought equal parental rights to the 
children. The court declared that her prevention from achieving this status under the 
Adoption Act unfairly discriminated against her and consequently struck down the 
provision. The judgment lifted the prohibition on and extended the right of same-sex 
couples to adopt children.  
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Finally, the dispute in J and Another v Director General Department of Home 
Affairs and Others264 concerned the parentage of a child born through in-vitro fertilization 
to a partner of a same-sex union. All four of these cases speak to how the right of 
protection of family life is equally important in conventional and unconventional 
relationships.  
In other instances, it has led to the extension of the institution of marriage to 
include people in same-sex relationships. In Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie (Doctors 
for Life International and Others, Amici Curiae); Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and 
Others v Minister of Home Affairs,265 the equality challenge was specifically to the law of 
marriage, i.e. the right of same-sex couples to get married. In this judgment, the court 
struck down the common-law definition of marriage in South Africa266 and the exclusion 
of same-sex couples from the wording of s 30(1) of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 as they 
infringed on the right to equal protection of the law as well as unfairly discriminated based 
on sexual orientation.  
Some scholars suggest that it is nearly impossible for the court to find a 
differentiation that has no rational connection to a legitimate government objective.267 Yet, 
this judgment proved the exception. The court found the state’s detailed regulation of 
heterosexual marriages but lack of regulation for same-sex unions in contravention of s 
9(1) of the equality clause.268 The court’s directive order to parliament to recognise and 
regulate same-sex unions in a manner consistent with dignity resulted in the promulgation 
of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. Legal commentators applaud the Fourie judgment for 
three reasons: it demonstrated that a law or action could infringe both s 9(1) and s 9(3), it 
affirmed the rights of same-sex couples, and led to the regulation of same-sex unions by 
way of the Civil Union Act.269 Prior to Fourie, the law treated marriage, in terms of 
common law, as a union between a man and woman. 
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The court has repeatedly held it unfair to privilege marriage as the only protected 
institution in its equality jurisprudence.270 By accepting domestic partnerships as a form of 
family deserving protection,271 the court not only conceded to the explicit prohibition of 
unfair discrimination based on sexual orientation, but also fulfilled the constitutional 
commitment to substantive equality. 272  The court’s equality jurisprudence relating to 
sexual orientation has been proactive in eradicating discriminatory anti-gay laws and 
progressively developing South African family law to confer some of the benefits and 
responsibilities of marriage to same-sex couples.273  
 
(ii) Analogous grounds 
The phrasing of s 9(3), particularly the inclusion of the word ‘including’, suggests that the 
list of prohibited grounds is not a closed list. 274  In view of that, people may make 
distinctions based on grounds that are not clearly recognised in s 9(3) but may also 
constitute discrimination because they are based on attributes fairly similar to the grounds 
specified in s 9(3).275 The court calls these other unspecified grounds analogous grounds.  
 A determination of whether there has been discrimination on an analogous ground 
requires an objective examination of two important questions. First, the court must decide 
whether the differentiation is linked to the differential treatment of people ‘based on 
attributes and characteristics attaching to them’ that are comparable with the specified 
grounds.276 In this part of the enquiry, the Constitutional Court advises against a narrow 
definition of these attributes and characteristics. 277  Secondly, the court must decide 
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whether the differentiation potentially ‘impairs the fundamental dignity of persons as 
human beings, or affects them adversely in a comparably serious manner’.278 
 Presently, the Constitutional Court has recognised differentiation based on HIV 
status and South African citizenship as constituting analogous grounds of discrimination. 
The court explored the former in Hoffmann v South African Airways.279 In that case, the 
appellant had applied for work with SA Airways as a cabin attendant. SAA rejected his 
application upon discovery of his HIV-positive status, following a blood test done during 
the selection process. The court held that SAA’s refusal to employ someone because of his 
HIV status violated the right to equality guaranteed by the Constitution. Hoffmann 
categorically condemned all forms of stereotyping and prejudice on the analogous ground 
of HIV status that may impair the dignity of people living with HIV.280  
 In Larbi-Odam and Others v Member of the Executive Council for Education 
(North-West Province) and Another,281  the Constitutional Court established citizenship 
status as an analogous ground of discrimination when it held that Regulation 2(2) of the 
Regulations regarding the Terms and Conditions of Educators282 differentiated between 
citizens and foreign nationals, to the detriment of foreign nationals.283 The applicants were 
foreign nationals with permanent residency who were temporarily employed as teachers in 
the North-West Province. The MEC for Education in the North-West province issued them 
with notices with the intention to terminate their employment and proceeded to advertise 
their posts because only South African nationals could teach in a permanent capacity in 
state schools. The court found that ‘permanent residency status’ entitled the applicants to 
compete with locals in the employment market and any limitation or exclusion on the 
grounds of citizenship status was purely discriminatory. Essentially, citizenship is a 
‘personal attribute which is difficult to change’.284  
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 Similarly, in Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and others; 
Mahlaule and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others,285 the court held that 
the exclusion of permanent residents from the social welfare scheme was unfairly 
discriminatory as it infringed their constitutional right to equality. Thus, the differentiation 
on the grounds of citizenship was clearly on a ground ‘analogous’ to those grounds listed 
in s 9(3) of the Constitution. The Khosa case not only illustrates the Constitutional Court’s 
recognition of analogous grounds of discrimination, it shows how the courts sometimes 
read the right to equality with other rights (in this case socio-economic rights). 
 In summation, the s 9(3) inquiry, the test for unfairness, has been at the heart of the 
equality analysis and has elicited much controversy.286 In some instances, the courts have 
been lauded for its ability to read the Constitution asymmetrically to allow acts benefitting 
certain vulnerable groups.287 In other instances, they have been criticised for the very same 
ability. Some commentators have gone so far as to accuse the Constitutional Court of 
tilting the balance of fairness under the Constitution in favour of the marginalised and 
vulnerable.288 
 
2.4.4 The role of human dignity in the equality jurisprudence 
Evidently, South African equality jurisprudence emphasises a substantive conception of 
equality. Underlying this equality jurisprudence is yet another concept, namely human 
dignity. The Constitutional Court first linked the right to equality to the concept of dignity 
in Hugo when it asserted that: 
The prohibition on unfair discrimination in the interim Constitution seeks not only to 
avoid discrimination against people who are members of disadvantaged groups. It 
seeks more than that. At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a 
recognition that the purpose of our new constitutional and democratic order is the 
establishment of a society in which all human beings will be accorded equal dignity 
and respect regardless of their membership of particular groups.289  
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Subsequent Constitutional Court decisions since Hugo have often inextricably linked the 
two concepts.290 In this respect, the court has invoked the value of dignity in its equality 
judgments in three ways: first, to describe the prohibited grounds in s 9(3); secondly, to 
determine the fairness of discrimination; and finally, to assess the reasonableness of 
discrimination under the limitation clause.291 The court’s continuous reference to human 
dignity in interpreting the right to equality firmly places dignity as the fundamental value 
underlying the principle of equality.292 This centrality and prominence given to the value 
of dignity, both in relation to unfair discrimination and as a value underlying the principles 
of equality generally, has elicited some controversy within academia. 
 The Constitutional Court’s dignity-centred approach to equality particularly 
appears to highlight a dichotomy about the substantive obligation of the equality provision. 
In some quarters, the prominence of dignity in relation to unfair discrimination only limits 
the pursuit of substantive equality. Those who belong to this cluster view dignity as an 
individualistic concept incapable of capturing transformation. Scholars like Anton Fagan 
consider this prominence as deeply flawed claiming that there is no connection between 
unfair discrimination and dignity.293  
 In a slightly different manner, Hepple argues that despite it being a background 
value to all human rights, dignity is rather too vague to be the basis of equality law.294 
Likewise, Albertyn and Goldblatt feel equality should have ‘meaning independent of the 
value of dignity’, i.e. the value of equality should define the right to equality instead of the 
value of dignity.295 They contend that ‘importing dignity into the heart of the equality right 
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decisively shifts the emphasis away from a group-based understanding of equality…’296 
and away from the transformative use of the right.’297  
 For critics like Dennis Davis, the problem was endemic from the very beginning; 
the Hugo court ‘introduced the principle of dignity to interpret equality without ever 
explaining whether it was the absence of a prior constitutional right to equality or a breach 
of the self-standing dignity right that has been infringed.’ 298  In doing so, it relegated 
equality to an abstract notion without any use of a comparator. 299  In his view, ‘the 
Constitutional Court has rendered meaningless a fundamental value of our Constitution 
and simultaneously has given dignity both content and a scope that make for a piece of a 
jurisprudential legoland’.300 He further avers that ‘by conflating equality with dignity or its 
variants the court has failed to engage with the component parts of equality, let alone 
achieve any working balance’.301  
 Essentially, these critics are of the same opinion that the dignity-based equality 
jurisprudence focuses too much on the individual and his or her personal feelings of harm 
suffered. This focus on the individual narrows the understanding of the right to equality.302 
Therefore, the central role given to human dignity (a vague and complicated concept) 
could inadvertently relegate equality to a secondary meaning that risks its transformative 
potential.303 In short, the court’s dignity-based analysis is uncritical, individualistic, and 
incongruent with the need to balance individual and community.304 
 However, other quarters see the Constitutional Court’s dignity-based approach to 
equality as a human rights approach that serves the pursuit of substantive equality. Susie 
Cowen, unlike Albertyn and Goldblatt, perceives dignity as a concept that not only focuses 
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on the individual but also on collective concerns.305 In her assessment, ‘there is nothing in 
the concept of dignity itself, nor in its relationship with other rights and values, that 
inhibits its ability to serve the equality jurisprudence well’.306  
 Sandra Liebenberg echoes similar sentiments. In her view, the confines of human 
dignity transcend subjective personality issues, contrary to the assertion by Albertyn and 
Goldblatt, to include acknowledgment of both the conditions of material disadvantage and 
its impact on different groups in society.307 Laurie Ackermann is inclined to agree with 
them in this observation to some degree.308  
 All three dignity-advocates recognise the important role dignity plays in the right to 
equality, as the value of equality cannot single-handedly support the right as critics like 
Davis, Fagan, Albertyn, and Goldblatt advocate. That is to say, ‘dignity, alongside the 
value of equality, is capable of being (and should be) developed as an important 
interpretive vehicle for a substantive understanding of equality’. 309  This affirms 
Malherbe’s claim that ‘equality without dignity is inhuman’.310 
 Irrespective of the position taken, there appears to be a degree of persuasion in both 
sides of the debate. The Constitutional Court has invoked the value of human dignity in its 
analyses in a number of diverse situations. 311  Human dignity featured prominently in 
analyses of discrimination based on sexual orientation that eventually led to the 
decriminalisation of sodomy laws and the extension of certain laws to include homosexual 
people.312 Similarly, the court has often invoked the value of dignity in interpreting socio-
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economic rights.313 However, the court has arguably not always engaged with the value of 
dignity consistently. 
 
2.4.5 Where the court (possibly) got it wrong 
The Constitutional Court has occasionally been criticised for failing to engage with the 
value of dignity, particularly in three equality claims concerning sex workers, cohabitants, 
and refugees. The first of these claims was in Jordan and Others v S and Others,314 where 
the court failed to apply its substantive equality test with sensitivity to the social context of 
women.315 Given that the majority of sex workers are female and their customers male,316 
it came as a big surprise to many when the majority of the court ruled that s 20(1) (A) of 
the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 did not constitute unfair indirect discrimination 
against women. 
 The majority of the court, per Ngcobo J, refused to approve the decriminalisation 
of adult sex workers because they were ‘not persuaded by the argument that gender 
discrimination exists simply because there are more female prostitutes than male 
prostitutes’. 317  In their view, the impugned provision was merely ‘a gender neutral 
provision which differentiates between the dealer and the customer, a distinction that 
makes them liable to the same punishment, cannot be said to be discriminating on the basis 
of gender, simply because the majority of those who violate such a statute happen to be 
women’.318 This reasoning, and many like it, has elicited severe disapproval and criticism 
from various scholars. 
 Some commentators are of a mind that the majority judgment completely 
disregarded its own test for unfair discrimination laid out in Harksen, as evident from the 
lack of consideration for and application of context, impact or constitutional values in this 
                                                          
313 Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and others; Mahlaule and Others v Minister of 
Social Development and Others 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC).  
314 2002 (11) BCLR 1117 (CC). The case concerned the constitutionality of legislation that criminalised 
commercial sex work and the keeping of a brothel, criminalising only the prostitute and not the customer.  
315 Jagwanth op cit note 26 at 135.  
316 Rosaan Kruger ‘Sex work from a feminist perspective: A visit to the Jordan case’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 138. 
317 Supra note 314 para 17.  
318 Ibid para 18.  
67 
 
case.319 By ignoring the gender dimension as well as the economic and social motives 
underpinning prostitution, the majority failed to employ its own substantive equality test. 
 In contrast, the minority (per O’Regan and Sachs JJ) noted that the impugned law 
stems from and perpetuates gender stereotypes in a manner that causes discrimination.320 
In their view, the impugned law not only constituted indirect discrimination against 
women, directly linked to stereotypes and patterns of gender disadvantage;321 it reinforced 
these by imposing a stigma on the prostitute but not the customer.322 This apparent neutral 
measure in fact strengthens the view that ‘a prostitute is a “fallen” woman while the 
customer is rather manly, though sometimes weak. Such discrimination, therefore, has the 
potential to impair the fundamental human dignity and personhood of women.’323  
 The minority judgment at least took into consideration context, albeit limited, when 
they noted that prostitutes are women who constitute a vulnerable marginal group who are 
often forced to become vulnerable.324 Many women turn to prostitution out of dire need, 
not choice; an important social and economic consideration the majority failed to 
recognise.  
 Furthermore, some commentators criticise the case for its lack of engagement with 
the value of dignity. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly emphasized the pivotal role 
of human dignity in the equality analysis.325 Yet, this dignity-centred approach proved 
irrelevant, as the question of fairness was somewhat overlooked by the majority and 
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dubiously applied by the minority.326 The majority of the court barely broached the issue 
of the rights of sex workers to dignity. The minority on the other hand felt that: 
[o]ur Constitution values human dignity which inheres in various aspects of what it means to 
be a human being. One of these aspects is the fundamental dignity of the human body that is 
not simply organic. Neither is it something to be commodified. Our Constitution requires that 
it be respected. We do not believe that section 20(1)(A) can be said to be the cause of any 
limitation on the dignity of the prostitute. To the extent that the dignity of prostitutes is 
diminished, the diminution arises from the character of prostitution itself…the dignity of 
prostitutes is diminished not by section 20(1)(A) but by their engaging in commercial sex 
work….327  
 
Therefore, according to the minority, sex workers are vulnerable and marginalised because 
of their occupational choice. Taking this argument further leads to the obvious deduction 
that certain occupational choices or activities can diminish human dignity. Some scholars 
found this reasoning by the minority court erroneous. Barrett asserts that while it is likely 
that the profession of sex workers may diminish or jeopardise their social dignity 
(dignitas), it is rather perverse to suggest that their inherent human dignity (dignatio) or 
personhood diminishes in the process.328  
 Inherent human dignity, unlike social dignity, is not diminishable because it does 
not have degrees of intactness that can be determined by factors such as status or 
behaviour.329 This is where, according to Barrett, the court went wrong. The Jordan case 
was not merely about female sexuality or prostitution;330 it was an opportunity for the 
court to address an Act that imposes a particular view of morality.331 By failing to see the 
impact of the criminalisation of prostitution on sex workers, the court failed to protect the 
rights of a vulnerable group to equality and as a result failed to endorse its own equality 
test.332 
 In the second of the equality claims, the court failed to consider gender differences 
in economic and social power of those involved in domestic partnerships in their rejection 
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of the equality claim brought before them in Volks NO v Robinson.333 The case involved 
the constitutionality of s 1 of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 that 
excludes partners of co-habiting relationships from claiming maintenance from the estates 
of their deceased partners.  
 The majority of the court held it appropriate to distinguish between married and 
unmarried couples, to the advantage of the former. Albertyn argues that ‘the court neatly 
sidesteps the claim by placing the context of cohabitation for poor and vulnerable women 
outside the consideration of unfair discrimination’, leaving the gendered structure of 
society intact.334 Thus, the actual test for unfairness in the equality analysis (the extent of 
impact on human dignity) was somewhat overlooked.  
 The majority further averred that ‘Mrs Robinson is not being told that her dignity is 
worth less than that of someone who is married…she is simply told that there is a 
fundamental difference between her relationship and a marriage relationship in relation to 
maintenance’.335 This, coupled with the contextual oversight, affirms the assertion that 
Robinson was predominately hinged on a rather superficial analysis of dignity and devoid 
of context and impact.336 The majority’s reasoning comes back to an argument on the 
choice for cohabiting women to marry.337 The focus on the ‘choice’ to marry does not 
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necessarily take into consideration social context and practical realities associated with 
choice.338  
 As pointed out by Jagwanth, relationships (domestic partnerships being no 
different) involve power dynamics and these powers tend to be unequal and gendered to 
the detriment of women since they tend to be financially and socially vulnerable.339 In 
addition, historically cohabiting couples have been subject to prejudice and 
stigmatization.340 By failing to see this, the court was unable to recognise cohabitants as a 
marginalised group deserving of constitutional protection, and consequently failed to apply 
its own dignity jurisprudence appropriately. 
 In the third of the equality claims, the Union of Refugee Women and Others v 
Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority and Others,341 the majority (per 
Kondile AJ) found that the provisions of the Private Security Industry Regulation Act 56 
of 2001 did in fact differentiate between citizens and permanent residents on one hand, and 
all foreigners on the other. However, this differentiation was a fair one that served a 
legitimate government purpose. Besides, the constitutional protection (the right to choose a 
vocation) sought after is not available to refugees or other foreigners. Thus refugees, as a 
category of foreign nationals, have the right to seek employment but not to choose an 
occupation.  
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 Accordingly, the majority held that the apparent internal discrimination embedded 
in the provision was fair and consequently did not violate the equality right as challenged. 
Despite refugees being a vulnerable group in society, the majority avoided any contextual 
factors and their subsequent impact on the group in its inquiry of the claim.342 The court 
altogether circumvented the Harksen substantive test, rendering the judgment too 
formalistic. Conversely, the minority judgment (per Mokgoro J and O’Regan J in a joint 
dissent) was relatively contextual and as such a substantive judgment due to its application 
of the Harksen test.343 
 In these three equality claims, the minority judgments tended to show a proper 
approach to substantive equality by way of contextual analysis and engagement with the 
value of dignity, in contrast to the majority judgments’ abstract and formalistic approach. 
In all three instances, the majority vaguely alluded to or entirely ignored the context-based 
approach that gives rise to substantive equality. These seemingly missed opportunities to 
vindicate the rights of vulnerable members of society have raised questions about the 
courts ability to aid the transformative process. 
 
2.5 Situating foreign nationals in the equality discourse 
Historical and contemporary analysis of domestic law and jurisprudence on equality 
suggests that inequality is highly controversial in South Africa. The controversy 
engendered by the general equality discourse in the country is further complicated when it 
is assessed in the context of migration, particularly in relation to non-nationals or 
foreigners engaged in economic activities. South Africa has long had a deep-rooted 
reliance on migrant labour from surrounding countries. It is unsurprising that the existence 
of foreign nationals remain a significant feature of present-day South African society.  
 Historically, foreign nationals (initially as slaves and indentured labourers and later 
as contract migrant workers) have been required to mitigate domestic labour shortages.344 
This cheap migrant labour pool was mostly concentrated in the mining, agriculture and 
construction sectors, the so-called migrant sectors. For instance, the mining sector is 
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considered the leading recruiter of non-nationals, employing the most foreign workers 
from both surrounding and other nations.345 Tracing the use of foreign labour in the mining 
industry during apartheid reveals a consistent and large supply of labour from 
Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana.346 
 Granted that such trends have diminished considerably in recent times, South 
Africa remains very much a migrant-receiving country, with some sectors still heavily 
dependent on foreign labour. However, unlike the apartheid era when foreign nationals 
were cautiously welcomed, even encouraged, into South Africa for their cheap labour, 
contemporary South Africa has become increasingly hostile, anti-migrant and xenophobic 
where foreigners are concerned. Xenophobia and anti-migrant rhetoric permeates every 
level of South African society. It is reflected in the media and government policies as well 
as political and everyday discourses.347  
 What is more, xenophobic attitudes and sentiments against foreigners in South 
Africa tend to have a racial tone coupled with some degree of physical violence. This 
newly constructed black-on-black hatred or ‘Afro-phobia’ often positions foreign nationals 
as scapegoats for various domestic social and economic ills, including: rising crime rate, 
unemployment, the HIV/Aids pandemic, and lack of social services among other things.348 
The hostile and often differential treatment of foreign nationals within the wider society 
and in the workplace speaks to issues of equality.   
 Even though there is not a lot of equality jurisprudence relating to foreign nationals 
on record, it is a reality nonetheless. Foreign nationals, as a protected class in the domestic 
context, include a variety of individuals: permanent residents, asylum seekers, refugees, 
persons in possession of any of the various South African temporary residence permits or 
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those holding an exemption in terms of s 31(2)(b) of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002.349 
Foreign nationals can theoretically rely on the South African Constitution to challenge any 
legal infringements to their fundamental rights because most rights in the Bill of Rights, 
with the exception of three reserved for citizens only,350 apply to ‘everyone’.351 South 
African courts have interpreted ‘everyone’ to include permanent residents,352 foreigners 
with temporary permits like a work or study permit,353 and even those yet to be officially 
admitted into the country.354  
 More specifically, s 9, like most of the rights in the Bill of Rights, accords the right 
to equality universally, i.e. applies to everyone. Therefore foreign nationals can be 
beneficiaries of the right to equality. On two occasions, the Constitutional Court decided 
that s 9 (3) of the Constitution prohibits discriminating against foreign nationals. In both 
the Larbi-Odam and Khosa judgments, the court held that differentiation on the grounds of 
citizenship was clearly analogous to the grounds listed in s 9(3), and therefore constitutes 
discrimination on unlisted or analogous grounds. It is worth noting, however, that in both 
instances, the court dealt with a category of non-nationals it deemed legally worthy as they 
had acquired permanent residency status, which entitled them to certain rights on par with 
citizenship status. Thus, the right to equality seemingly extends only to regular or 
authorised foreign nationals.  
 A further survey of litigation involving foreign nationals alluding to an 
infringement of the constitutional equality provisions highlights the supremacy and broad 
application of the Constitution itself. Given that the Constitution affects all branches of 
South African law, it is not restricted to the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court alone. 
Often times, decisions on a contentious interpretation or application of certain provisions 
                                                          
349 Jonathan Klaaren ‘Human Rights Protection of Foreign Nationals’ (2009) 30 ILJ 82 at 86.  
350 Sections 19, 20 and 22 of the Constitution. 
351 Currie & De Waal op cit note 163 at 34. 
352 Supra note 313 para 47 
353 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others ; Shalabi and Another v Minister of Home 
Affairs and Others ; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (CCT35/99) [2000] ZACC 
8; 2000 (3) SA 936; 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (7 June 2000) para 37.  
354 Lawyers for Human Rights and Other v Minister of Home Affairs and Other (CCT 18/03) [2004] ZACC 
12; 2004 (4) SA 125 (CC); 2004 (7) BCLR 775 (CC) (9 March 2004) para 27.  
74 
 
in other legislation, regulations or policies have been made at other levels of the judiciary 
system. In Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Watchenuka and Another, 355  the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) has endorsed a constitutional ruling by the Cape of Good 
Hope Provincial Division of the High Court on the rights of asylum seekers to work and 
study whilst awaiting formal recognition as refugees. This case lifted a blanket prohibition 
on employment and/or studies. 
 Due to the myriad policies that govern foreign nationals, there tends to be an 
overlap between constitutional framework and other pieces of legislation promulgated to 
give effect to its principles and spirit. Legal actions involving foreign nationals almost 
always overlap with immigration law to some extent. When the constitutional framework 
is superimposed onto immigration law, the legal status of the non-nationals in question and 
the rights they are entitled to become critical in resolving equality claims. Simply put, non-
nationals differ when viewed through the legal lens. In some instances, foreigners, like 
those with permanent residence status in the abovementioned cases, receive special 
dispensation and are comparable to citizens in treatment and specific rights enjoyment.356  
 In other instances, foreign nationals rely strongly on the progressive nature of the 
constitutional democracy and its liberal substantive enjoyment of rights to lay strong 
claims to certain entitlements to which they would ordinarily have no claim. When this is 
the case, the issue is not so much the disputed entitlement and its significance as the 
eligibility of the individual contesting for the recognition of the disputed restricted 
entitlement. This was precisely the situation in Union of Refugee Women and Others v 
Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority and Others.357  
 In this dispute, the Constitutional Court had the difficult task of deciding on the 
rights of refugees to work in the private security industry. One of the issues raised by the 
applicants in the appeal application to the Constitutional Court involved the 
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constitutionality of s 23(1)(a) of the Private Security Industry Regulation Act 56 of 2001 
(PSIRA). Section 23(1)(a) of the PSIRA requires individuals wanting to register with the 
Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority as a service provider to be a citizen or a 
permanent resident of South Africa. The applicants, all recognised refugees under the 
Refugees Act 130 of 1998, contested that the aforementioned provision discriminated 
against them because of their refugee status and consequently encroached on their 
constitutional right to equality. 
 In resolving the dispute, the court was split in their conclusion. First, the court 
reiterated and applied its general equality test as consolidated in Harksen v Lane NO and 
Others.358 Accordingly, the majority judgment (per Kondile AJ) concluded that the internal 
discrimination embedded in the provision was fair and consequently did not violate the 
applicants’ rights to equality as challenged. The rationale was simple: although the 
disputed provision did in fact differentiate between citizens and permanent residents on the 
one hand, and all foreigners on the other, this differentiation served a legitimate 
government purpose — to limit the registration eligibility to people whose trustworthiness 
could be objectively verified. Moreover, the differentiation could not be deemed unfair 
because the specific constitutional protection (the right to choose a vocation) the applicants 
sought is not available to refugees or other foreigners. 
 In opposition, the minority judgment (per Mokgoro J and O’Regan J in a joint 
dissent), after considering the status of refugees and South Africa’s international law 
obligations, found the disputed provision to be unfairly discriminatory and constitutionally 
invalid. In their view, the ‘section did not recognise that refugees occupied a position most 
similar to permanent resident status and should therefore be entitled to admission to the 
industry.’359  
 Dissenting views aside, this case was particularly challenging on two fronts: first, 
the issue in contention implicated one of two constitutional rights reserved for citizens; 
secondly, the individuals laying strong claims to this restricted right were not eligible to it 
in the first instance. While it was similar to that of the Larbi-Odam and Watchenuka cases 
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in that they all, to some extent (some more than others), questioned the right of equality of 
foreign nationals to access wage-earning employment, it differed from them in that the 
peremptory provision merely limited the right to work.  
 The non-nationals in this case still had the right to work; only the choice of 
vocation was limited. The disputed Act under review still guaranteed the right to work, 
however limited it is, unlike in Larbi-Odam where the grievant was discriminated against 
with regards to general employment opportunities or in Watchenuka where there was a 
total exclusion from employment. One important fact to note, however, is that the Union of 
Refugee Women judgment reversed the idea accepted by the court in Larbi-Odam that 
certain categories of foreign nationals (namely permanent residents and in this case 
refugees who are equivalent to permanent residents) are on par with South Africans with 
respect to employment. 
 It is common knowledge that all foreign nationals are not similar; they differ with 
regards to their legal or immigration status, and subsequently to the rights and benefits 
they can enjoy. In this respect, disputes involving foreign nationals tend to overlap with 
immigration law to some degree. An instance when the constitutional framework 
overlapped with immigration (and administrative) law was clearly illustrated in Koyabe 
and Others v Minister for Home affairs and Others (Lawyers for Human rights as Amicus 
Curiae).360  
 In this case, Kenyan nationals (the applicants) had applied for and been granted 
South African permanent residence permits by the Department of Home Affairs (DHA). 
They later applied for identity documents but the DHA withdrew their application after an 
internal investigation revealed that their residency status was fraudulent. This discovery 
meant that the applicants were now deemed ‘prohibited persons’ 361  and subject to 
deportation. However, the applicants had a right — per the review procedure set out in s 8 
of the Immigration Act — to request the Minister’s review of the deportation decision. The 
applicants failed to submit such a request within the prescribed period. Instead, they 
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launched an application at the North Gauteng High Court (Pretoria) for a judicial review362 
and for the Minister’s decision to withdraw their residency status to be set-aside.  
 The High Court dismissed the application concluding that the applicants had not 
exhausted the internal remedies as required by s 7(2) of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 13 of 2000 (PAJA). Moreover, the Court did not find any ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ that would allow the applicants to be exempted from the obligation to 
exhaust the internal remedies. Both the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal denied 
their applications for leave to appeal. In their application to the Constitutional Court, the 
applicants raised two major problems for consideration: the first concerned the scope of 
the constitutional right to just administrative action363 that is given effect to in s 5 of 
PAJA; the second concerned the interpretation of s 7(2) of PAJA in light of s 34 of the 
Constitution. The Constitutional Court denied the appeal, reasoning that the application for 
judicial review was hasty, given that they had neither exhausted the available ministerial 
review, nor had they adequately shown any exceptional circumstances to warrant 
exemption from complying with the internal review procedure altogether.  
 Aside from the Constitutional Court domain, the equality jurisprudence in relations 
to foreign nationals has slowly been developing elsewhere. In the field of employment law, 
the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration (CCMA)364 and the Labour 
Courts have been instrumental in developing the equality jurisprudence as it pertains to 
foreign nationals. Section 39(2) of the Constitution requires the courts to interpret statutes 
in a manner that promotes the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. By extension 
therefore, the constitutional jurisprudence informs the interpretation of other statutes. 
However, the Labour Court has been more progressive in advancing the equality 
jurisprudence as it pertains to foreign nationals, particularly the unauthorised. 
 In 2008, the Labour Court single-handedly changed the position of migrants in an 
irregular situation when it rejected the conventional notion that a foreign national who 
                                                          
362 In terms of s 5 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 13 of 2000, hereafter ‘PAJA’.  
363 Section 33 of the Constitution.  
364 The CCMA is an independent dispute resolution body established in terms of the 1995 LRA to replace the 
old Industrial Court system. As an independent body, it does not have affiliations with any trade union, 
political party, or business.  
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does not possess a valid work permit, issued under the Immigration Act 13 of 2002, does 
not qualify as ‘employee’ as defined by the LRA. In the landmark case of Discovery 
Health Ltd v CCMA & Others, 365  Discovery Health (the employer) terminated the 
employment of an Argentinian national, Lanzetta, upon discovering he did not possess a 
valid work permit. Consequently, Lanzetta referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the 
CCMA. First, the commissioner had to decide on the jurisdiction of the CCMA to 
determine the dispute. In this regard, the commissioner held that the CCMA did have 
jurisdiction because Lanzetta was an ‘employee’ as contemplated in the LRA; contrary to 
the employer’s contention that the CCMA had no jurisdiction because of the underlying 
validity of the employment. The employer argued that:  
The definition of “employee” in s 213 of the LRA contemplated an underlying contract of 
employment and that since the contract in this instance was void ab initio because it was in 
conflict with the Immigration Act, it could not be said that Lanzetta was an employee.366 
 
The employer then applied to the Labour Court to review and set aside the commissioner’s 
ruling on jurisdiction.  
 On review, the Labour Court, adopting a purposive interpretation of s 213, agreed 
with the Commissioner’s ruling that ‘Lanzetta was an ‘employee’ as defined in the LRA, 
and so the CCMA had jurisdiction to determine the unfair dismissal dispute referred to 
it’.367 This ruling helped extend the scope of ‘employee’ to include unauthorised foreign 
workers, and in doing so endorsed the right of access to the dispute-resolution mechanisms 
of the CCMA, and brought once marginalised foreign nationals under the protection of 
employment law.368 Discovery Health, albeit controversially, set a new precedent for the 
way labour disputes involving unauthorised foreigners are adjudicated generally. It 
essentially allowed for labour protection for an otherwise legally marginalised group of 
foreign nationals. 
                                                          
365 (2008) 29 ILJ 1480 (LC), hereafter Discovery Health.  
366 Ibid para 12.  
367 Ibid para 33. 
368 Dieudonne Coffie Wabo ‘Emerging jurisprudence on the labour law protection for undocumented migrant 
workers in South Africa: Lessons for countries’ (2009) available at www.ilera-
online.org/15thworldcongress/.../CS1W_28_COFFIE.pdf , accessed 19 August 2015. 
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 Prior to the Discovery Health decision, legal interpretations into the statutory 
definition of ‘employee’ (i.e. s 213 of the LRA) disqualified foreign nationals who do not 
possess valid work permits and ultimately barred them from accessing any labour 
protection because their employment arrangement breached the Aliens Control Act or 
Immigration Act. In a number of disputes,369 the CCMA consistently refused jurisdiction 
to settle any disputes involving unauthorised migrants owing to the fact that their 
employment violated the Immigration Act. 370  Thus, pre-2008 employment dispute 
adjudication primarily focused on the view that a contract of employment in contravention 
of a statute is consequently invalid in South African law.371 Such restrictive notions tended 
to limit the equality rights of vulnerable foreign workers.   
 In yet another case involving a foreign national, the Labour Court ruled that the 
termination of the permanent contact of employment of a Burundian refugee nurse 
constituted procedurally unfair dismissal. In Ndikumdavyi v Valkenberg Hospital & 
Others,372 the judge interpreted the words ‘employment contract’ in s 186(1)(a) of the 
LRA widely to mean ‘employment relationship’. Thus, this interpretative approach 
provided ‘equal protection for formal refugees and other vulnerable groups of 
employees’, 373  since formal refugees were regarded as equal recipients of the rights 
provided by the LRA.  
 In summation, exploration of available literature thus far reveals that equality, as 
elusive as it is generally, becomes even more complex when considered in relation to 
                                                          
369 See Moses v Safika Holdings (Pty) Ltd (2001) 22 ILJ 1261 (CCMA), Vundla v Millies Fashions (2003) 
24 ILJ 462 (CCMA), Georgieva-Deyanova v Craighall Spar (2004) 9 BALR 1143 (CCMA).  
370 Post-Discovery, the CCMA issued a directive declaring its power and competence to conciliate and 
arbitrate disputes referred to it by illegal foreigners in terms of the LRA. Also see chapter two, specifically 
paragraph 2.5.5, of the fifth edition of the CCMA practice and procedure manual (2010) available at 
http://www.ccma.org.za/UploadedMedia/2010%20Practice%20and%20Procedure%20Manual.pdf. 
371 Dawn Norton ‘Workers in the shadows: an international comparison on the law of dismissal of illegal 
migrant workers’ (2010) 31 ILJ 1521 at 1549.  
372 (2012) 33 ILJ 2648 (LC). The applicant was hired as a professional nurse at Valkenberg Hospital, and 
started work on 1 July 2010. On 20 July 2010, the hospital informed him that, as the department's policy 
permitted the employment of foreign health professionals on fixed-term contracts only and his refugee status 
expired on 24 December 2010, it was retracting the offer of permanent employment immediately.  
373 Ibid para 20.  
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foreign nationals, particularly the unauthorised. While it is apparent that the South African 
courts (and CCMA) are gradually expanding the rights framework for foreign workers by 
way of purposive interpretation of laws, there is still much to be done if the equality ideal 
is to be fully expressed. There is still a need for reform as foreign nationals, particularly 
the vulnerable category, are severely constrained by the legal framework that provides 
very narrow legal protection owing to their immigration status.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
A review of the equality discourse is a necessary step in establishing the appropriate 
context for further analysis of peoples’ lived realities. The fact is that South Africa is an 
unequal society with a discriminatory past. A cursory survey of the literature reveals a 
body of substantial constitutional and legislative provisions aimed at promoting equality in 
South Africa. The equality discourse in South Africa over the years has progressed to 
incorporate anti-discrimination laws intended to eradicate various forms of stigma, 
stereotyping, and prejudices instituted by the Apartheid government. Pre and post-
constitutional equality jurisprudence in South Africa, though slow in developing, has aided 
in redressing some of the inequalities inherited from the country’s racist past.  
 However, the Constitutional Court’s approach to analysing the right to equality and 
the corresponding legal tests has not always been consistent. Even so, the court will not 
condone any form of prejudicial policies or discriminatory actions that does not 
compliment the spirit of the Constitution, which is premised on equality and dignity for all. 
The court has intricately linked the right to equality with dignity. Equality in the South 
African context is rather a complex and unique issue. The repercussion of the past 
inequalities is still reverberating some twenty years after democracy. The aftermath of the 
historic inequality is salient in the area of social welfare where social security legislation 
excludes some categories of people (like unauthorised migrants) from statutory protection. 
 When considered in relation to foreign nationals, the equality discourse is far from 
ideal. Foreigners, by virtue of their nationality, are like second-class citizens. This is 
problematic especially in places like South Africa where anti-migrant sentiments and 
rhetoric are very pronounced. However, the judiciary system is trying to mitigate some of 
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the negative perceptions held about foreign nationals through a gradual development of 
jurisprudence involving non-nationals.  
 South Africa, jurisprudentially, legislatively, and socially has a long way to go in 
attaining full equality. The elimination of discrimination is too critical an issue to be 
solved solely by a broad application of the law. Apartheid had as much psychological as it 
did a social impact therefore, the elimination of discrimination requires more than a mere 
repeal of repressive laws. Essentially, if equality is a desirable democratic ideal, then what 
aspect or dimension of people should be made alike? As the world and Africa embarks on 
a journey for greater equality and social justice, the response to this question will delineate 
how then to measure the parameters of equality.  
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CHAPTER III TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
‘Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere’1 
 
3.1 Introduction  
A review of the prevailing discourse reveals that equality, as a moral and political ideal, is a 
contested and elusive concept, with many scholars differing on its interpretation.2 Scholars who 
belong to the Utilitarian school of thought construe equality in terms of the degree of the 
resulting benefits for those involved. For these scholars equality is about maximising the total 
welfare (wellbeing) of individuals in society.3 Other scholars, mainly egalitarians, tend to view 
equality as more than making people generally better off. According to these egalitarians, 
equality is fundamentally good in itself. Consequently, all persons, who are equal in worth, 
should treat or relate to one another as contemporaries.4 
 Given that scholars cannot agree on what the precise notion of equality should be, it is 
unsurprising that the measure of the ideal of equality itself — what dimension should be 
considered to make people alike — is just as controversial.5 The political philosopher, Ronald 
Dworkin’s two-part essay of ‘what is equality?’ began the debate of whether welfare or resource 
is the appropriate egalitarian standard of distributive equality.  
 Since his contribution, numerous scholars have proposed diverse theories as to the 
appropriate basis for measuring distributive shares, whilst still others have added to the 
Dworkinian theory in some manner or form. Scholars like Richard Arneson and Gerry Cohen are 
welfare egalitarians who promote welfare as a metric for equality, whilst John Rawls and Ronald 
                                                          
1 Martin Luther King Jr. ‘Letter from a Birmingham jail’ (1963) available at 
http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html, accessed 20 February 2014. 
2 Nils Holtug & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen ‘An introduction to contemporary egalitarianism’ in Nils Holtug & 
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds) Egalitarianism (2007).  
3 Martin Hevia & Joel Colon-Rios ‘Contemporary theories of equality: A critical review’ (2009) 74 Revista Juridica 
Universidad de Puerto Rico 131; Victoria University of Wellington Legal Research Paper No 15/2013. 
4 Richard Arneson ‘Egalitarianism’ Edward N. Zalta (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013) available 
at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/egalitarianism/>. 
5 G.A Cohan ‘Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods and Capabilities’ (1990) 56 Louvain Economic Review 357. 
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Dworkin endorse the equal distribution of resources among people. Still others like John Roemer 
encourage adoption of a blend of the two under the banner ‘equal opportunity’.  
 If it is asserted that the pursuit of equality is a desirable idea in a democratic social order, 
then what aspects of peoples’ lives exactly should be made equal? In this chapter, the question of 
‘equality of what?’ is at the forefront of the discussion. Accordingly, deliberating on how to 
measure the parameters of equality, three conceptions of distributive equality (welfare, resources 
and opportunities) are analysed in presenting the best-perceived material requirements and 
measures of the ideal of equality. The premise here is that there needs to be, and there is, a 
possibility of safeguarding the welfare of all in society as well as guaranteeing an equal share of 
or access to needed resources.  
 
3.2 The search of appropriate criterion in the pursuit of fairness 
To reiterate, there are various conceptions of equality. The concept poses a conundrum in that 
people can become equal in one way, and can become unequal in others.6 What form of equality 
is it then important to pursue? The notion of equality in the context of distributive justice is not 
about treating or considering everyone as contemporaries, but about distributing certain goods 
proportionally in accordance with peoples’ recognised inequalities.7  
 The critical issue then becomes the appropriate basis or metric for measuring people’s 
distributive shares. Should an attempt be made to make people equal in welfare, material 
resources, or opportunities? A consideration of a metric for equality is necessary for this 
discourse because the plight of foreign workers in South Africa falls within a larger equality 
domain. Consequently, any measures undertaken to correct their plight will concern distributive 
justice.  
 
3.2.1 Equal welfare 
In answering what egalitarians should seek to equalise, welfare theorists assert that what is of 
paramount importance is peoples’ overall wellbeing and as such society should seek to equalise 
                                                          
6 Ronald Dworkin ‘What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare’ (1981a) 10(3) Philosophy & Public Affairs 185. 
7 Bernard Williams ‘The idea of equality’ in Robert Goodin & Philip Pettit (eds) Contemporary political 
philosophy: An anthology, second edition (2006) at 456.  
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the welfare of its members.8 Individuals are deemed to have been treated in the same fashion if 
resources are distributed among them in a manner that leaves them reasonably the same in 
wellbeing.9 Thus, one achieves equality, and consequently justice, only when everyone enjoys 
the same level of wellbeing or welfare. Utilitarianism is a kind of welfare equality as it involves 
maximising the aggregate welfare (total wellbeing) of individuals in society.10  
 Yet a welfare-centred conceptualisation of equality requires making interpersonal welfare 
comparisons, which can be rather problematic for at least two reasons.11 Firstly, welfare — like 
the conception of equality itself — elicits varied interpretations. Some may take it to connote 
success in attaining desired plans or pursuits, while others may liken it to happiness or pleasure 
or even satisfaction.12 These different interpretations of welfare at the onset render welfarism 
much too subjective a theory to address equity challenges. Besides that, it is theoretically 
difficult, if not nearly impossible, to make interpersonal comparisons of welfare simply because 
people are different, have varied preferences and ideas of what constitute their wellbeing. Even if 
it were possible to measure welfare in interpersonally comparable units, the result would not be 
ethically desirable.13 In consequence, it is submitted the idea of welfare as a metric for equality is 
inadequate.  
 Secondly, and perhaps the biggest criticism of welfare equality, is the objection to 
‘levelling down’ or downscaling owing to the problem of ‘expensive tastes’. The crux of this 
concern is that some people have preferences that are expensive to satisfy. Satisfying these kinds 
of people to the same degree as those with modest or controlled preferences will undoubtedly 
require a great many more resources.14 Therefore, people with expensive tastes will inadvertently 
secure more resources under a welfarist approach.15 Taking into account peoples’ expensive 
tastes may very well thwart the exact aim of welfare equality, as the only way to achieve equality 
                                                          
8 Louis Pojman ‘Theories of equality: a critical analysis’ (1995) 23(2) Behavior and Philosophy 1 at 10.  
9 Dworkin op cit note 6 at 185.   
10 Amartya Sen ‘Equality of what’ (1980) in The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, I, 197-220 at 205.  
11 Richard J Arneson ‘Equality and equal opportunity for welfare’ (1989) 56 Philosophical Studies 77 at 81.  
12 Dworkin op cit note 6 at 244.  
13 Louis Putterman, John E. Roemer & Joaquim Silvestre ‘Does Egalitarianism Have a Future?’ (1998) 36(2) 
Journal of Economic Literature 861 at 865.  
14 Elizabeth Anderson ‘What is the point of equality?’ (1999) 109 Ethics 287 at 293.  
15 Putterman et al op cit note 13 at 866.  
85 
 
in this instance will be to level down, make everyone equally worse off or unhappy. 16 
Consequently, it is also submitted that interpreting equality in terms of welfare is undesirable. 
Dworkin cautions that welfarism, as a theory is neither a coherent nor an attractive ideal because 
it does not hold people personally responsible for their own wellbeing or personal choices.17 The 
issue of expensive tastes means individuals can attain different levels of welfare because of the 
choices they make. When welfare inequality occurs because of voluntary personal choice, 
equality of welfare turns into a poor ideal for sustaining distributive equality.18 
 
3.2.2 Equal resources 
Dworkin and many resourcist scholars reject equality of welfare and advocates for the adoption 
of a theory of equality of resources. Resource equality supposes that equality is achieved when 
the resources devoted to each individual leaves their share of the total resources identical.19 It 
advocates for everyone to have the same share of resources. While it is clear that the state cannot 
guarantee people equal wellbeing, at least it can distribute resources (economic resources in the 
least) or goods so that everybody has an identical share.20 The premise is that the state can 
control resources redistribution much better than regulating wellbeing, which can be just as 
elusive as equality itself.  
 In any case, a theory of equality of resources is supposedly a much stronger ideal for 
explaining equality as it holds people responsible for their choices or decisions, including their 
expensive tastes.21 In this context, people are responsible for their bad choices or actions; and 
only compensated for circumstances out of their control such as gender or race.22  
 Despite its relative strength for explaining equality, resourcism is not without criticism. It 
risks the same problem of levelling down or downscaling as does welfarism. At times, it is 
necessary to make everyone worse off so long as they all have identical resources. However, 
                                                          
16 Pojman op cit note 8 at 11.  
17 Dworkin op cit note 6 at 244.  
18 Arneson op cit note 11 at 81.  
19 Ronald Dworkin ‘What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources’ (1981b) 10(4) Philosophy & Public Affairs 
283 at 289.  
20 Arneson op cit note 11 at 77.  
21 Dworkin op cit note 6 at 244. 
22 Pojman op cit note 8 at 12. 
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unlike welfarism, resource theorist hold people responsible for developing expensive tastes as a 
condition for being entitled to equal resources.23 Still, some critics of this approach also protest 
that resourcism has the tendency to create over-reliance on the welfare state, especially if 
equality infers a duty of the state to redistribute resource continuously.24  
 A resource-based approach to equality is also susceptible to what has been dubbed ‘the 
slavery of the talented’ problem where people with high talents would be relatively 
disadvantaged in welfare should individual talents be included among the resources to be 
distributed.25 This measure of resource equality is undesirable because applying it will result in 
objectionable distribution of welfare. 
 Both theories of welfarism and resource equality are essentially about equality of 
outcomes or results, converging onto same status and/or income. The resource-welfare 
discussions thus far suggest that striving to secure the same welfare or outcomes for everyone in 
society is impracticable and indefensible. The point being, two people may start out with equality 
of resources, but through some rational and voluntary choices of their own end up unequal in 
welfare.26 The fact of the matter is that some will always end up with more than others in one 
way or another. How then can a society still pursue and attain the degree of distributional 
equality it seeks?  
 
3.2.3 Equal opportunity or access  
While it is understandable that welfare and resources are both necessary, they are complicated to 
obtain. There is no way to guarantee people equal wellbeing; at best, they can be offered equal 
resources. That is not to say the pursuit of equality is futile. An alternative framework for 
analysing equality is needed. Perchance the best approach will be to make opportunity the 
preferred concept of advantage to be equalised among people.  
 Perhaps it is time that the focus is shifted away from the outcomes towards addressing the 
inequity embedded in the actual processes or opportunities (starting positions) offered to 
individuals rather than the resultant outcomes. After all, equality of opportunity (starting points) 
                                                          
23 Anderson op cit note 14 at 293.  
24 Pojman op cite note 8 at 13.  
25 Dworkin op cit note 19 at 312.  
26 Arneson op cit note 11 at 84.  
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and equality of outcomes (end-points) are both sub-divisions of substantive equality.27 It is the 
assertion that equalising people’s real chances of getting a ‘good’ that they aspire to (equal 
opportunity or access) is a relatively much stronger and appropriate interpretation of distributive 
equality. Equal opportunity or access therefore is the appropriate measure of equality for the 
pursuit of social justice because it transcends goods and welfare to accentuate the equal moral 
worth of individuals.  
  ‘Equal opportunity’ is not a simple notion. It is complex and requires contextualisation 
in a general theory of justice. Equality of opportunity means fundamentally that inequalities 
produced by differences in peoples’ circumstances are unfair.28 Therefore, equal opportunity, as 
a principle of equality, implies the creation of real chances so that everyone has the potential to 
achieve the same outcomes; the extent to which they actually do is subject to their autonomous 
choices or effort.29 People with equal opportunity can still have intrinsic issues that affect their 
ability to access the opportunity. The failure to access opportunity in this case is not a matter of 
external barriers. 
 The premise with this notion of equality is that people should technically have the same 
chance, opportunity, or access to secure desired goods or services, or to vie for better positions in 
society.30 Everyone should at least have the same starting position. This premise assumes that the 
outcomes (wellbeing or resource share) sustained by individuals are the product of their 
circumstances (social circumstance), effort (rational action), and policy.31 If this is accepted, then 
the ultimate goal of the conception of equal opportunity is to ‘level the playing field’ among 
individuals by removing any irrelevant barriers that impede some people from reaching a desired 
final condition.32 Achieving this condition requires a space where all individuals have a realistic 
                                                          
27 Pojman op cit note 8 at 24.  
28 Andrew Mason Levelling the playing field: The idea of equal opportunity and its place in egalitarian thought 
(2006) at 129.  
29 John E Roemer ‘Equality of opportunity’ in Steven N Durlauf & Lawrence E Blume (eds) The New Palgrave 
dictionary of Economics, 2 ed (2008) 1.  
30 John Baker ‘Equality’ in Healy, S, Reynolds, B & Collins, M L (eds) Social Policy in Ireland: principles, practice 
and problems, 2 ed (2006) 6.  
31 John E Roemer ‘Equality of opportunity: A progress report’ (2002) 19 Social Choice and Welfare 455 at 456.  
32 Pojman op cit note 8 at 18.  
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chance of success if they were to attempt to do or attain an available good or opportunity, and 
then leaves individual choices and their efforts to dictate further outcomes.33  
 For instance, if all foreign workers have equal opportunity with regard to social 
protection, it means they have fair access to decent and valuable employment and subsequently 
fair chance at securing the needed social security. This is because formal employment is a 
prerequisite to secure work-related formal social protection. In this model, inequalities ensue 
when differences in peoples’ positions are such that some but not others can secure the resources 
needed to be able to lead a decent life.34 So in order to prevent the differences in peoples’ 
circumstances from influencing their relative access to resource or advantage (opportunities), 
justice will require mitigating the effects. This interpretation of equal opportunity contains the 
appropriate procedural components required by a theory of social justice.35  
 Furthermore, equal opportunity is, for the most part, a question of addressing inequalities 
of access to particular kinds of goods or resources.36 Both the welfarist and resourcist approaches 
to equality overly accentuate the end goal (result) of wellbeing at the expense of the means 
(process) instrumental in reaching the goal.37 The right to social protection is an illustration. The 
end goal will be to extend social protection to all, but the means of realising this goal will be to 
eradicate inequality relating to conditions of, and opportunities for working. In this scenario 
social protection may be a particular kind of ‘good’ or service desired by a large proportion of 
people in all sections of society: the employed and unemployed, abled-bodied and disabled alike, 
young and old, males and females and so forth.  
 However, not all who desire it can have it. It will be necessary, even expected, to set 
certain conditions of access to social protection, which may well mean that not everyone who 
desires the goods or services satisfies the conditions. Even if all or many people satisfied the 
conditions of access, there will simply not be enough funds to cover everyone, necessitating the 
                                                          
33 Mason op cit note 28 at 22.  
34 Ibid at 216. 
35 Social justice simplistically refers to political, social, and economic rights and opportunities. Despite the varied 
understanding of social justice, it is central in South African jurisprudence in general and labour law in particular. 
For a detailed conception of social justice, see John Rawls A Theory of Justice (1971) Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
36 Mason op cit note 28 at 7.  
37 Ingrid Robeyns ‘The capability approach: a theoretical survey’ (2005) 6 Journal of Human Development 93 at 95. 
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need to regulate access through more stringent system of rationing.38 In this situation, it will be 
perfectly reasonable to limit, contingently and fortuitously, social protection owing to financial 
feasibility.  
 While it would be acceptable for a policymaker to set stringent conditions that govern 
access to social protection, the conditions should not set an intrinsic limit to the number of 
people who might gain access to social protection by satisfying the established conditions. 
People from all sections of society should preferably have an equal chance of satisfying the 
conditions for the good in question should they choose to do so. Equality of access in this context 
necessitates that no instituted legal, bureaucratic, or other barriers should deny any members of a 
particular group fair access to (social protection) opportunities.39  
 Bernard Williams aptly articulates this argument when he describes equal opportunity as 
‘the notion that a limited good shall in fact be allocated on grounds which do not a priori exclude 
any section of those that desire it’.40 No policy or social intervention in this regard makes it 
harder for members of a particular group to participate on an equal footing with more privileged 
groups.41 Any action short of identical participation is a limitation on opportunities since equal 
opportunity constitutes a degree of equality of participation to ensure a level of equal outcomes.  
 However, that does not mean that the equal opportunity approach incessantly guarantees 
equality. Absolute equal opportunity is unfeasible, as two people will never have exactly the 
same opportunity to reach a goal.42 Equal opportunity only means all persons should enjoy the 
same sets of available choices or options at a point in time.43 After this initial equivalent option 
stage intended to equalise outcomes, inequalities of outcome may ensue at a later stage owing to 
certain autonomous choices or ‘differentially negligent behaviour’.44 Inequality is only bad or 
unjust when it does not arise from voluntary choices. Thus any actual differential outcomes 
owing to differences in choice (which are factors within the individual’s control), despite an 
                                                          
38 Williams op cit note 7 at 458.  
39 Baker op cit note 30 at 7.  
40 Williams op cit note 7 at 459. 
41 Baker op cit note 30 at 7. 
42 Pojman op cit note 8 at 18.  
43 Arneson op cit note 11 at 83.  
44 Ibid at 84.  
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initial levelled playing field, are ethically acceptable from a distributive equality standpoint.45 
 The assumption now is that it is fair to hold people personally responsible for the choices 
they make and if need be, let them bear the consequences of their choices. Whilst this may be 
seemingly reasonable, sometimes it is unreasonable to put too much emphasis on personal 
responsibility. This is because the situations under which people make choices may remarkably 
affect whether it is fair to require them to bear personal responsibility for the consequences.46  
 
3.3 Human capability approach: Conceptual framework to equal opportunity 
Equality of opportunity has not escaped criticisms.47 The concern here, however, is not so much 
with identifying the economic, political, or even the social obstacles that currently stand in the 
way of implementing equality of opportunity, but with how to limit inequality by ensuring that 
everyone in society is in a reasonably comparable position to lead a decent life. In order to 
seriously deliberate on ameliorating the social phenomenon of inequality and advocate for policy 
reform to bring about social change in society, there can be no reliance solely on advancing a 
theory of equal opportunity.  
 In order to ensure the principles expounded in the equal opportunity theory are realised in 
practice, due regard must be given to people’s real opportunity or ability to choose. Peoples’ 
realised achievements and their possible freedoms or opportunities from which to choose forms 
the cornerstone of the human capability approach.48 The suggestion here is that policymakers 
will do best to utilise the capability approach in designing or evaluating (social) policies to 
ensure the realisation of a level of fairness and social justice. As a normative theory, the 
capability approach is valuable in the conceptualisation of inequality and subsequently social 
change. In this study, human capability plays an evaluative role in determining whether equal 
opportunity exists for irregular migrant workers. 
 
                                                          
45 Roemer op cit note 31 at 455.  
46 Mason op cit note 28 at 218.  
47 See Matt Cavanagh Against equality of opportunity (2002). Also see Thomas Pogge ‘A critique of the capability 
approach’ in Brighouse & Robeyns (eds) Measuring equality (2010). 
48 Ingrid Robeyns ‘The Capability Approach’ in Edward N Zalta (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(2011) available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/capability-approach.  
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3.3.1 Constructing capability 
The capability theory,49 initially intended as a theory of the ‘currency’ of justice in formulating 
the principles of distributive justice,50 has morphed into substantive equal opportunity. For Sen, 
capability is about the freedom to achieve valuable beings and doings – thus what a person may 
value doing or being. The capability approach here is in terms of human development and equal 
opportunity – that is, expanding people’s freedom or ability to choose one type of life over others 
by removing major sources of obstacles that hamper freedom.51  
 In order to appreciate the human capability approach to understanding social justice, it is 
important to explicate what Sen meant in developing the concept. While a complete theoretical 
review of the capability approach, as developed by Sen, goes beyond the scope of this chapter, a 
brief conceptualisation is necessary in understanding its usefulness as an evaluative tool in this 
context. 
 Sen intended the capability approach to be an egalitarian response to and critic of both 
resourcist and welfarist approaches.52 Martha Nussbaum then further developed Sen’s theory into 
a partial theory of justice. In Sen’s view, neither resource nor welfare is suitable for interpersonal 
comparison for a theory of justice. Rather, the focus should be on a person’s doings and beings 
(referred to as ‘functionings’), and their actual freedom to choose from those functionings.53 That 
is, neither the resources nor the welfare derived should be the basis for an evaluation of an 
individual’s life, but on their ‘capability to function’.54  
 The two main underlining ideas of the capability approach are those of functionings 
(valuable doings and being) and freedom. Sen considers what a person is effectively able to do 
and to be as a functioning, and a capability as the freedom to achieve said functioning.55 Peoples’ 
‘capability set’ or opportunity set represents all the various set of functionings (possible doings 
                                                          
49 Originally pioneered by Amartya Sen and further advanced by Martha Nussbaum and other scholars. 
50 Mathias Risse ‘Immigration, ethics and the capabilities approach’ (2009) 34 Human Development Reports 
Research Paper 1 at 2.  
51 Ibid.  
52 See Amartya Sen ‘Equality of what?’ (1979) 1 The Tanner Lecture on Human Values 197.  
53 Richard Arneson ‘Distributive justice and basic capability equality: “Good enough” is not good enough’ in A 
Kaufman (ed) Capabilities equality: Basic issues and problems (2006) 21.  
54 Jonathan Wolff ‘Equality: The recent history of an ideal’ (2007) 4 Journal of Moral Philosophy 125 at 131.  
55 Ibid at 132.  
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and beings) that they are able to achieve with their given resources and opportunities.56 As 
regards the key idea of functionings, this is rather broad and can include things such as being 
literate, part of a community, healthy, respected, working, resting, and so forth. Although Sen 
fails to set out a definitive list of functionings, it is recognised that the various things that a 
person may value doing or being (functionings) can be elementary (like nourishment or 
mobility), complex (e.g. self-respect), general or specific. What is more, functionings can either 
be potential or achieved, rendering them measurable and comparable.  
 The second main idea of freedom is relatively simpler than the first. Freedom, for Sen, 
has an opportunity aspect as it speaks to a person’s ability to achieve desired functionings. It is 
about the availability of substantive opportunities so that people can choose those options that 
are most valuable to them.57 Hence, according to Sen, the basis of social justice is actually the 
pursuit of basic capability equality, a scenario in which each person equally has the capability to 
achieve all necessary basic types of functionings.58  
 Therefore, a pursuit of social justice will require a situation in which policies and actions 
are set in a way that each person equally has freedom to achieve a suitable level of basic 
capabilities. This is not to suggest that the capability approach is by any means a simple one. As 
a theory, it cannot explain social phenomenon such as inequality; 59  but coupled with 
supplementary explanatory theories it can be effective in addressing policy challenges, 
particularly those pertaining to welfare.60  
 
3.3.2 Assessing equal opportunity through human capabilities 
Bearing in mind that the intent is on making opportunity the preferred measure of equality, it 
makes sense to focus on what people are effectively able to be and do as a metric.61 Assessing 
whether there has been equal opportunity will involve assessing the impact of policies on 
people’s valuable opportunities or ability to choose (capabilities). In other words, the way 
                                                          
56 Robeyns op cit note 37 at 100. 
57 Ibid at 95.  
58 Arneson op cit note 53 at 21.  
59 It is a normative framework for evaluating or assessing people’s wellbeing or policies.  
60 Robeyns op cit note 37 at 94. 
61 Ibid.   
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policies in reality influence people’s ability to lead the lives they want, have what they want, and 
be who they desire.62  
 Using the right to social protection as an example yet again, suppose the government 
imposes a legal rule that only the formally employed citizens are entitled to access social 
protection. Using the capability approach to evaluate this policy will reveal that the policy does 
not support equality in any form. To reach this conclusion would require broad analysis of how 
such a policy impacts on people’s substantive opportunities: to discover the social protection 
position of people.  
 The first analysis would have to assess whether the resources or means necessary for 
obtaining or enjoying the right to social protection is present. The inquiry is whether or not there 
is an existing social security policy and if people have reasonable chances of meeting eligibility 
criteria or conditions, i.e. whether it would extend its cover to everyone in society.  
 The second analysis would have to establish existing conditions for securing social 
protection. This stage involves, for instance, determining peoples’ access to paid work or 
existing prospects to acquire social protection. All stages of this evaluation happen within a 
given context because peoples’ real or effective opportunities are influenced in some degree by 
the social context — social institutions, legal norms or environmental factors — in which 
genuine choices occur.63 Therefore, assessing whether the conditions in which people make 
choices are enabling or fair would require scrutinising the social context within which the 
choices are made.64 Thus, the capability approach to equality forces an analysis of the context in 
which issues of policy and social change takes place.  
 As discussed in the previous chapter, current equality policy developed as a way to 
contest the negative treatment accorded to some groups but not to others.65 Equal opportunity is 
likely the appropriate metric for assessing equality in South African society in view of the 
country’s political past. Arguably, the principle of non-discrimination embedded in anti-
                                                          
62 Ibid at 95.  
63 Ibid at 99.  
64 Ibid.   
65 Ockert Dupper ‘The current legislative framework’ in EML Strydom (ed) Essential employment discrimination 
law (2004) 14.  
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discrimination legislation are a form of equal opportunity, albeit a weak form.66 This is because 
the principle of non-discrimination does not condone decisions, procedures, or rules that deny 
people access to advantage because of their race, religion, gender, or nationality, among others.67 
This notion of equal opportunity or access is a key requirement not captured by both welfarist 
and resourcist approaches to equality.  
 Coupling equal opportunity with the capability approach would enable scholars to gauge 
disparities in South African domestic policies that hinder the freedoms of some members, in an 
attempt to bring it more in line with international norms and standards. The capability approach 
is not only useful in allowing scrutiny of inequalities concerning other matters in addition to the 
distribution of resources,68 it will also identify salient structural and psychosocial inequalities, 
such as de facto group segregation and other unfair informal social norms, that affect peoples’ 
abilities to stand as equals in society.69 The capability approach is sensitive to human diversity as 
it recognises that people’s needs vary according to a range of personal, social, and environmental 
factors.70 Thus, the proposed model is holistic in addressing a person’s ability to take advantage 
of opportunities available to them in light of differing needs and circumstances.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
The chapter has considered three conceptions of distributive equality (welfare, resources and 
opportunities) in an attempt to present the best requirements for measuring the parameters of 
equality. Welfare as a metric for equality fails because welfare is too ambiguous and lacks the 
necessary conditions for interpersonal comparisons.  
 Similarly, equality of resources, though relatively stronger than welfare equality, must 
fail because it is also about equality of outcomes. As already established, advocating for the 
same level of welfare or resource outcomes for everyone in a society is impractical and 
indefensible because people make autonomous choices and decisions that inevitably influence 
                                                          
66 Baker op cit note 30 at 6.  
67 Mason op cit note 28 at 29.  
68 Anderson op cit note 14 at 319.  
69 Elizabeth Anderson ‘Justifying the capabilities approach to justice’ in Harry Brighouse & Ingrid Robeyns (eds) 
Measuring justice: Primary goods and capabilities (2010) at 88.  
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their outcomes. All attempts to distribute goods or resources equitably will be ineffective 
because someone will always end up with more than others in one way or another. There is no 
guarantee of people’s equal wellbeing or equal resources in spite of government’s best 
intentions.  
 The best approach to equality will be to make opportunity the measure as it takes into 
consideration what people are effectively able to be and able to do. Equality of opportunity is 
essentially about levelling the playing field by removing any irrelevant barriers that impede some 
people from enjoying the same chances at reaching the outcome. The use of equality of 
opportunity coupled with Sen’s capability approach as an evaluative tool will allow for easier 
detection of differential treatments that impair the dignity of a group. 
 The capability approach is interdisciplinary yet seldom applied in a socio-legal context. 
Despite its usefulness in issues of policy and social change, it alone cannot be relied on in 
advocating for policy reform or social justice as it is not an explanatory theory but merely a 
normative framework. In view of that, the equal opportunity theory coupled with the capability 
approach can explain and address inequality embedded in South African work-related social 




CHAPTER IV SOCIAL PROTECTION: MIGRATION, LABOUR, AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES  
 
‘For much of human history, movement – migration – has been the norm: an endless search for 
new hunting grounds, new pastures, new sources of goods to be traded, new means of work. The 
rise of the modern state changed all that.’1 
 
4.1 Introduction 
A 2014/15 ILO World Social Security Report asserts that in the year 2012, only 27 per cent of 
the world’s working-age population (and their families) had access to comprehensive social 
security systems.2 This suggests that the fundamental human right to social security is unfulfilled 
for a significant proportion of the world’s population.3 Evidently, almost three-quarters of the 
global populace, some 5.2 billion or so vulnerable individuals, enjoy little to no access to social 
protection.4 What is more, a great number of these people, some 800 million people, constitute 
the working poor, with many of them working in the informal economy.5 The chronic lack of 
access to social protection for a large majority of people will inevitably result in growing levels 
of inequality as social protection policies help promote economic and social development.6 
 While the prospects of extending substantial rights to irregular migrants may be 
considered extremely problematic by some people, the promotion of the rights of unauthorised 
migrants is conceivable. There are reasonable normative and pragmatic arguments for advancing 
the rights of unauthorised migrants that warrant attention. Arguments in favour of promoting the 
rights of this vulnerable class of foreigners can be done from myriad perspectives, including 
migration, labour and human rights viewpoints.  
 Accordingly, this chapter delineates arguments on the need to extend social protection 
rights to unauthorised foreign workers from three dominant perspectives: namely migration, 
                                                          
1 Nigel Harris Thinking the Unthinkable: The Immigration Myth Exposed (2002) 9.  
2 International Labour Organization (ILO) World Social Security Report 2014/15: Building economic recovery, 
inclusive development and social justice (2014) 2.   
3 In South Africa, social security is also a constitutional right.  
4 ILO op cit note 2.  
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid.  
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labour, and human rights. Section 4.2 of the chapter broadly introduces some technical issues 
relating to the conceptualisation of social protection. Arriving at a working definition of social 
protection for purposes of the study produces conclusion regarding the concept. 
 Section 4.3 of the chapter commences an argument in favour of social protection rights 
promotion from a migration angle. Central to this argument is an analysis of clandestine 
migration flows to reveal structural factors facilitating and perpetuating migration for 
employment and the subsequent need to extend the right of access to social protection to the 
most vulnerable role players, unauthorised foreign workers.  
 Finally, sections 4.4 and 4.5 explore the need for extending social protection coverage 
from both a labour and human rights context respectively. In this regard, the chapter shows that 
migration is synonymous to labour movement, and legal protection is a way of regulating that 
movement.  
 Essentially, this chapter makes salient the complex relationship between immigration, 
social security, and labour laws. However, the chapter does not intend to propose solutions to the 
exclusion of unauthorised foreign workers from the social protection systems of host nations.7 
Section 6.6 of chapter 6 of the thesis explores that proposal. Presently, the chapter identifies and 
discusses major debates within the field of social protection. 
 
4.2 Conceptualising social protection 
Social protection is increasingly gaining focus on development agendas globally. Economies 
across the globe are beginning to recognise it as a powerful mechanism for the fight against 
poverty, exclusion, and inequality. Concerns about globalised economic risks (such as the 2008 
global financial and economic crisis), 8  the changing nature of work, as well as increasing 
complex labour market segmentation trends, to an extent, account for the sudden salience of 
social protection in many policy debates in both government and academia. The global financial 
and economic crisis, for instance, has had a significant impact on poverty and economic growth, 
                                                          
7 Recommendations for proposed reforms are dealt with in chapter 7.  
8 Piyasiri Wickramasekara ‘Protection of migrant workers in an era of globalization: The role of international 
instruments’ in R Blanpain (ed) Comparative labour law and industrial relations in industrialized market economies 
(2010) 251.  
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which impact on global migration and migrant workers.9 Slack economic growth during the 
crisis hindered expansionary measures as governments limited funds available for social 
protection interventions for people in need.10  
 There have been several conceptualisations of social protection, each focusing on a 
specific kind of vulnerability. Traditional understanding of social protection often centres on 
poverty (mainly income poverty) reduction. Thus, social protection has focussed and continues 
to focus on mechanisms to mitigate and/or protect people against life’s many shocks. Even so, 
social protection as a concept has also evolved to include a wide range of strategies that aim to 
make significant contributions to the promotion of economic growth and stability. The discourse 
has moved beyond the context of improving upon the livelihoods of the poor (as an end goal) to 
include giving the poor the opportunity to contribute to and benefit from the growth process.11 
That is to say, that social protection is a wide concept. 
 Major institutions, like the World Bank and the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
as well as other specific states or governments, employ different definitions of social protection 
depending on their agenda focus or need. Note, however, that the term ‘social security’ is more 
widely used in international human rights and numerous national instruments. For instance, the 
World Bank uses the term social security and defines it as ‘interventions that assist poor 
individuals, households, and communities to reduce their vulnerability by managing risks 
better’.12 Similarly, the ILO describes social security as:  
the protection which society provides for its members, through a series of public measures, 
against the economic and social distress that would otherwise be caused by the stoppage or 
substantial reduction of earnings resulting from sickness, maternity, employment injury, 
unemployment, invalidity, old-age and death and the provision of medical care and 
subsidies to families with children.13   
 
                                                          
9 Ibid. 
10 ILO op cit note 2 at xxiv.  
11 Abena D Oduro ‘Formal and informal social protection in sub-Saharan Africa’ Paper prepared for the ERD 
August 2010 at 11.  
12 Trina Haque ‘Dynamic risk management and the poor: developing a social protection strategy for Africa’ (2001) 1 
Africa Region Human Development Series at 4.  
13 International Labour Organization International labour migration: A rights-based approach (2010) 108-9.  
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Both descriptions of social security by the World Bank and ILO are limited to public measures, 
and considerably too narrowly focused on a traditional view of poverty reduction. 14  These 
traditional views of risk management and poverty reduction lean more towards the concept of 
social security than social protection.  
 In spite of the fact that the two concepts are often interchangeable, a slight distinction 
warrants conceptual clarification. Social security typically refers to (a combination of) public and 
private measures intended to protect individuals and their families against financial insecurity 
caused by certain contingencies, and includes the traditional twin elements of social insurance 
and social assistance.15  
 In this respect, the South African Department of Social Development, in Chapter 7 of the 
White Paper for Social Welfare (1997),16 defines social security as:  
covering a wide variety of public and private measures that provide cash or in-kind benefits 
or both, first, in the event of an individual’s earning power permanently ceasing, being 
interrupted, never developing, or being exercised only at unacceptable social cost and such 
person being unable to avoid poverty and secondly, in order to maintain children....17  
 
Although, the South African White Paper provides for a relatively broader definition that entails 
both public and private measures, it is still not comprehensive enough to capture all the 
complexities of vulnerability. The fact of the matter is that the concept of vulnerability, albeit 
contested, varies.18  
 The idea of social protection, on the other hand, is much wider than social security as it 
goes beyond the aspects that traditionally fall within the scope of social security. Social 
protection covers all features of social security (i.e. social insurance and social assistance), social 
services, and developmental social welfare aimed at improving human welfare.19  
                                                          
14 Oduro op cit note 11 at 2. 
15 Article 1.5 of the Code on Social Security in the SADC.  
16 The White Paper for Social Welfare is the baseline policy for a developmental social welfare in South Africa.  
17 EML Strydom ‘Introduction to social security law’ in Strydom, EML (ed) Essential social security law (2001) 23.  
18 Ingrid Palmary & Loren Landau ‘Citizenship, human rights, empowerment and inclusion, and the implications for 
social protection and social security harmonisation/coordination policies in SADC’ in Mpedi & Smit (eds) Access to 
Social Services for Non-Citizens and the Portability of Social Benefits within the Southern African Development 
Community (2012) 143. 
19 See Article 1.4 of the Code on Social Security in the SADC.  
100 
 
 Thus comprehensive social protection, 20  encompasses the following most common 
aspects: social assistance policies (cash or in-kind resources that are transferred to vulnerable 
individuals or households), social insurance (contributory schemes to mitigate risk, e.g. 
unemployment or health insurance schemes), and labour market interventions (programmes 
intended to protect workers e.g. minimum wage legislation). In this regard, the Taylor report21 
defines social protection as: 
…basic means for all people living in the country to effectively participate and advance in 
social and economic life, and in turn to contribute to social and economic development. 
Comprehensive social protection is broader than the traditional concept of social security, 
and incorporates developmental strategies and programmes designed to ensure, 
collectively, at least a minimum acceptable living standard for all citizens. It embraces the 
traditional measures of social insurance, social assistance and social services, but goes 
beyond that to focus on causality through an integrated policy approach including many of 
the developmental initiatives undertaken by the State.  
 
Similarly, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) conceptualises the term ‘social protection’ as ‘a 
set of policies and programs designed to reduce poverty and vulnerability by promoting efficient 
labour markets, diminishing people’s exposure to risks, and enhancing their capacity to protect 
themselves against hazards and interruption/loss of income’.22  
 Better still, Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler propose a more expansive meaning of social 
protection. They describe social protection as follows: 
the set of all initiatives, both formal and informal, that provide: social assistance to 
extremely poor individuals and households; social services to groups who need special 
care or would otherwise be denied access to basic services; social insurance to protect 
people against the risks and consequences of livelihood shocks; and social equity to 
protect people against social risks such as discrimination or abuse (emphasis in original).23  
 
The characterisation of social protection offered by Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler highlights 
four important dimensions that seek to recognise and deal with diverse forms of vulnerability: 
                                                          
20 The South African Department of Social Development makes use of the term ‘comprehensive social protection’. 
See the Department of Social Development ‘Strategic plan 2009-12’ available at 
http://www.dsd.gov.za/index2.php?option=com_docman&amp;task=doc_vie, accessed 1 October 2014. 
21 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa 
Transforming the Present – Protecting the Future (Consolidated Report) (2002) 41. 
22 Asian Development Bank ‘Social protection’ available at http://www.adb.org/de/node/152489, accessed 10 
November 2015. 
23 Stephen Devereux & Rachel Sabates-Wheeler ‘Transformative social protection’ (2004) IDS Working Paper 232 
at 9.  
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protective elements (recovery assistance from shocks); preventive measures (mitigating risks in 
order to avoid shocks); promotive measures (promoting opportunities); and transformative 
elements (focusing on underlying structural inequalities which give rise to vulnerability and 
exclusion).24  
 The conceptualisation provided by Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler is preferable, and used 
in the rest of the discussion, not only because it is more in line with the definition contained in 
the Code on Social Security in the SADC.25 It also transcends the simple management of risks to 
include a need for changes in the legal and regulatory frameworks to assist all classes of workers 
(local or migrants) locked in exploitative relationships owing to prevailing social inequalities.26 
In summation, social protection as a concept can connote various meanings. As a caveat, it is 
worth noting that whilst the study often mentions ‘social security’, the term serves as part of the 
broader idea of social protection. 
 
4.2.1 Forms of social protection 
It is clear from the above-explored characterisations of social protection that the concept is rather 
wide and can protect people in different ways based on their needs and status. Since social 
protection includes a range of possibilities, it is important to contextualise and outline the 
important components or areas of social protection most relevant for people of working age 
generally and for migrant workers particularly, given the focus of this study. 
 The ILO classifies the social protection needs of migrants into three general categories, 
all of which really pivot on income security.27 The first need is for migrants to replace any short-
term or permanent loss of income because of employment contingencies such as unemployment, 
disability, sickness, or maternity. The second relates to the need for some level of income 
support or other protection measures to avoid poverty and/or social exclusion in the event of 
earning capacity ceasing or disrupted. The third and final need concerns support in restoring 
and/or facilitating earning ability and employment participation after any employment 
contingencies. 
                                                          
24 Ibid at 10.  
25 See Article 1.4 of the Code on Social Security in the SADC.  
26 Oduro op cit note 11 at 2.  
27 ILO op cit note 2 at 25.  
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 Because the subjects of inquiry are those involved in some kind of economic activity, it is 
therefore necessary to focus attention on those specific rights related to their status as workers. 
That is, those areas of social protection related to employment or work-related risks. 
Accordingly, the primary strands of social protection most relevant to migrant workers, and of 
particular interest in this study, are social insurance (specifically unemployment and employment 
injury benefits), labour security, and to some extent social assistance. Where necessary, the study 
will refer to specific areas of social protection.  
 
4.3 A migration perspective of social protection 
Migration has always been a feature of human existence.28 People have been mobile as far back 
as recorded human history goes.29 Although migration is by no means a new phenomenon, 
contemporary processes of globalisation have changed its drive and nature. 30  The world is 
becoming gradually smaller as economies, markets, and societies are integrating across 
borders.31 The unintended consequence of this shrinking of the world, i.e. globalisation, has led 
to an increasing economic and political interdependence among diverse nation states. 32 
Developments in technology — mainly information and communications technologies (ICTs) — 
further drive this globalisation phenomenon. The improvement in ICTs not only bolsters 
economic and political relationships across borders; it also makes it easy to connect international 
labour markets.33 
 Even with the increasing integration of global markets and economies, developments in 
the cross-border movement of people lag far behind.34 For this reason, as more and more people 
move across international borders for economic reasons, individual nations are coming up with 
more intricate ways to control or restrict the mobility of people across their borders to protect 
                                                          
28 Bridget Anderson ‘Precarious past, precarious futures’ in Cathryn Costello & Mark Freedland (eds) Migrants at 
work: Immigration and vulnerability in labour law (2014) 29-43 at 29.  
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30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid at 249. 
32 Mathias Risse ‘Immigration, ethics and the capabilities approach’ (2009) 34 Human Development Reports 
Research Paper 1 at 1.   




national economic interests.35 Contemporary immigration policies the world over have become 
stricter in attempts to limit, control, or deter migration, particularly migration for employment.36 
Regardless of the increasing border control measures, people still leave their home countries for 
places where they are not entirely welcomed in the hope of finding a comparatively better life. 
Thus, the cross-border movement of people globally has become highly controversial. 
 
4.3.1 Internal migration in South Africa 
Although the primary focus of this study is on international or cross-border migration, it is 
important to explore the phenomena of internal migration movements in South Africa.37  A 
discussion of the migratory moves within the domestic borders, seemingly tangential, is 
necessary to provide the proper historical context in which to situate the current domestic 
migration trends or patterns.38 
 As discussed in chapter one, the apartheid regime created a system of large-scale 
marginalisation of the black population. It did so through myriads of draconian laws, some in the 
form of discriminatory migration controls that strictly regulated domestic migrants. 39  The 
apartheid homeland policies like the Bantu Authorities Act, Groups Areas Act, and the Urban 
Areas Act worked together to restrict the free movement of black South Africans, particularly 
African/Black people, within the country. The Native Urban Areas Act specifically designated 
South African urban areas as ‘white’ and limited the access and use of all black people, mostly 
black people, except for employment purposes. Black South Africans were required to carry 
permits called passes, a kind of internal passport, for admission into and employment in ‘white’ 
areas. These laws essentially determined patterns of internal migration in the country. 40 
                                                          
35 ILO op cite note 12 at 14. 
36 Robin Cohen Migration and its enemies: Global capital, migrant labour and the nation-state (2006) 184.  
37 Internal migration broadly refers to movement within the same country. In the South African context, it is 
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38 Pieter Kok & Mark Collinson Migration and urbanization in South Africa (2006) 1 available at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-04-02/Report-03-04-02.pdf, accessed 1 October 2014. 
39 Christine Fauvelle-Aymar MiWORC Report No. 6 Migration and employment in South Africa: An econometric 
analysis of domestic and international migrants (QLFS (Q3) 2012) (2014) 14. 




Consequently, domestic migration, historically, was mostly circular, 41  involving movement 
mainly from rural or peri-urban areas to urban or mining areas.42  
 Even with the fall of apartheid, circular migration patterns and the effects of 
discriminatory migration controls persist.43 Wentzel and Tlabela aptly summarise the historical 
context of current migration trends in the following observation: 
South Africa has a sad history of racially based government interventions in the movement and 
settlement patterns of its own people and those from other countries in the region, with grave effects 
on the well-being of most of its population. The dramatic political changes that took place in the 
early 1990s did remove the cause of this pain for most but not necessarily the lasting effects. Very 
poor rural people, trapped in the legacy of the apartheid homeland policy, have probably found it 
difficult to escape from their situation.44 
 
Perhaps it is unsurprising that labour migration45 has become a sensitive and pertinent discourse 
in South Africa, and the Southern Africa region generally. Although there is a long history of 
regional cross-border movement in Southern Africa,46  contemporary migration patterns have 
made the management of the arrivals and departures across South African borders for 
employment highly contentious. Such is the sensitivity of labour migration in the domestic arena 
that regional calls for a harmonised regional migration policy that promote free movement of 
labour has often being strongly opposed by regional ‘power houses’, including South Africa.47 
 Up until 2004, South Africa viewed two regional instruments — the 1995 SADC Draft 
Protocol on Free Movement and the 1998 SADC Draft Protocol on Facilitation of Movement — 
as threatening. For a developing economy such as South Africa, any public policy that 
encourages unrestricted cross-border labour flow raises apprehension, as there is both a real and 
perceived threat of the sudden influx of economic migrants from troubled neighbouring states 
                                                          
41 Circular migration is when people move for employment or educational purposes but their place of residence 
typically do not change with the move. 
42 Fauvelle-Aymar op cit note 38 at 14. 
43 Ibid.  
44 Cited in Kok & Collinson op cit note 37 at 1.  
45 This form of migration focuses mainly on individuals who move between countries for employment or migrant 
workers. 
46 Jonathan Crush, Vincent Williams & Sally Peberdy Migration in Southern Africa: A paper prepared for the policy 
analysis and research programme of the Global commission on International Migration (2005) 5. 
47 Jason P Schachter ‘Data assessment of labour migration statistics in the SADC region: South Africa, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe’ (2009) International Organization for Migration at 5.  
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and elsewhere on the continent. This is precisely the current climate and sentiment in the country 
as popular discourse tends to view immigration into the country as negative rather than strategic. 
This is not to suggest that contentions surrounding migration is unique to Southern Africa or 
South Africa. Current affairs suggest that hostility to migration and to migrants subsists in the 
global north, i.e. Europe and North America.  
 
4.3.2 Migration trends: Characterising a vulnerable group, quantifying the unidentifiable  
The first step in effective migration management is having good data. In this respect, the UN 
Population Division projects that about 244 million people, nearly 3.3 per cent of the world’s 
population, live outside of their country of birth or citizenship. 48  This global estimate 
constituting the global migration population includes asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants for 
employment and their families.49 These international migrants account for a very small share, a 
mere 3.2 per cent, of the entire global population.50 Only a small proportion of people actually 
migrate. Yet migrants are significant enough to warrant attention. The ILO estimates that a large 
proportion of this projected total international migrant stock, more than 90 per cent, migrate for 
work (i.e. constitute migrant workers).51  
 What is more, the growth of labour migration and the resulting distribution of 
international migrants by major source of origin and destination are notably interesting. The 
United Nations High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development further projects that about 
half of all international migrants, some 100 million or so people, are living in just ten countries.52 
The United States of America, the Russian Federation, Germany, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia, and Spain respectively supposedly 
host the majority of the world’s migrant population. 53 Data organised according to continent 
                                                          
48 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division ‘Population Facts’ No. 2013/2 
September 2013. Available online at 
http://esa.un.org/unmigration/documents/The_number_of_international_migrants.pdf. 
49 Wickramasekara op cit note 8 at 248. 
50 Ibid.  
51 International Labour Organization Preventing discrimination, exploitation and abuse of women migrant workers – 
Booklet 1 (2003) 9.  
52 Jean-Christophe Dumont & Bela Hovy World migration in figures (2013) 2.  
53 Ibid.  
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blocs suggests that the African region alone accounts for nearly 20 million of this migrant-
workers population.54 However, research shows that most of the migrants from the African 
region are more likely to remain on the continent.55  
 Another interesting feature of the migration phenomenon is the manner or channel in 
which it occurs. The ILO approximates that roughly 10-15 per cent of all international migration 
that take place can be categorised as unauthorised, irregular or clandestine.56 Whilst the precise 
number of irregular migrants internationally is difficult to determine due to the clandestine 
nature of their movements,57 anecdotal evidence suggests that the unauthorised movement of 
people across international borders persist. For instance, the United States supposedly boasts the 
highest number of irregular migrants in the world — some 10 million irregular migrants, mainly 
from Mexico.58 Similarly, more than half of the 3-4 million migrant workers in Russia are 
unauthorised or irregular.59  Other countries like the United Kingdom all boast a significant 
population of irregular migrant workers.60 
 Additionally, international migration is very much a gendered phenomenon. Globally, the 
proportion of female migrants (both regular and irregular) is comparable to their male 
counterparts, and rising. Migrant women constitute nearly half, roughly 49 per cent, of all 
international migrants worldwide.61 In the African region, the feminisation of migration is even 
more noticeable, with women constituting half of Africa’s migrant stock.62  Women migrant 
workers often tend to cluster in low-wage sectors outside the ambit of normal labour laws, where 
they encounter gender bigotry, sexual exploitation, and violence, in addition to the other forms of 
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unfairness migrants face generally.63 Evidence suggests that most women migrants are engaged 
in domestic worker sector, and are among the world’s most vulnerable workers.64 
 The domestic level tends to replicate, albeit on a much smaller scale, the above global 
trends. The South African case is particularly interesting as it is both a sending and receiving 
country of migrants in the SADC region.65 However, its status as a migrant-receiving country 
particularly tends to raise controversy. The country’s comparatively strong economy and 
political stability partly explain its acquired status as a favourable destination for migrants in the 
region. 66  The heightened political unrest, increased poverty and famine, as well as failing 
economies on the continent, contribute to people leaving oppressive conditions in search of 
comparatively better life elsewhere.67 South Africa, regarded as one of the more stable and 
relatively wealthier countries (economic powerhouse) left on the continent, attracts and absorbs 
people from its northern neighbours and other countries across the continent.  
 National migration data, though disputed,68 indicate that between the periods of 1994 to 
2004, the South African government received about 160 000 refugee claims.69 In 2007 alone, the 
Department of Home Affairs (DHA) received about 45,673 new asylum applications.70 The 
geographical distribution of this increasing migrant stock consists of some 687,678 migrants 
from Southern Africa, 41,817 from the rest of Africa, 228,318 from Europe and 40,889 from 
                                                          
63 Wickramasekara op cit note 8 at 256.  
64 ILO op cit note 13 at 95.  
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68 The reliability of migration statistics in the country is questionable as it is virtually impossible to capture 
accurately the number of migrants, particularly unauthorised migrants, as statuses may change without notification. 
Some people may enter the country by legal means and later become illegal due to overstayed visas or rejected 
refugee status. Unauthorised migrants are near impossible to find and count as staying under the radar is imperative 
for survival. Moreover, statistics tend to be either very conservative or outrageously manipulated for political 
purposes.  
69 Crush et al op cit note 46 at 13.  
70 Jonathan Crush ‘South Africa: Policy in the face of xenophobia’ (2008) available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/south-africa-policy-face-xenophobia, accessed13 February 2014.  
108 
 
Asia. 71  These records offer only a snapshot of what is happening at the highly regulated 
formalised spectrum of cross-border migration discourse.72  
 At the informal end of cross-border movements, deportation data indicates that the 
government has deported over 1 million foreign nationals since 1994, mainly from neighbouring 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho.73  Although it is practically impossible to know how 
many unauthorised foreign nationals reside in South Africa, current statistics puts the number of 
undocumented migrants present in the country between 1 and 8 million.74 Some government 
officials further claim the number of Zimbabweans in South Africa to be around 3 million and 
rising.75 However, a conservative estimate by Statistics South Africa puts the number of irregular 
migrants in the 500 000 to 1 million range.76 These migrants enter, live, and work in the country 
often without legal consent from the government.  
 In spite of this, it must be noted that these figures are often constructed and magnified to 
politicise a perceived ‘immigration problem’ that often stigmatises migrants and perpetuates 
xenophobic sentiments. In fact, foreign nationals are a numerical minority in almost all 
societies.77 In South Africa specifically, foreign nationals constitute only about two per cent of a 
population of 53 million people.78 Although it is arguable that this clandestine population are as 
numerous in reality as estimates suggest, they constitute a sizeable enough number to be a 
recognisable group both domestically and globally.79  
 Despite the reliability issues associated with current domestic records, it is undoubted 
that immigration into the country is rising and will continue to rise. The conspicuous rise in the 
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inflow of migrants from neighbouring countries and across Africa into South Africa cannot be 
viewed in isolation. Consensus in the migration literature points to a number of social, economic, 
and political factors that propel this international movement of people.  
 
(a) Factors influencing international cross-border movement 
The literature that covers the economic and sociological explanations of why people migrate 
reveals that people move for a variety of reasons. Although the causes of migration are 
theoretically complex and difficult to determine,80 the reasons for migration, broadly speaking, 
could be cultural, economic, environmental, and/or socio-political. In the general classification 
of motives for migration, there are so-called ‘push’ or ‘pull’ factors that further drive the surge.  
 Push factors are those conditions that drive individuals, either voluntarily or forcibly, out 
of their countries of origin. These factors may include environmental threats such as drought, 
overpopulation, and famine; political conditions such as conflict, rights violations, and fear of 
persecution; and economic concerns relating to unemployment, poverty and the absence of 
economic opportunities.81 
 Pull factors, on the other hand, are comparatively positive features of the destination 
countries that attract potential migrants to its borders. The availability of comparably better 
economic opportunities and the promise of a better life or standard of living can dictate where 
individuals end up.82  
 Globalisation is supposedly expanding income and security disparities among countries, 
which in turn increases migration pressures.83 Van Niekerk J aptly reflects that not only has 
globalisation ‘had a profound effect on international migration’, it has ‘increased significantly 
the number of people who migrate as a means of escaping poverty, unemployment and other 
social, economic and political pressures in their home countries’.84 Analysis into the important 
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factors that motivate people to move in the Southern Africa region replicates global patterns. 
Economic factors are the single most dominant motivation for people moving within the 
Southern Africa region, and into South Africa particularly.85 However, economic factors in this 
context act as both push and pull factors for potential migrants in the region. Failing economies 
on the continent have resulted in underemployment and lack of economic opportunities in some 
countries. Thus, migrants from these countries forcibly move in search of better opportunities. 
Alternatively, South Africa is one of the more stable and wealthier economies on the continent 
and is therefore attractive to migrants in search of better opportunities and standards of living.  
 In any case, people may leave their countries of origin for varied reasons, but it is the 
availability of comparably better opportunities in destination countries that mostly draws people. 
This is true for all regions of the world. Whether escaping political conflict, famine, or economic 
hardship, it is the prospect of something better elsewhere that guides people’s decision to move 
from their location. In this context, the actual decision to migrate — often to improve life 
chances or opportunities — can be an informal attempt at seeking social protection, a coping 
strategy, to remove themselves from situations of disadvantage.86 
 
(b) Typologies of foreign nationals 
There are different categories of migrants or foreign nationals, ranging from most secured to 
least secure. South African legislation recognises and distinguishes between citizens and various 
categories of migrants or non-nationals. The different legal categorisation of migrants, albeit 
non-exhaustive, include permanent residents, temporary residents, refugees, asylum seekers, and 
irregular (‘illegal’) foreign nationals. The law then gives the various types of non-nationals 
differentiated rights based on their immigration status and/or the reason for entering the country.  
 Permanent residents are foreign nationals permitted to live in the country indefinitely.87 
This group of foreign nationals typically enjoy most of the same rights, privileges, duties, and 
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obligations as citizens, except for those explicitly reserved for citizens such as the right to vote.88 
The South African Constitutional Court has confirmed this provision of equal treatment of 
permanent residents and citizens in a number of judgments.89  
 Temporary residents are non-nationals permitted to enter and/or stay in the country for a 
certain period.90 As a condition for their stay, the law requires that they do not breach the terms 
of their permit or become a ‘prohibited or undesirable person’.91 
 In line with its international obligation, refugees are foreign nationals granted asylum in 
terms of the South African Refugees Act 130 of 1998.92 Legally, they are entitled to full access 
and enjoyment of the constitutional rights contained in the Bill of Rights, are allowed to work, 
study, and access social protection.93 
 Asylum seekers, on the other hand, are by definition individuals who are seeking 
recognition as refugees in South Africa, or those whose refugee status has not been confirmed.94 
Although asylum seekers may work and study in South Africa,95  they are only entitled to 
minimum protection until they become fully recognised refugees.96 
 An irregular, unauthorised, or clandestine foreign national is a foreigner who is in the 
country in contravention of the Immigration Act and includes a ‘prohibited person’.97 Such an 
individual is open to arrest and deportation.98  The term used in South African government 
publications is ‘illegal’. As already pointed out in chapter one, someone can become irregular in 
multiple ways. Irregularity can occur when someone enters the country clandestinely by crossing 
the border at a place other than a recognised port or post. Others acquire fraudulent documents 
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prior to coming or during their stay in the country. Others still, after entering the country legally, 
contravene the terms of their residence permit by overstaying the allowed period, failing to 
renew, or by engaging in activities (working, trading, studying, and/or receiving government 
services) in defiance of their permit conditions. The flow of clandestine migration is not unique 
to South Africa. Countries in the global north like the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Australia encounter this issue. 
 
4.3.3 The form and nature of labour migration policy in South Africa 
The response of policymakers to the migration phenomenon is to institute domestic immigration 
policy and legal framework through which to address and manage migratory flows. In this 
respect, the South African government has decrees regulating the flow of migrants into the 
country, with differing impact on foreign nationals. In this respect, two broad public policies — 
namely the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 and the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 — regulate foreign 
nationals in South Africa. 
 While both the Immigration and the Refugees Acts broadly regulate foreign nationals in 
the country, the 2002 Immigration Act and its subsequent 2004 amendment constitute the 
principal policy or framework relevant to labour migration in South Africa.99  This existing 
labour migration policy covers two forms of laws: ‘laws relating to the admission of persons to 
and removal of persons from South African territory; and laws dealing with policy towards 
regulations of non-citizens inside the country’s borders.’ 100  In order to grasp the country’s 
current policy response to the inflows of foreigners from the region, it is necessary to outline the 
historical developments leading up to the current migration regime. Thus, the subsequent 
discussion examines the nature of past and existing domestic labour migration policies. 
 
(a) Migration policy pre-2002 
A historical assessment of developments leading up to the enactment of the Immigration Act 13 
of 2002 reveals an inherent residuary system, which is a legacy from the oppressive past of the 
                                                          
99 The Immigration Act 13 of 2002 has been amended  by the Immigration Amendment Act 19 of 2004. It falls 
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country.101 Immigration policing can be traced as far back as 1913, but policies regulating the 
admission of people into and within the country, including foreign nationals from other African 
countries, became increasingly restrictive during the height of the apartheid regime.102  
 The Immigration Regulation Act of 1913, including all subsequent amendments, arguably 
set the tone for the current immigration policy. South African immigration policy from 1913 up 
until the infancy of apartheid was characterised by ‘racial anxiety, white nationalism, and 
antisemitism’.103 However, it never went as far as regulating Africans from outside South Africa. 
Immigration policies only began focusing on migrants from other African states at the peak of 
apartheid. Essentially, immigration regulations during this period were numerous and similar in 
content. 
 In an attempt to consolidate all policies relating to immigration into a single legislation, 
the apartheid (Nationalist Party) government introduced the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991 
(ACA).104 The ACA did little to reform previous harsh legislation, as many of its provisions 
were mere transplants of preceding discriminatory policies. 105  The birth of the democratic 
dispensation in 1994 brought with it some substantive improvements to the ACA as the newly 
democratic government removed provisions that contained palpable violations of the rights of 
foreigners.106 Despite this progressive move, there was still a negative connotation attached to 
the amended policy owing to its historical origin. The resulting outcome was thus a need for an 
entirely new immigration policy mechanism free of any racial exclusion and domination.107 
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Consequently, the democratic government enacted the Immigration Act 13 of 2002, among other 
reasons, to redress some of these negative implications.  
 Additionally, in 1999, the government developed the White Paper on International 
Migration (the White Paper) with the hope of facilitating South Africa’s integration into 
SADC.108 The 1999 White Paper on immigration policy strongly emphasised the need to deter 
clandestine migration and the exercise of territorial sovereignty in controlling immigration rules. 
Article 15 of the White Paper explicitly states, as one of its priorities: ‘ensuring that illegal aliens 
do not take available job opportunities away from community members and do not compete with 
them for scarce public service’.  
 It is arguable that the intent of the African National Congress (ANC) to overhaul previous 
immigration policies and usher in a democratic era of policy reform is somewhat successful. It 
could be argued that the current immigration policy is merely types and shadows of both the 
ACA and the White Paper since it is still overly focused on control. 
   
(b) Contemporary labour migration policy 
In spite of historical developments and the revision of migration legislation, the current 
Immigration Act is still a restrictive labour migration policy because it is unfriendly towards 
unskilled and semi-skilled migrants, particularly the unauthorised, in its regulation of both the 
movement and employment of these foreigners within the country.  
 The intake of foreign workers into the South African labour market is minimised as much 
as possible by means of the reservation of employment opportunities for South African citizens, 
permanent residents and some highly skilled migrants.109 Employers are encouraged to make use 
of internal human resource reserves as far as they are able. Non-nationals are a last resort, and 
even so not all foreigners are welcomed.  
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 For instance, the DHA may admit some skilled foreigners into the country in certain key 
areas through special skills work permit quotas. Each year, per the Immigration Act, the Minister 
of Home Affairs, in consultation with the Ministers of Labour and Trade and Industry, identify 
and categorise any scarcity and critical needs in areas of the economy where skilled foreign 
labour can be used. The Act then permits identified qualified foreigners to apply for a 
scarce/critical skills work permit from the nearest Home Affairs office. However, this application 
process is often too bureaucratic and tedious, and success is not guaranteed. Among the 
application requirement are a five-year minimum practical experience, an evaluation of the 
formal qualification by the South African Qualifications Authority, completion of an application 
form and a fee payment for consideration of the visa.110  
 In striving to protect the existing internal labour market and simultaneously address the 
country’s skills shortage crisis, admission for employment purposes has been restricted to highly 
skilled foreign workers who have the preferred exceptional or scarce skills necessary to fill 
existing skills gap. Section 38 of the Immigration Act, which specifically deals with employment 
conditions, provides that: 
[n]o person shall employ- an illegal foreigner; a foreigner whose status does not authorize him or 
her to be employed by such person; or a foreigner on terms, conditions or in a capacity different 
from those contemplated in such foreigner’s status.111  
 
 Section 49(3) of the Act, which imposes criminal sanctions on employers who employ 
irregular migrants, further supplements this internal prohibition. In terms of s 49(3), ‘anyone who 
knowingly employs an illegal foreigner or a foreigner in violation of this Act shall be guilty of an 
offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment not exceeding one year…’ Thus, 
the Act expressly criminalises those who employ foreigners working without permits.  
 In consequence, the immigration policy (specifically ss 38 and 49) intentionally or 
unintentionally establishes unequal opportunity that has repercussions on the social protection 
and human capability of some foreign workers.112 The Act greatly deters the admission of semi-
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skilled, low-skilled, or unskilled workers. Incidentally, this negatively influences the livelihood 
of those affected foreign workers, particularly the unauthorised ones.  
 Looking at the evolution of South African immigration policy, the current South African 
discourse on international labour migration arguably still focuses on control and exclusion. The 
legal approach adopted by the South African government concerning labour migration is to close 
its borders and restrict the number of foreign workers admitted into the country.  
 Essentially, the Immigration Act is selective in the types of foreigners it allows entry to 
and proceeds to criminalise unauthorised foreign workers and employers who employ them. This 
immigration policing approach still primarily focuses on security, control and exclusion rather 
than management and development. 113  It does not offer any meaningful protection since it 
restricts access to available opportunities.114 In fact, the legal barriers to migration instituted by 
the government have inadvertently produced the reverse of the desired outcome. That is, the 
immigration law regulating the entry, stay, and exit of foreigners so austerely makes it too 
difficult for people to cross borders legally.115 Consequently, clandestine migration is very much 
a component of the migration discourse in South Africa.  
 In light of the increasing clandestine nature of economic migration into the country, the 
Minister of Home Affairs proposed radical changes to the current immigration law that could 
potentially exacerbate an already difficult situation. The proposed changes, which took effect on 
1 April 2014, are likely to have adverse effect on foreign nationals desiring to work in South 
Africa. The government is cancelling the previous exceptional skills work permits/visas that 
regulated the inflow of valuable foreign skills to thwart the skills shortage problem in the 
country. This means that individuals once considered exceptionally skilled are no longer 
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welcomed in terms of the amended policy, unless declared ‘critical’ by the Department of 
Labour.116  
 However, policymakers have not downplayed the challenges associated with developing 
a proper framework for managing migration in the country. In an address at a colloquium on 
immigration, the incumbent Home Affairs Minister Malusi Gigaba recognised the need for 
further policy reform. In his address, he stated that ‘South Africa’s “outdated” laws will undergo 
an overhaul to accommodate economic migrants, among other changes.’117 What these changes 
are or will look like remain unseen; nonetheless, the Minister seems to be taking positive steps in 
the right direction.  
 Policymakers may consider public policies that deny access of unauthorised migrants to 
essential rights, such as the current Immigration policy, a ‘deterrence measure to curb 
migration’. 118  Yet, experience suggests that restrictive regulation and policy vis-à-vis 
unauthorised migrants (such as the 2002 immigration law and the now implemented proposed 
amendments) are problematic in that they hamper the development of human capabilities.119 
South Africa will need a more progressive approach to international migration. That is to say, 
any future immigration policies or amendments will require a careful consideration and balance 
of a human rights regime as well as national development and interests.  
 In summary, the foregoing discussion corroborates that there is an existing labour 
migration policy or framework in South Africa. However, the nature of the South African labour 
migration policy in operation is quite restrictive. This observation is notable because scholars 
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propose a linear relationship between the nature of migration policies in operation and the legal 
position of different category of migrants in social security (protection) law.120  
 
4.4 In search of work: Social protection from a labour perspective 
An examination of the plight of unauthorised foreign workers is incomplete without considering 
the most crucial element of the labour migration process, work. Migrant workers, whether in a 
regular or irregular situation, cross international borders with the sole intention of seeking 
employment. The actual term ‘migrant workers’, those economically active migrant populace, 
suggests that these individuals engage in some kind of economic activity to support themselves 
and their dependants in destination countries. It is important to explore how they gain access to 
the labour market of host countries, and the conditions surrounding the employment they happen 
to get. A labour view of social protection thus argues that individuals derive work-related social 
protection and/or entitlements to social benefits primarily through labour market participation. 
Accordingly, authorised wage work is the main mechanism to justify people’s entitlements to 
vital work-related social protection in South Africa.  
 
4.4.1 Access to the domestic labour market  
Work is a vital component of the international labour migration phenomenon and usually the first 
barrier for irregular migrants. The ILO asserts that the majority of economically active people 
generally gain their livelihoods through income-generating activity, namely work.121 The labour 
market, whether formal or informal, serves as the primary source of social protection.122 Thus, 
labour market participation in the context of migration can be either a means to or a source of 
social protection in itself for all migrants, including unauthorised migrant workers.  
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 As a form or source of social protection, work provides a measure of income security, 
and income security is a necessity for the wellbeing of individuals and their families.123 Paid 
work gives a basic level of financial security and serves as a shield against unemployment and 
other work-related contingencies. The reality is that most employment-related contributory social 
protection is limited to those individuals who are or have been previously economically active.124  
 As a means to social protection, work is the main avenue through which workers gain 
access to rights and entitlements to employment-related benefits.125 The opportunity or access to 
work is a step in providing protection against labour market risks such as loss of employment 
and ultimately against poverty.126 The right of access to work is an extension of social protection 
perhaps because the employment relationship is a key reference for accessing other essential 
labour and social rights in most countries. The employment relationship helps determine the kind 
and degree of rights and duties employers have towards their workers.127 
 The discussion in the second part of this chapter already alludes to the fact that one of the 
‘pull’ factors escalating the movement of economic migrants is the availability or perception of 
comparable well-paid work in host nations. However, the admission of foreign workers is one of 
the most contested public policy issues in most national contexts.128 As previously indicated, a 
significant proportion of the world’s migrant population are working in host economies without 
legal authorisation.  
 Unlike their highly skilled and/or regular counterparts who are often better accepted,129 
host countries tend to deny unauthorised migrant workers access to the right to work from the 
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onset by precluding them from participating in the host labour market.130 Contemporary legal 
controls on foreign workers show that the prohibition of unauthorised work lies at the centre of 
the intersection of immigration and labour law.131 The fundamental tension in national labour 
migration policy goals — expanding employers’ access to migrant workers vis-à-vis protecting 
the employment and conditions of local workers — is evident in the South African context.132 
 In South Africa, like most globalised economies, public policy grants the opportunity to 
access employment in the domestic labour market only to citizens and long-term residents with 
permanent residence status. This ‘right to preferential access’ to the domestic labour market (a 
clear form of labour market protectionism) implies that some people are undoubtedly locked out 
of economic growth. 133  It follows that the current labour migration policy in South Africa 
envisages the admission of only skilled migrant workers for a defined and limited period. 
Consequently, the policy either overtly denies or extremely limits access to the labour market by 
all other would-be migrants, particularly the unauthorised, who do not possess the desired skills 
or qualifications.134 
 This attempt to protect the internal labour market against influx by ‘undesirable’ migrants 
indirectly facilitates clandestine migration. National law puts labour migration through a 
complex administrative procedure. South African admission policy requires foreign nationals to 
obtain a work permit before they take up or engage in any economic activity in the country. The 
acquisition of a work permit supposedly serves as both a residence permit and formal 
authorisation to take up employment. However, the procedure for obtaining a work permit is 
bureaucratic and costly. These legal hurdles undoubtedly affect the legal access to the labour 
market. In this regard, employment, or lack of access to, can reflect or perpetuate the inequality 
some migrant workers experience.  
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 Social protection for this class of workers is about more than income security; it is about 
giving people access to the dignity of being productive as they are willing and able to work.135 
For that reason, labour market accessibility — thus the right of access to work — is one of the 
essential components of social protection that can have great consequences for the overall 
welfare of unauthorised foreign workers. It is therefore necessary to link these workers to 
opportunities for economic activities.  
 The right to work in this respect is more to do with access to decent work.136 This is to 
mean:  
opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair income, security in the workplace and 
social protection for families, better prospects for personal development and social integration, 
freedom for people to express their concerns, organize and participate in the decisions that affect 
their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men.137  
 
Access to or opportunities for decent work or economic activities will improve their capabilities, 
which will in turn reduce the likelihood of their reliance on social assistance mechanism, which 
will ultimately reduce the probability of poverty for these people.138 
 
4.4.2 Working conditions of migrant workers  
Generally, irregular migrant workers, by law, have little to no access to labour markets, given 
their precarious legal position in the host country. In fact, most regimes of host nations prohibit 
them from taking up wage labour. In reality, however, some migrants tend to engage in certain 
areas of the host economy in spite of known legal prohibition.139 Restrictive and criminalising 
immigration policy negatively affects the ability of migrants to find any decent wage work, let 
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alone formal well-paid employment. 140  This is particularly true for irregular migrants who, 
because of their lack of legal status, take any kind of work they can find, often to their detriment.  
 As observed by Standing, the very nature of contemporary migration is ‘intensifying 
insecurities and putting many into precarious circumstances’.141 The plight of irregular migrant 
workers is concerning, as the increasing transformation of the labour market can be a real source 
of deleterious employment conditions.142 Unauthorised migrant workers are highly susceptible to 
excessive abuse and exploitation by employers and corrupt bureaucrats owing to their presence 
and activities being in violation of established immigration and labour laws.143 Unauthorised 
women migrant workers, notably female domestic migrant workers, are doubly disadvantaged as 
migrant workers and as women.144  
 Aside from the common labour exploitation, female migrants find themselves in low-
wage sectors lacking in basic protection and are more susceptible to trafficking, violence, and 
sexual exploitation by unscrupulous employers.145 Yet, unemployment can be a real source of 
risk that can affect every facet of their lives, not just economically. Increased susceptibility to 
unemployment is likely to exacerbate their overall economic vulnerability, as poverty is 
inevitable. 
 Globally the informal employment argument is, for the most part, accurate for this group, 
as unauthorised migrants that do work are mostly doing informal work. Research shows that 
most migrant workers, notably the low skilled, work in sectors where employment conditions are 
overall flexible.146 These sectors include but are not limited to agriculture, construction, domestic 
work, and hospitality. Therefore, those unauthorised non-nationals who find work are most likely 
in irregular wage employment in service as street vendors, casual labourers, or domestic workers, 
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out of reach of the states’ regulation.147 These sectors in the informal economy tend to be located 
at the periphery of a highly regulated formal economy. Moreover, these informal sectors of the 
labour market are either entirely ‘not covered by social security’ or often ‘compliance with social 
security laws is poorly enforced’.148 Thus, affirming the notion that conventional work-related 
social security provisions are limited to workers in the formal economy.149  
 In South Africa specifically, the levels of formal employment are rather low.150 This 
translates into the exclusion of a large proportion of the population from participation. Many 
migrant workers (with the exception of the highly skilled or permanent residents) in South Africa 
are, in reality, informal workers operating in under-regulated work environments.151 Informal 
workers tend to work in places or sectors of the economy where labour standards are often 
under-regulated or unregulated entirely, and access to social security and social protection is 
inadequate. Studies reveal that unauthorised migrants tend to be concentrated in precarious jobs 
in sectors where wages are sub-minimum and exploitation high. 152  These exploitative and 
labour-intensive sectors include mining, commercial agriculture, construction, hospitality, and 
security.153 In fact, the agricultural sector leads as the lowest-paying sectors in the country.154 
 In these so-called ‘migrant sectors’ of the economy, employment arrangements are often 
atypical.155 Unauthorised migrants tend to engage in so-called 3-D jobs that local workers would 
prefer to avoid. These jobs are not only mundane, but also dirty, dangerous and degrading;156 and 
those who do them tend to accept or even suffer under deleterious working and living conditions 
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for fear of detection and possible prosecution for immigration violations.157 In that line of work, 
income is unreliable, jobs are neither regular nor secure, conditions are perilous, and the 
probability of poverty is relentless.  
 Reports, albeit anecdotal, suggest that migrant workers experience poorer earnings and 
working conditions compared to their national counterparts in so-called migrant-concentrated 
sectors such as construction, agriculture, and hotel.158 Whatever the circumstance, these people 
are available and willing to engage economically; yet the law prohibits them from taking on 
available decent work that offers some level of protection against future risks. In this respect, 
laws that bar or exclude unauthorised foreign workers from employment (the right to work), by 
imposing criminal sanctions on employers who hire them, can have serious subordinating impact 
on their livelihood.159  
 Furthermore, South Africa has no specific labour policies or framework for migrant 
workers. However, the general national employment legislation - namely, the LRA, the EEA and 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (BCEA) - can regulate the working 
conditions of migrant workers as they apply to all workers. In spite of this, these statutes rely 
heavily on the definition of ‘employee’ in granting work-related protection to migrants. In South 
African employment law, an ‘employee’ is ‘any person, excluding an independent contractor, 
who works for another person or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive any 
remuneration and any other person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the 
business of the employer’.160  
 The common-law view and much of the early jurisprudence concerned with interpreting 
the definition of ‘employee’ had always presumed a valid employment contract as an eligibility 
criterion. 161  By interpreting the definition of ‘employee’ through the lens of contract law, 
jurisprudence categorically denied unauthorised foreign workers from the protection of South 
African employment law.162 The blanket omission of the protection rights of irregular migrant 
                                                          
157 Dupper op cit note 81 at 220. 
158 ILO op cit note 154 at 29.  
159 Fiss op cit note 77. 
160 See s 213 of the LRA, s 1 of the BCEA and the s 1 of the EEA respectively.  
161 Supra note 83 para 36.  
162 DJ Meyer ‘Migrant Workers and Occupational Health and Safety Protection in South Africa’ (2009) 21 SA Merc 
LJ 831-849 at 834.  
125 
 
workers under national labour law pivoted on the notion that any employment contract entered 
into with an undocumented foreign worker was illegal (per s 38 of the Immigration Act), and 
subsequently rendered null and void. This meant that the law systematically excluded and denied 
unauthorised foreign workers from any labour protection.163   
 The legal prohibition on irregular migrants from entering into employment arrangements 
is not unique to South Africa. In most jurisdictions, the state and national employers are not 
obliged to offer work to unauthorised migrants. However, unauthorised migrants, when 
employed, should acquire the labour rights ensuing from the employment relationship.164 This is 
similar to the position taken in Discovery Health Ltd v CCMA & others.165 In this judgment, the 
Labour Court made two important findings that changed the position of migrant workers.166 
 First, the court held that the intention of the legislature was to deter and penalise 
employers who breach ss 38(1) and 49(3) of the Immigration Act, not to invalidate broadly any 
concluded employment contract where one of the parties commits an offence.167 Secondly, the 
court held that the definition of ‘employee’ in the LRA is not ‘necessarily rooted in a contract of 
employment’, because a ‘contract of employment is not the sole ticket for admission into the 
golden circle reserved for “employees”’. 168 Since the definition of ‘employee’ is not solely 
dependent on the existence of an employment contract,169 foreign nationals employed without 
possession of valid work permits acquire ‘employee’ status and the necessary labour rights 
flowing from that status.  
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 Although it could be argued that this part of the judgment is possibly an obiter dictum,170 
it is consistent with similar sentiments that the Labour Court expressed. 171  In summation, 
Discovery Health not only usurped the common-law narrow understanding of employment to 
include irregular migrant workers in the ambit of labour law and within the scope of protection 
of s 23 of the Constitution, it also espoused similar progressive jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court on the legal status and rights of irregular migrant workers.172  
 In Kylie v CCMA and Others,173 the LAC discounted the common-law understanding of 
employment and proceeded to extend labour protection to workers engaged in unlawful activities 
or illegal work by widening the definition of ‘employee’ to include a sex worker. This may have 
strong implications for irregular migrant workers because it could be argued that irregular 
migrants are often engaged in ‘illegal’ work owing to legislative prohibitions.  
 The Kylie and Discovery Health cases are similar in the sense that both judgments 
concerned the question of whether a contract between an employer and an employee must be 
valid if the party rendering service is to be recognised as an employee under employment law. 
However, where Kylie relates to work that is illegal because of the nature of the industry, 
Discovery Health concerns the performance of lawful work where the status of the worker is 
illegal. Both judgments strongly suggest that people engaged in employment relationships, with 
or without a formal contract of employment, have a right to employment protection. 
Consequently, migrant workers, including the unauthorised, would then have the same recourse 
to justice in labour disputes or discriminatory labour matters as South African citizens. 174 
However, the impact of both the Discovery Health and Kylie judgments on social security law 
remains unclear, as not many cases concerning the statues of migrant workers have been 
adjudicated utilising the principles enunciated in these judgments.175  
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 Although irregular migrants are supposed to have equal labour rights, this is not true in 
practice. Like in most countries, migrant workers in South Africa often engage in jobs that are 
considered ‘mundane, dirty, degrading or even dangerous’ by the locals who reject them.176 
Typically, these jobs constitute appalling conditions of employment that border on slavery, since 
they involve longer working hours, poor pay, and various forms of discrimination such as 
xenophobic and abusive treatments.177 These vulnerabilities, among others, have led to debates 
about the rights of migrant workers generally and unauthorised migrants specifically. 
 Economic opportunity afforded through the labour market and/or the availability of work 
is important in determining the living conditions of foreign nationals. An examination of the 
protection position of migrants through the lenses of work exposes an interplay of immigration 
and labour laws that is not always harmonious. A rigid immigration policy that strictly regulates 
the absorption of foreign human resource into the domestic labour market may be favourable in a 
country (such as South Africa) where the majority of the population (and the poorest) are without 
work.178 Despite the appeal, overly restrictive control-centred immigration policing is not the 
solution. It has the potential to exacerbate an already delicate situation. In short, ‘…criminalising 
aliens creates a marginalised underclass who is easily open to abuse. Devoid of state protection, 
and denied any rights and entitlements, aliens look for jobs to survive. Because of their illegal 
status they are forced to accept employment whatever the payment, risk, physical demand or 
working hours involved.’179  
 
4.5 Social protection through a human rights lens 
Advocacy or defence for a rights-based approach to social protection will be incomplete without 
explicating and reiterating the vulnerabilities associated with migration, particularly the 
clandestine kind. The premise is that the plight of unauthorised foreign workers is inherently a 
human rights issue brought about by vulnerable situations attached to their immigration status. In 
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short, illegality is perhaps the most significant factor or source of vulnerability for unauthorised 
migrants in destination countries.180 
 Globally, it is recognised that migrants, particularly the irregular, as a category of people 
are most vulnerable and in need of protection. 181  All migrant workers encounter various 
obstacles in crossing international borders and more institutional hurdles once in destination 
countries, be it formal exclusion from participation in political life or access to legal institutions 
and other social and economic benefits.182 These hardships may stem from being outside their 
home country and consequently devoid of its legal and social protection.  
 However, those migrants who are in an irregular situation are comparatively worse off 
than other categories of migrants. They often find themselves in unwelcoming lands, living on 
the margins of society and unable to assert their rights either because they are ignorant of the 
laws and practices of the land or simply out of fear of detection.183 National policies do not 
permit them to take up employment; and when they do, they are engaged in unfavourable 
conditions compared to other workers.184 In addition, social protection systems in host nations 
tend to exclude foreign nationals either wholly or partially. This is particularly true for migrants 
in an irregular situation. In short, the above issues characterise migrants as a vulnerable group. 
The vulnerabilities associated with unauthorised migrants are partly due to a lack of or 
ineffective legal response to the labour and social rights of these workers in host nations, as well 
as a lack of political commitment on the part of the destination government or society.185  
 In South Africa, the vulnerability of foreign nationals (migrants) is very much 
recognised. The Constitutional Court has consistently reiterated the vulnerability of foreign 
nationals in its equality jurisprudence. As a category of people, foreign nationals are extremely 
vulnerable because they are a ‘minority group with little political muscle in all countries’.186 As 
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in Canada, South Africa recognises foreign nationals as ‘a group lacking in political power and 
as such vulnerable to having their interests overlooked and their rights to equal concern and 
respect violated. They are among “those groups in society to whose needs and wishes elected 
officials have no apparent interest in attending”.’187 This characterisation, though mainly relating 
to regular migrants, is pertinent for unauthorised migrants too.  
 In spite of the recognition of the vulnerable condition of migrants generally and in South 
Africa particularly, unauthorised migrants are amongst the most exposed to human rights abuses. 
South African migration policy excessively focuses on restricting access and regulating 
movement and does not give much attention to protecting the actual human rights of the 
individuals involved in the process.188 Thus the general treatment of migrant workers in the 
country, particularly those in an irregular situation, points to a broader human rights issue. This 
then raises two concerns regarding the human rights situation of this group of people, namely 
their economic vulnerability and social exclusion.  
 
4.5.1 Economic vulnerability 
Migrant workers, as a category of workers, are more often than not highly susceptible to diverse 
forms of marginalisation, discrimination, and human rights abuses in host nations.189 Most of the 
exploitation migrants encounter happen at work. While this can be true for even regular 
migrants, who tend to be readily accepted by host economies, for the many migrants who find 
themselves at the bottom of the employment ladder, owing to their lack of permission to work, 
the situation is often far worse.190 The economic difficulties unauthorised migrant workers face 
in host nations are, in large part, ascribed to the illegal nature of their entry, presence, and/or 
employment. The fact of the matter is that their precarious legal position does not allow for 
adequate integration into the labour market of host countries.  
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 Reported instances of the maltreatment and exclusion of foreign nationals are particularly 
severe for those who enter and work without formal permission from the host authority.191 
Unauthorised foreign workers, as a group of migrants, are perhaps the most vulnerable by virtue 
of their precarious legal position.192 Irregular migrants, because of the illegality of their presence, 
find themselves in a weak bargaining position. 193  Consequently, they are often at risk of 
exploitation and exposure to dangerous work conditions, only to receive unequal — lower, or in 
some cases no — wages compared to local workers or their legal counterparts for the same 
work.194 More often than not, their legal status (or lack thereof) makes it difficult for them to 
assert their rights, even if they have knowledge of it them, or waive their rights entirely to 
maintain as low a profile as possible.195 To put it succinctly, ‘workers who are non-documented 
or in an irregular situation are frequently employed under less favourable conditions of work 
than other workers’, and that ‘the human problems involved in migration are even more serious 
in the case of irregular migration’.196 
 Locally, speculation suggests that there are a significant proportion of foreign nationals 
operating in the South African labour market without formal authorisation (without work visas). 
These migrants are engaged in ‘illegal’ jobs, receiving ‘illegal’ wages without benefits. Their 
lack of legal recognition further exacerbates their vulnerabilities as local workers often demonise 
these migrants and make them scapegoats for various existing social and economic problems.197 
In this respect, local workers often see migrants as, and in some cases blame them for, driving 
down wages, weakening their bargaining power, and/or intensifying an already acute 
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unemployment situation. Popular discourse in South Africa suggests that migrant workers ‘steal’ 
the jobs of locals.198  
 Despite the obvious appeal of irregular migrants to the local labour market, the erroneous 
assumption that unauthorised migrant workers should not be entitled to human rights protection, 
simply because they are not legally entitled to be in the country, dominates public discourse.199 
That is, populist views maintain that immigration contraventions abrogate any obligation for 
human rights protection. This sentiment resonates in different ways across different strata of the 
South African society, from grassroots to policy level.  
 
4.5.2 Social exclusion  
What happens at the workplace often reproduces on a bigger scale at the larger societal level. 
International migrants, both the legal and irregular, tend to live in permanent insecurity in host 
societies where the police and other community members often harass them. Those migrants 
entering and/or working without authorisation are most likely to encounter high levels of 
exploitation, human right abuses, or even forced labour. 200  Additionally, they are likely to 
experience stigmatisation and discrimination because their ‘illegal’ status is often associated with 
criminality.201 The media often perpetuates and legitimises the criminalisation and demonisation 
of irregular migrants.  
 According to the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants 
(PICUM), ‘undocumented migrants residing in Europe are socially excluded and very vulnerable 
to marginalisation’.202 The social exclusion and marginalisation of (unauthorised) migrants is not 
unique to Europe. Locally, anti-migrant or xenophobic sentiments and rhetoric and social 
exclusion of non-nationals are very much a feature of South African national culture. In South 
Africa, the social marginalisation of foreign nationals is more apparent in the treatment of 
‘illegal foreigners’. South African society is highly intolerant of non-nationals and often makes 
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foreigners scapegoats for local social and economic problems.203 For instance, the arrest of 35 
protesting foreign workers during the 2012 De Doorns farm workers’ strike is indicative of 
tension between foreign nationals and locals.204 In fact, South Africa, unlike the United States, is 
unsuccessful at assimilating immigrants into its society.  
 It could be argued that the social tensions that often explode into the savage attacks, 
killings and mass displacement of many foreigners living in various South African townships is 
indicative of a broader societal resentment against migrants.205 The sporadic surge of xenophobic 
acts of violence could perhaps be a physical manifestation of the country’s harsh immigration 
discourse, hostile domestic laws, and political rhetoric around foreign nationals. Xenophobic 
violence could also be testimony of the government’s failings to manage migration effectively.206 
In a society where xenophobic or anti-migrant sentiments and rhetoric are ubiquitous, the plight 
of this category of migrants warrants actual attention.  
 One cannot view the social plights of migrants in isolation. The reality is that there is 
interplay between immigration and labour (and social security) laws, which does not need to be 
necessarily antagonistic. The conflict tends to arise when policymakers give precedence to 
immigration laws over labour and social security laws.207 Previous discussion already alludes to 
the fact that the nature of migration policies in operation directly affects the legal position and 
treatment of migrants. In the case of unauthorised migrants, their irregular immigration status 
gives them a weak legal position, which relegates them to a weaker social position and results in 
access only to work in the informal sector endemic with abuse and exploitation. 208 
 Accordingly, ‘when migration policies are made without attention to vulnerability, 
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marginalisation and discrimination, then millions of vulnerable migrants become cheap, 
disposable labour, scape goats for xenophobic rhetoric and policy, and casualties in an ill-defined 
war against iregular migration.209 South African migration policy overly focuses on security and 
population control, which tends to criminalise migrants and ultimately promote xenophobia.  
 Social protection in this instance becomes a necessary (employment-related) human 
right.210 Yet, social security systems of host nations are often exclusionary to the detriment of 
irregular migrant workers.211 In short, unequal opportunity at the onset of the process (in this 
case in immigration law) sets the tone for differential treatment later on in the process (labour 
and social security laws) and the eventual outcome (social integration).  
 Thus, the criminalisation of the employment of unauthorised migrants under the 
immigration policy undermines the potential rights owed to them in labour law and those 
possibly available to them in social security law.212 If these foreigners are denied the opportunity 
to work (a necessary element in accessing benefits), it is unsurprising that their ability to access 
work-related social protection is hindered, in addition to being ostracised by the larger society. 
There is therefore a strong need for social policies that protect all migrants against hostile 
economic and social conditions. 
 
4.6 Socio-political pressures influencing the legal position of migrants 
Examination of the South African legal framework regulating labour migration seemingly 
reaffirms the notion that restrictive national migration policies affect the legal position of 
different groups of migrants in social protection, with unauthorised migrants enjoying fewer 
rights.213 In this regard, it is necessary to explore some of the prevailing policy and structural 
debates around the socio-political pressures affecting the treatment of foreign nationals in order 
to ascertain how and why immigration policies can influence the level of domestic protection 
accessible to these foreign workers.  
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4.6.1 A structural argument 
Legal policies and practices that exclude unauthorised migrants from certain basic social rights 
in host countries seemingly infer that these people have themselves to blame for their precarious 
position, without considering larger structural forces that stimulate clandestine migration 
itself. 214  Proponents of these restrictive legal policies and practices seem to imply that 
unauthorised migrants are voluntary transgressors of immigration and administrative rules 
because they knowingly enter without the state’s consent. According to these thinkers, migrants 
who enter clandestinely or become irregular in the host country are non-party to the shared 
national social contract that binds local community members.215 Consequently, they forfeit any 
benefits of local community membership because they crossed a national boundary without that 
state’s official authorisation.216  
 The main premise of this argument is that a state’s primary sovereign responsibility is 
towards its citizens, not necessarily to the nationals of another country, especially if they are 
unauthorised. Therefore, states must not feel the need to offer these foreigners anything beyond 
the minimum protection, if even that. For that reason, those who hold these protectionist views 
regard rights extension to unauthorised foreigners as encouraging or rewarding them for 
violating immigration rules. Consequently, the natural solution to the supposed immigration 
crisis will be to implement more punitive border control measures to dissuade future ‘illegal’ 
foreigners, halt further clandestine activity, and subsequently eliminate the probable exploitation 
that comes with it.217  The premise is that if policy actively prohibits these foreigners from 
clandestine entry or operation in the country in the first instance, they will be safe from any 
imminent exploitation.  
 It could be argued that the South African government may have had this view in mind 
when developing the current immigration policy. As evident from one of the stated objective in 
the preamble of the Immigration Act of 2002, South African migration management is about 
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instituting ‘a system of immigration control which ensures that...border monitoring is 
strengthened to ensure that the borders of the Republic do not remain porous and irregular 
immigration through them may be effectively detected, reduced and deterred’. 
 Granted the above presupposition sounds valid and rational at face value, it is not entirely 
accurate. Those who are in favour of advancing the rights of unauthorised migrants refute these 
protectionist and victim blaming arguments by offering a more pragmatic argument based on 
structural analyses of clandestine migration flows. For the pragmatists, and the position taken in 
this study, unauthorised migrants are not mere voluntary transgressors of state immigration laws 
who are undeserving of legal protection.218 Rather they are victims of a structural phenomenon 
that places them in a position of extreme vulnerability.  
 The counter-argument is that regardless of the seemingly open opposition to clandestine 
migration adopted by policymakers by means of specialised policies that seek to limit the entry 
and other rights given to unauthorised migrant workers, local governments and employers tend to 
subtly allow or even promote clandestine cross-border movements.219 The core of the argument 
is that while these immigration stakeholders take the position of being against clandestine 
migration, they actually encourage the phenomenon. They do so in two subtle ways.  
 First, governments fail to control their national borders effectively. It is common-cause 
that the international legal principle of state territorial sovereignty accords nation-states the 
sovereign prerogative, albeit within limitations, to control its physical borders.220 This territorial 
discretionary power includes the right to regulate and manage the entry and expulsion of foreign 
nationals into and within their lands.221 The reason being, ‘if a state is not free to decide who will 
enter its territory according to its own criteria and to regulate the conditions of such ingress, it is 
severely impeded in its function as the governing authority of the territory in question’.222  
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 However, in practice, states often fail to exercise said territorial right. Permeable national 
borders are indicative of such failures on the part of states to exert their territorial powers to 
control the admission of foreigners into their land.223 Opponents of legal policies and practices 
that marginalise unauthorised migrant workers consider the presence of permeable borders as a 
silent invitation to enter by governments.224 The common-sense reason here is that leaky borders 
will always be attractive to people who are looking to flee from unfavourable conditions (usually 
economic and political instability) in their home nations.225 Porous borders make it easy for 
people to enter hassle-free and bypass rigid formal methods or controlled borders into the 
country.  
 This argument is quite compelling in the South African context. At a first glance, the 
South African government is seemingly dedicated to combating clandestine migration.226 In fact, 
South African policies openly declare ‘war’ on the issue. One of the aims of the Immigration Act 
is to ensure that ‘border monitoring is strengthened to ensure that the borders of the Republic do 
not remain porous and clandestine immigration through them may be effectively detected, 
reduced, and deterred’227 (emphasis in original). Yet, South African borders — particularly the 
border shared with Zimbabwe228 — have become undeniably porous for irregular migrants as 
people commonly cross without going through immigration posts.229 The failure of the South 
African government to use its ‘immigration-regulatory powers’ to regulate or manage its borders 
effectively could be seen by some people as a silent offer to irregular migrants to enter.   
 Secondly, those belonging to this pragmatic school of thought not only see governments 
as negligently permitting clandestine migration by leaving the borders porous but also consider 
these authorities as ungracious hosts. The line of reasoning is that host countries appreciate and 
readily accept the physical labour offered by non-nationals, particularly those low- and semi-
skilled ones, but are unwilling to increase their admission quotas for the legal entry of this 
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category of workers or accept responsibility for their labour rights.230 Thus, destination countries 
quite liberally admit skilled migrants, but often tightly control the number of legally issued visas 
for low and semi-skilled foreign workers.231  
 This is particularly evident in the South African context, where admission policy 
facilitates the migration of skilled migrants and reasonably assures their rights, but rarely does so 
for the low and semi-skilled. It is therefore unsurprising that some foreigners end up entering and 
working in violation of often-stringent immigration laws. That is not to suggest that unauthorised 
migrants willingly refuse to conform to immigration laws (or voluntarily enter illegally); rather, 
they fail to conform because the immigration processes are often too bureaucratic and costly.232 
To enjoy the protection of labour and social security laws, foreigners intending to engage in 
economic activities in the South Africa must obtain permission from the Department of Home 
Affairs (DHA) in the form of a work permit.233 It suffices to say that many people bypass the 
DHA process altogether. Some proceed to engage in economic activities without legal consent, 
while others obtain fraudulent documents in order to get work. Thus, administrative difficulties 
in obtaining authorisation make it simply too demanding for some migrants to obtain the 
required legal status. 
 The argument goes further in positing that the presence of irregular migrants is in fact a 
profitable necessity to some national economies. The fact of the matter is that there is a global 
competition for cheap sources of labour because of globalisation.234  Therefore, the irregular 
migrant workers pool, often dominated by low-skilled foreign workers, provides a cheaper and 
flexible workforce alternative to what would otherwise be a burden on the payrolls of many 
employers in the local economy.235  
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 In United States for instance, irregular migrants constitute a part of the low-skilled 
workforce, where they contribute the successes of labour-intensive industries like agriculture, 
construction, domestic work, restaurants, and cleaning services. 236  In this respect, host 
governments and employers cannot simply profit from the labour of these workers without 
affording them certain fundamental rights and protection.237 The rules of hospitality require that 
these governments play the part of gracious hosts and treat their guests with courtesy and offer 
them safety and guest privileges.  
 Locally speaking, certain sectors of the South African economy are so-called migrants 
sectors.238 These sectors — namely the commercial agriculture, construction, and secondary 
sectors — heavily depend on foreign, often irregular, external labour to function.239 Yet the 
South African immigration policy is restrictive to the point that there is virtually no prospect for 
these low-skilled foreign workers to migrate legally. Since only a select number of migrants, ‘an 
insignificant percentage of the actual number of workers demanded by domestic employers,’240 
are given legal opportunities to enter and work in South Africa, a continuous demand for cheap 
no-strings-attached labour force in some sectors of the economy will undoubtedly stimulate 
irregular migration flows. Logic dictates that the absence of legal opportunities for labour 
migration is likely to promote irregular migration.241 
 Essentially, the promise of a comparably better standard of living, coupled with high 
demand for cheap foreign labour in some sectors of the destination country as well as badly 
managed porous borders serve to pull all sorts of economic migrants. Therefore, governments of 
host countries should partly take responsibility for the clandestine migration phenomenon instead 
of simply characterising irregular migrants as voluntary transgressors of their immigration laws.  
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4.6.2 A consequential argument 
Globally, clandestine migration is increasingly being characterised as a significant legal problem 
that poses a threat to national sovereignty.242 In response to this legal threat (real or perceived), 
nations are gradually enacting more punitive immigration control measures to deter the irregular 
migration process. In light of this, many see rights protection of those in an irregular situation as 
particularly problematic and often equate it to encouraging or even rewarding transgressors 
and/or making home territories attractive to future clandestine entry.243  
 Whilst protectionist measures have their merits, too much restriction in immigration 
policy can have dire consequences for this foreign workforce. That is not to say that governments 
should open up their borders or refrain from implementing or enforcing immigration laws. The 
point is to find a manageable compromise that ensures that rights extension serves the interests 
of all stakeholders, including migrants, citizens, and the state. 
 Popular discourse proposes that immigration, particularly the clandestine kind, poses a 
real threat to the domestic workforce. Some scholars have gone as far as to argue that 
immigration leads to unemployment and greater job insecurity for local workers.244 In that line of 
argument and given the actual high unemployment rate in South Africa,245 it is understandable 
how and why migrants can be perceived as a threat to the job security of locals. A mass influx of 
blue-collar unauthorised migrant workers can greatly disadvantage local workers who compete 
with them, whilst benefitting the urban elite who gain from their cheap labour.246   
 Specifically with regards to the pay and general employment conditions of the domestic 
workforce, employers willingly substitute local human resources with the existing pool of 
irregular migrants so as to cut their wage bill.247 Unauthorised migrant workers, by virtue of their 
status, are vulnerable and easy to exploit, as they do not possess legal rights. Their vulnerability 
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makes them attractive to unscrupulous employers who depend on their exploitability as a 
competitive advantage.248  
 Due to the ostensible threat unauthorised foreign workers pose, there have been moral 
panic calling on the government to eliminate ‘illegal foreigners’ and to curb the migration 
process entirely. Yet evidence suggests that excessive control measures intended to curtail 
clandestine migration prove too costly and ineffective.249 A 2003 report by the International 
Organization for Migration puts the cost of enforcing immigration restrictions (i.e. border 
controls, issuing of visas and passports, apprehending, detaining, prosecuting and deporting 
unwanted migrants, inspecting labour conditions) at around 30 billion US Dollars annually.250 
Despite these substantial fiscal investments into keeping undesirable people out, irregular 
migration is far from ceasing. The failures on the parts of governments to deter clandestine 
migration, in spite of aggressive measures, speak to a broader problem than mere lack of control. 
Therefore, at least from a migration perspective, there is a need for policy developments that 
effectively manage cross-border migration as opposed to solely focusing on enforcement, control 
and exclusion.251 In this respect, protecting the rights of unauthorised foreign workers should be 
seen as an investment in the right direction. 
 Given that the vulnerability of these migrants is a crucial factor that makes them desirable 
to those employers who demand cheap and exploitable labour, the lack of regulation only 
perpetuates irregular migration. From a labour perspective, a minimum floor of substantive rights 
to these workers will ensure any incentives for unscrupulous employers are eliminated. 252 
Policing this will require processes for the reporting of abuses by migrants to the Department of 
Labour without fear of deportation. The extension of the right of access to social protection to 
these workers is a form of regularising migrant labour. The regularisation of immigration status 
for unauthorised foreign workers has positive knock-on effects for the local labour market. 
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Regularisation serves to reduce downward pressure on wage and working conditions, as they 
would no longer be preferred over locals.253  
 Competition for local jobs is likely to reduce once this foreign labour pool becomes less 
appealing to prospective employers. 254  In short, law enforcement on working and wage 
conditions can reduce incentives for employers to exploit migrants.255 Although there are no 
simple solutions to the current migration challenge, the truth of the matter is that the cross-border 
movement of unskilled and semi-skilled workers is real and far from ceasing. Excessive 
restrictions on the movement of these labourers have proven to be futile and costly.  
 
4.7 Conclusion  
Unauthorised migrant workers often encounter great risks in getting to their destination countries 
and greater difficulties once in.256 Evidence further suggests that migrants entering or working in 
countries without the proper documents or permission are likely to experience high levels of 
exploitation, risk of forced labour, and abuse of human rights.257 This is often because these 
foreign workers are either utterly ignorant of their rights, if they have any, or are tricked into 
renouncing them by unscrupulous employers.258 It is clear then that clandestine migration reflect 
a range of vulnerabilities and risks. 
 Further analysis reveals that the nature of immigration policies of nation states (whether 
favourable, ambiguous, or restrictive) determines the legal status of migrants, the kind of work 
they can access and eventually their social position and treatment in the larger society of host 
countries. The existing policy framework relevant to labour migration in South Africa is rigid 
and restrictive. Contemporary South African labour migration policy simultaneously tries to 
protect the domestic labour market and skills shortages by reducing the number of non-nationals 
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admitted into the labour market. In doing so, the policy sets in motion a system of differentiation 
that neither aids equal opportunity nor fosters human capabilities. 
 South Africa needs a new policy approach to immigration that is cognisant of both human 
rights and development. That is to say, the current immigration policy needs reforming into a 
more development-oriented policy replacing its current restrictive form. If left unchanged, the 
restrictive immigration policy will only lead to a further rise in clandestine migration. In order 
for South Africa to leverage the opportunities or benefits of migration and address its challenges 
simultaneously, it would need a policy that addresses the public’s misconceptions of immigration 
and hostility towards migrants.  
 This is not to negate the power of government to remove undesirable people from its 
land; it merely proposes that immigration, labour, and social security laws need to be in careful 
alignment to ensure the state can exercise its power whilst giving effect to all people’s rights to 
access fundamental social and labour benefits. Immigration control at the expense of social 
security and labour protection should not be the sole priority; an effective migration management 
needs a fair balance of the two areas of law.  
 Seemingly, the extension of social protection rights to unauthorised foreign workers, in a 
country where poverty and inequality are ubiquitous and too few people have work, raises 
complex legal problems. However, it is necessary for irregular migrants to have proper access to 
actual opportunities if they are to improve on their vulnerable legal and social status in host 
nations. Besides, the purpose of social protection is to defend the most vulnerable members of 
society in order to reduce chronic poverty and exclusion amongst the general populace. In any 
case, continuous marginalisation or exclusions in opportunities or access to social rights will 
undoubtedly exacerbate the vulnerability of affected individuals. The subsequent chapters 5 and 
6 will examine international, regional, and domestic social protection instruments of relevance to 




CHAPTER V  SOCIAL PROTECTION: TRANSNATIONAL NORMS FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF MIGRANTS 
 
‘Migrant workers can make their best contribution to host and source countries when they enjoy 
decent working conditions, and when their fundamental human and labour rights are 
respected.’1 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Individual nation states have broad sovereign discretion to determine who enters and remains in 
their territories; however, such authority is prone to gross abuse by those in control.2 In this 
regard, the extent to which international and regional human rights instruments protect the 
human rights of all worker categories becomes increasing important. 
 Research suggests that international, and to some extent regional, human rights 
instruments confer substantive rights protection to all migrant workers, including unauthorised 
foreign workers. However, in order for them to be effective, relevant nation-states, particularly 
migrant-receiving states, need to sign and ratify these human rights norms and other pertinent 
treaties envisioned to protect migrant workers.3 
 Additionally, and most importantly, international instruments are necessary in order to 
guide and synchronise various national legislation, policies and practices in order to protect both 
migrant workers and state interest, because domestic laws and political rhetoric are prone to 
hostility where debates about the rights protection of unauthorised migrant workers is 
concerned.4  Furthermore, available evidence suggests that international norms and standards 
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significantly influence the regulation of labour and, to some extent, the social protection 
frameworks in developing countries.5  
 Under South African law specifically, international law serves an interpretative function.6 
Various provisions of the South African Constitution mandate or underscore the interpretative 
function of international law.7 Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution, among other things, provides 
that ‘[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum must consider international 
law’. Similarly, s 233 stipulates that ‘[w]hen interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer 
any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any 
alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law’. Thus, both ss 39(1) and 233 
of the Constitution mandate domestic courts to consider international law in interpreting 
legislation.8 
In addition to the directive on the interpretational function of international law, the 
Constitution explicitly addresses the incorporation of international law into domestic law. South 
Africa seemingly adopts a hybrid approach to the reception of international law. On the one 
hand, s 231(4) of the Constitution applies a ‘dualist’ approach to treaty-law.9 It requires the 
legislature to enact national legislation or, in the case of self-executing provisions, parliament 
approval before incorporating an international instrument into domestic law. 
On the other hand, it adopts a ‘monist-like’ approach to international customary law.10 
Section 232 of the Constitution automatically adopts international customary law as part of 
domestic law as long as it is consistent with other domestic legislation.11 Section 232 explicitly 
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provides that ‘[c]ustomary international law is law in the republic unless it is inconsistent with 
the Constitution or an Act of Parliament’. 
It is evident from the explored constitutional provisions that international norms or 
standards are important in the South African context, as they serve as both substantive and 
interpretational tools. 12  In this respect, the Constitutional Court has reaffirmed the role of 
international law in South Africa as follows:  
[P]ublic international law would include non-binding as well as binding law. They may 
both be used under the section as tools of interpretation. International agreements and 
customary international law accordingly provide a framework within which [Bill of Rights] 
can be evaluated and understood… (emphasis added).13 
 
 Accordingly, this chapter surveys the existing relevant international, continental, and 
regional instruments or norms relating to the labour and social protection rights of migrants 
developed by both international and regional bodies. The chapter reveals that there are 
considerable efforts on the part of the international community (mainly the UN and ILO) and 
regional bodies (the AU and SADC) to address the protection concerns of the most vulnerable 
group of migrants, unauthorised foreign workers. The chapter concludes by arguing that whilst 
there is a set of norms which attempts to ensure the humane treatment of foreign workers, these 
standards are comparably inadequately developed.  
 
5.2 Contemporary international instruments for the protection of migrants 
The international community recognises the extreme vulnerabilities and plight of migrant 
workers, as the varied range of international and regional (soft and hard) human rights legal 
instruments governing the treatment of migrant workers can attest. 14  The UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights aptly captures the general intention behind a global normative 
human rights response to the rights protection of migrant workers. According to the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘migrants whose rights are protected, are able to live with 
dignity and security and, in turn, are better able to contribute to society both economically and 
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socially than those who are exploited, marginalised and excluded.’ 15  Since immigration is 
inherently a transnational phenomenon, the degree to which (unauthorised) migrant workers 
enjoy protection in terms of international human rights law, particularly in their right of access to 
social security, is necessary.  
International standards that confer rights to migrant workers are numerous and diverse. 
More specifically, international law strongly affirms the right to social (security) protection. This 
is evident from the Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944, which called for the ‘extension of social 
security measures to provide a basic income to all in need of such protection and comprehensive 
medical care’.16 Similarly, the International Labour Conference, during its 89th session in June 
2001, reaffirmed that social (security) protection is ‘a basic human right and a fundamental 
means for creating social cohesion’.17 In this respect, several international instruments establish 
the fundamental right to social (security) protection that extends rights to migrant workers and 
their families.  
In any case, international instruments relevant to the protection of foreign workers take 
the form of three types. Some of these instruments are universal or fundamental human rights 
and consequently far-reaching in nature (applies to all human beings, including all migrant 
workers), whilst others deal specifically with migrant workers, and still others take the form of 
employment standards that apply to all workers in the workplace.18 Furthermore, international 
social (security) protection standards typically take three forms with differing impact; namely, 
Conventions, Recommendations, and Codes of Conduct and Resolutions.  
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Conventions and Recommendations differ in legal status. Conventions are binding 
international treaties, subject to ratification, that impose legal obligation on member states, 
whilst Recommendations are non-binding guidelines that normally supplement conventions 
dealing with the same subjects.19 The diverse range of these protective instruments reinforces the 
assertion made by Dupper that ‘international efforts to defend human rights of migrants are 
“scattered”, “fragmented,” and “limited in impact”’.20 The validity of the observation by Dupper 
notwithstanding, there is an existing international effort to protect human rights of migrant 
workers generally, and in some instances protect their right to social security specifically.  
In this respect, both the United Nations (UN) and the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) have been instrumental in the international arena in their concerted efforts to bring to the 
fore the protection interests of workers employed in countries other than their own. Both 
institutions recognise the need to protect migrants and their families. In view of that, an 
examination follows of the extent to which their contributions to an international charter on 
migration adequately safeguard the rights of unauthorised foreign workers, particularly their 
right of access to social protection. 
 
5.2.1 The response of the United Nations  
The United Nations (UN) formally positions the rights of migrant workers into an international 
human rights framework.21 The UN achieves this through a rights-based approach that codifies 
various major human rights treaties into one comprehensive docket, namely the International Bill 
of Human Rights, that offer human rights protection to all persons, including migrant workers.  
The International Bill of Human Rights includes the following core instruments and their 
corresponding protocols: 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); International Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
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or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICRMW).22 
The collection of human rights provisions contained in the International Bill of Human 
Rights, as universally accepted principles, confers protection to all human beings irrespective of 
nationality or status. These core international human rights treaties guarantee to all persons a 
number of fundamental procedural protection as well as civil, political, and socio-economic 
rights. Thus, foreign nationals can look to a number of universal human rights instruments of the 
UN for protection against discrimination and exploitation on grounds other than their non-
national status.23  
More importantly, the UN treats social protection as a human right. However, the 
discussion focuses on three select essential social protection-related instruments in the Bill, for 
purposes of examining the rights position of foreign workers (in South Africa) generally and in 
social protection particularly. The first of these is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948 (UDHR).24 The UDHR affords general basic human rights and fundamental freedoms to 
everyone without distinction or discrimination. 25  Owing to the universality and general 
application of the UDHR, the human rights provisions contained therein applies to unauthorised 
or irregular migrant workers alike and are therefore inviolable.26 As an instrument of general 
application, the UDHR does not require official acceptance by individual states for its principles 
to apply.27  
Besides the general human rights, the UDHR also contains some important socio-
economic rights that are of relevance to the rights protection of irregular migrant workers. 
However, these socio-economic rights of migrants in terms of the UDHR are debatable because 
the UDHR does not directly create legal obligation and so cannot be enforced. Nonetheless, a 
                                                          
22 South Africa has ratified all of the instruments in the International Bill, with the exception of the ICRMW. The 
most recent ratification record being that of the ICESCR, which it ratified in January 2015. 
23 Wickramasekara op cit note 18 at 262. 
24 Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. 
25 United Nations (UN) Fact sheet No.2 (Rev.1), the International Bill of Human rights (1996).  
26 Vic Esselaar & Christoph Garbers ‘Migrant workers’ in Strydom et al (Eds.) Essential social security law (2006) 
287.  
27 op cit note 25. 
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number of provisions provided for in the UDHR are of relevance to social protection and related 
issues; namely articles 2, 22, 23 and 25(1).  
 First, art 22 of the UDHR deals directly with social (security) protection. The 
provision expressly states that ‘[e]veryone, as a member of society, has the right to social 
security and is entitled to realisation, through national effort and international co-operation and 
in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and 
cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality’. Thus, 
art 22 essentially recognises social protection as a fundamental human right linked to dignity and 
personality development. 
Article 2 on the other hand generally provides that ‘[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.’ This ‘equal treatment’ provision outlines the obligations of states in applying the 
rights in the UDHR. As a general rule, states may not discriminate against anyone, as far as the 
UDHR is concerned, on ‘the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the 
country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-
governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty’.28 
Article 23 recognises the right to work, 29  and with it all the necessary favourable 
employment conditions and benefits. The right to work in itself is arguably a form or extension 
of social protection,30 especially where migrant workers are concerned.  
Finally, art 25(1) guarantees an adequate standard of living including the right to social 
protection ‘in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age, or other lack 
of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control’. Therefore, it suffices to say that article 22 
read together with articles 2, 23 and 25(1) suggest that the UDHR extends socio-economic rights 
                                                          
28 Article 2. 
29 The right to work or to access the labour market is a very important principle that provides grounds for justifying 
other social rights, such as the right of access to work-related social protection. For a detailed discussion, see: Bob 
Hepple ‘A right to work?’ (1981) 19 ILJ 65, and Virginia Mantouvalou (ed) The right to work: Legal and 
philosophical perspectives (2015) UK: Hart Publishing Ltd. 
30 See discussion in chapter 4. 
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(specifically, the right of access to social protection) to all people, irrespective of their legal or 
immigration status. 
The second relevant UN social protection-related instrument is the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of 1966 (ICESCR).31 Unlike the UDHR, the 
ICESCR is much more targeted as it contains a detailed exposition of social protection. In 
addition, it is only legally binding on individual states that ratify or accede to it. South Africa 
signed the ICESCR in 1994 but only ratified it some twenty years after.32 As a signatory to the 
treaty, the government is obliged to refrain, in good faith, from any acts that would undermine 
the purpose of the treaty. Post-ratification, the UN can now apply international political pressure 
on the policymakers to take steps and appropriate measures to achieve progressively the full 
realisation of the rights contained in the ICESCR.33 
The ICESCR contains significant provisions that pertain to rights relevant to migrant 
workers, including the right of access to social security. For instance, art 9 of the ICESCR 
explicitly states that ‘[s]tates parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
social security, including social insurance.’ The phrasing of art 9 of the ICESCR suggests that 
the right to social security can extend to all people, including non-citizens and migrants in an 
irregular situation, upon ratification. South African law specifically requires the enactment of all 
ratified treaties or international agreements, unless their provisions are self-executing, into 
domestic law by means of national legislation before the courts can apply them.34  
Furthermore, the ICESCR also provides for other socio-economic rights linked to the 
right to social protection such as the right to work,35 the right to just and favourable conditions of 
work,36 the right to an adequate standard of living,37  and the right to the highest attainable 
                                                          
31 Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) o 16 December 1966; entered into force on 3 January 
1976. 
32 South African government ratified the ICESCR on 12 January 2015. 
33 Article 2(1) of the ICESCR. See also Laura Jakubowski ‘International Commerce and Undocumented Workers: 
Using Trade to Secure Labor Rights’ (2007) 14(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 509-525 at 517. 
34 See s 231(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.   
35 Article 6.  
36 Article 7.  
37 Article 11.  
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standard of physical and mental health.38 In this respect, the Committee on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights has emphasised the need to extend social protection to vulnerable persons 
such as migrant workers.39 
Thirdly, there is a more direct and migrant-specific and comprehensive piece of 
instrument — the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families (ICRMW)40 — that formally recognises and codifies 
human rights principles in the field of migration.41 The UN’s ICRMW aims to, among other 
things, improve the distinctive status of one of the most vulnerable groups of people (migrant 
workers and their families) as well as prevent and eliminate clandestine trafficking.42  
The ICRMW is a laudable development in human rights discourses because it is perhaps 
the most ambitious human rights instrument of general applicability in the labour migration 
context.43 Among other things, it recognises and guarantees basic human rights to all migrant 
workers and their families, as well as strives to extend a range of civil and work-related 
protection to vulnerable migrant worker groups and their families. Accordingly, it explicitly 
acknowledges the plight of unauthorised migrants as a group of vulnerable workers who are 
susceptible to less favourable employment conditions owing to their precarious legal status or 
situation, and consequently extends to them and their families certain fundamental human rights 
protection.44  
The ICRMW is divided into four parts. Part I deals with scope of application and 
definitions, part II prohibits discrimination on listed grounds, part III establishes a set of human 
rights for all migrant workers (including the irregular), and part IV establishes an additional set 
                                                          
38 Article 12.  
39 See articles 36-38 of General Comment No.19 (2008) on the right to social security (art 9) available at 
https://www.legal-tools.org/uploads/tx_ltpdb/G0840397_02.pdf, 10 December 2015. 
40 Adopted by GA res no 45 of 158 on 18 December 1990. Also referred to as the UN Migrant worker Convention 
41 Wickramasekara op cit note 18 at 263.  
42  See the preamble of the ICRMW. 
43 Linda Bosniak ‘Human rights, state sovereignty and the protection of undocumented migrants under the 
international migrant workers convention’ (1991) 25(4) International Migration Review 737 at 738.  
44 Preamble of the ICRMW. 
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of rights for only regular migrants and their families.45 Part III (articles 8-35), arguably the core 
of the Convention, is the most salient aspect of the ICRMW because it spells out a range of 
social and labour protection rights for all migrant workers. In effect, it protects fundamental 
rights of unauthorised or irregular migrant workers. 
Another notable development is the provision for equality of treatment principle imbued 
in part III of the ICRMW. Article 27(1) provides that ‘[w]ith respect to social security, migrant 
workers and their families shall enjoy in the state of employment the same treatment granted to 
nationals in so far as they fulfil the requirements provided for by the applicable legislation of that 
state….’ Similarly, art 25(1) requires all migrant workers to enjoy comparable treatment with 
‘nationals in respect of all conditions of work.46 Ideally, all migrant workers, regardless of any 
irregularities in their stay or employment,47 are to enjoy equality of treatment with nationals. 
 Essentially, the ICRMW affords all migrant workers, regardless of their legal status, the 
right to equality of treatment concerning employment, among others. 48  Like nationals, all 
migrant workers (under the ICRMW) are entitled to the same pay and conditions of work, to join 
trade unions, to receive emergency medical care, and to transfer their earnings out of the country 
upon termination of their stay.49  
The above exploration of the ICRMW exposes two salient points that warrant brief 
discussion. First, the Convention seemingly provides stronger protection in respect to labour than 
in the case of social protection.50 The phrasing of the provisions relating to labour protection of 
irregular migrants (art 25) appears more directive and resolute, as evident from the use of words 
such as ‘shall’.51 Secondly, the wording of art 25(3) in effect puts an unlawful contract on the 
                                                          
45 Bruno Paul Stefan van Eck & Felicia Snyman ‘Social Protection Afforded to Irregular Migrant Workers: 
Thoughts on the Southern Africa Development Community (with Emphasis on Botswana and South Africa)’ (2015) 
59 Journal of African Law 294 at 301.  
46 Esselaar & Garbers op cit note 26 at 288.  
47 Article 25(3).  
48 DJ Meyer ‘Migrant workers and occupational health and safety protection in South Africa’ (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 
831 at 841. See also Article 25 (1) of the Convention.  
49 See Part III of the Convention. Also see International Labour Organization International labour migration: A 
rights-based approach (2010) 133.  
50 Van Eck & Snyman op cit note 44 at 302.  
51 Ibid.   
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same standing as a strictly legal contract.52 The provision explicitly states that ‘[s]tates Parties 
shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that migrant workers are not deprived of any rights 
derived from this principle by reason of any irregularity in their stay or employment. In 
particular, employers shall not be relieved of any legal or contractual obligations, nor shall their 
obligations be limited in any manner by reason of such irregularity’.53 Whilst such provisions are 
seemingly at odds with statutory and common-law principles of most legal systems,54 South 
African law contends otherwise.  
In South Africa, developing labour law jurisprudence on the legality of the contract of 
employment seemingly endorses a similar position to that of art 25(3) of the ICRMW. For 
instance, the Labour Court has suggested that not all contracts concluded in violation of a 
statutory prohibition are necessarily invalid.55  
In Discovery Health Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & 
others,56 the Labour Court distinguished between ‘work that is illegal, and work that is alleged to 
be illegally performed’. 57  Generally, an employment contract involving the former will be 
invalid and unenforceable. In that case, the court held that a contract of employment concluded 
with a foreign national who does not possess a work permit is not void by virtue of a 
contravention of statutory provisions.58 The distinction is necessary because South African courts 
do not necessarily equalise all unlawful contracts with strictly legal ones. South African labour 
                                                          
52 Esselaar & Garbers op cit note 26 at 288.  
53 Article 25(3) of the ICRMW.  
54 Ibid. See also Mthethwa v Vorna Valley Spar (1996) 7 (11) SALLR 83 (CCMA); Moses and Safika Holdings 
(Pty) Ltd (2001) 22 ILJ 1261 (CCMA); Georgieva-Deyanova/Craighall Spar [2004] 9 BALR 113 (CCMA); 
Solidarity obo Steyn v Minister of Correctional Services (2009) 30 ILJ 2508 (LC).  
55 John Grogan Employment rights (2010) 67. See also Rumbles v KwaBat Marketing (2003) 24 ILJ 1587 (LC); 
White v Pan Palladium SA (Pty) Ltd (2006) 27 ILJ 2721 (LC); Discovery Health Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation & Arbitration & others (2008) 29 ILJ 1480 (LC); and to some extent Kylie v Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration & others (2008) 29 ILJ 1918 (LC). 
56 (2008) 29 ILJ 1480 (LC).  
57 Ibid para 56. An example of the former was explored in Discovery Health, while the latter was explored in 
‘Kylie’. For detailed discussion see: State Information Technology Agency (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation & Arbitration & others (2008 ) 29 ILJ 2234 (LAC), and Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber (2005) 26 ILJ 1256 
(LAC).  
58 Ibid para 24. 
154 
 
law equates only formally illegal contracts (work allegedly performed illegally) with strictly 
legal contracts, not those that involve the performance of work that is illegal.59 
Despite its remarkable development in extending substantial human rights protection to 
unauthorised foreign workers, rights previously limited to regular migrant workers, South Africa 
has failed to ratify the ICRMW. This has a bearing on the position of foreign workers generally 
and their right to social protection specifically, given the country’s position as a major migrant-
receiving nation on the continent. Even so, the ICRMW may prove useful in protecting irregular 
migrants in South Africa as it still reflects customary international law, a source of law in South 
Africa. 
 
5.2.2 ILO labour migration and social protection-related instruments 
The ILO is a specialised UN agency with a constitutional directive to protect migrant workers.60 
In achieving its constitutional mandate, it has taken measures in positioning the rights of migrant 
workers at the centre of its discourse on workers’ rights.61 The ILO has adopted legal norms 
through its various instruments (conventions, standards, and recommendations) on labour 
migration and social security specifically. One of the ways the ILO addresses migrant labour is 
through the provision of fundamental/universal labour rights that apply to all workers without 
distinction, as well as standards directly relevant to migrant workers. 
Like the UN, the ILO has also formulated a set of universal rights for workers in the form 
of the Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,62 which promotes parallel 
human rights at work.63 Similar to the UN’s International Bill of Rights, the ILO Declaration is a 
compilation of diverse but important fundamental conventions that safeguard the core labour 
rights of all workers by virtue of their shared humanity. The important feature of the ILO 
                                                          
59 Grogan op cit note 54 at 67. 
60 Wickramasekara op cit note 18 at 266; Dupper op cit note 20 at 226.  Also see the Preamble to the ILO 
Constitution.  
61 Paoletti op cit note 14 at 5.  
62 As a founding member of the ILO, South Africa is signatory to all eight of the conventions making up the 
Declaration.  
63 See http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/lang--en/index.htm 
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Declaration is its employment orientation. The Declaration itself contains principles that 
safeguard fundamental human rights for workers, including worker rights.64  
The eight fundamental conventions incorporated into the Declaration guard important 
rights such as freedom of association and organising rights, prohibition of compulsory and child 
labour as well as other form of discrimination in employment.65 An important aspect of these 
protected principles is the notion of equality of opportunity and treatment, as can be deduced 
from both the Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100) and the Discrimination 
(Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111) in the Declaration. Essentially, the 
labour rights provided in the ILO Declaration extends to all migrant workers (both in regular and 
irregular situations).  
All ILO member States are required to respect and promote principles and rights in the 
Declaration, regardless of ratification, by virtue of their membership. 66  In this respect, as a 
founding member of the ILO, South Africa is obligated to respect, promote, and realise the four 
core principles concerning the fundamental rights enshrined in the Declaration.67 That means that 
South Africa has an international duty to ensure that all workers within its borders, irrespective 
of their nationality or legal status, have their core human and labour rights guaranteed and 
protected. So all workers, including unauthorised foreign workers, must have their right to 
freedom of association and organising recognised, as well as shielded from forced or compulsory 
labour, child labour, and any discrimination in respect of employment, among other things.68 The 
South African government, to some degree, has endeavoured to fulfil this international obligation 
as is evidenced in the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2) of the South African Constitution that seeks to 
                                                          
64 Esselaar & Garbers op cit note 26 at 287.  
65 The Declaration comprises of eight fundamental or core Conventions, namely: Forced Labour Convention (No. 
29), Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (No. 87), Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98), Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100), Abolition of Forced Labour 
Convention (No. 105), Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No. 111), Minimum Age 
Convention (No. 138), and Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (No. 182). 
66 See http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/lang--en/index.htm. South Africa has ratified all of the eight 
core conventions. 
67 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (June 1998) ILO document CIT/1998/PR20A, 
available at http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/lang--en/index.htm 
68 Ibid. Article 2(a)-(d).  
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protect these fundamental worker rights.69 However, the extent to which the full realisation of 
these core labour rights relates to unauthorised foreign workers is yet to materialise. 
Additionally, the ILO has also developed a variety of conventions and recommendations 
specifically relating to the rights of migrant workers. Some of these instruments are specific to 
the social security protection of migrants and their families, while others address the plight of 
migrant workers generally. In this respect, two conventions — the Equality of Treatment (Social 
Security) Convention, 1962 (No. 118) and the Maintenance of Social Security Rights 
Convention, 1982 (No. 157) — and one accompanying recommendation — the Maintenance of 
Social Security Rights Recommendation, 1983 (No. 167) — constitute the relevant ILO social 
security instruments as far as migrant workers are concerned. 70  Both conventions and 
accompanying recommendations intend to offer substantive social security protection or 
entitlements to foreign workers and their families. However, these conventions have not been 
widely ratified; ratification stands at 37 and 4 respectively.71  
Moreover, there are four major ILO instruments aimed at addressing the plight of migrant 
workers generally. These migrant specific instruments consist of two significant conventions — 
the Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97) and the Migrant Workers 
(Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143),72 — and two Recommendations — the 
Migration for Employment Recommendation (Revised), 1949 (No. 86) and the Migrant Workers 
Recommendation, 1975 (No. 151).  
Convention No. 97 and accompanying Recommendation No. 86, historically developed 
in the post-Second World War era, provide for protection of migrants as it pertains to the 
migration process and employment, including pre-departure, transit, destination, and return.73 
Convention No. 97 provides for the equal treatment of migrant workers and national workers 
                                                          
69 See ss 9, 13 18 and 23 of the South African Constitution, 1996 respectively. The wording of these provisions is 
rather broad and could be read to include unauthorised foreign workers.  
70 See http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-international-labour-standards/social-security/lang--
en/index.htm 
71 Wickramasekara op cit note 18 at 270.  
72 This convention is also known as the Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of 
Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers Convention, 1975 (No. 143.  
73 Wickramasekara (2010) at 267.  
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regarding the full spectrum of social security and employment rights.74 Convention No. 143 is 
perhaps the first commitment by the international community to confront the issue of clandestine 
migration and illegal employment.75 The Convention comprises two parts: Part I (articles 1 to 9) 
addresses clandestine migration, and Part II (articles 10 to 14) guarantees to migrants equality of 
opportunity and treatment with nationals as regards employment and occupation, social security 
and cultural rights.76 
Note, however, that neither of these conventions specifically makes direct mention of the 
protection of irregular migrants.77 In fact, both conventions tend to exclude irregular migrants 
from the ambit of their protection, and consequently do nothing in improving the position of 
unauthorised migrant workers. This is evident in the provision of article 6(1) of Convention No. 
97 which provides that ‘[e]ach Member for which this Convention is in force undertakes to 
apply, without discrimination in respect of nationality, race, religion or sex, to immigrants 
lawfully within its territory, treatment no less favourable than that which it applies to its own 
nationals… (emphasis added)’. Article 10 of Convention No. 143 similarly mirrors this exclusion 
of unauthorised migrants.  
It is worth mentioning that South Africa has not ratified, with the exception of those core 
conventions incorporated into the ILO Declaration, any of the above ILO instruments dealing 
with migrant workers generally and their right of access to social protection specifically.78 A lack 
of ratification of these important instruments is indicative of a lack of willingness, on the part of 
the government, to commit to legally enforceable rights and obligations and/or implement 
international minimum standards needed for improving the position of vulnerable migrant 
workers. 79  Thus, there is no legally binding obligation on the part of the South African 
government to adhere to ensuing international principles and norms in its national laws and 
                                                          
74 See art 6. Also see Esselaar & Garbers op cit note 26 at 289; Van Eck & Snyman op cit note at 300.  
75 Wickramasekara op cit note 18 at 267. 
76 Ibid. See also art 10.  
77 Van Eck & Snyman op cit note 44 at 300.  
78 Ockert Dupper ‘The human rights of (irregular) migrants: An international, regional and South African 
perspective (Part 1)’ (2010) 2(1) International Journal of Social Security and Workers Compensation 61 at 65.  
79 Marius Olivier ‘International labour and social security standards: A developing country critique’ in Olivier, 
Dupper & Govindjee (eds) The role of standards in labour & social security law: International, regional & national 
perspectives (2013) 21. 
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practices. This may have significant bearing on the position of foreign nationals generally and 
their access to social protection specifically. 
However, unratified conventions may still form part of customary international law, 
which is a source of domestic law in South Africa.80 As previously indicated, the Constitution 
specifically directs the judiciary to consider international law, which may include unratified 
international instruments.81 Thus, unratified international instruments can still provide indirect 
domestic protection. In fact, the court in Discovery Health, arguably obiter dictum, considered 
relevant international norms of the UN and ILO in extending the definition of ‘employee’ to 
include unauthorised migrant workers. Judge Van Niekerk AJ emphasised the norms in the UN 
ICRMW and ILO Conventions 97 and 143 as useful for the interpretation of domestic legislation 
(particularly the LRA) in relation to the protection of fundamental rights of migrants. 82 
Therefore, although South Africa has not ratified ILO Conventions 97 and 143, their principles 
are still significant and useful for legislative interpretation domestically. 
 In addition to the above conventions, the ILO has adopted two auxiliary non-binding but 
significant instruments offering useful principles and guidelines to nations for managing 
migration policy and practices, namely the ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration, 
and Social Protection Floors Recommendation 202 of 2012. 83  The Multilateral Framework 
contains an annex of best practices to assist policymakers in addressing challenges faced in 
dealing with labour migration as well as important themes such as decent work, the protection of 
migrant workers, and migration governance, among others.84 Principle 11 of the Framework 
specifically calls for the adoption and implementation of policies to prevent clandestine 
migration and abusive conditions.85 Moreover, Guideline 9.9 of the Framework identifies the 
need to extend social security coverage to migrants in an irregular situation.86 
                                                          
80 Section 232 of the South African Constitution clearly states that ‘[c]ustomary international law is law in the 
Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament’.  
81 Sections 39(1) and 233 of the Constitution. 
82 Supra note 55 paras 47-49. 
83 International Labour Organization International labour migration: A rights-based approach (2010) at 131. 
84 International Labour Organization ILO Multilateral Framework on labour Migration: Non-binding principles and 
guidelines for a rights-based approach to labour migration (2006) at VI.  




Similarly, the ILO Recommendation relating to national floors of social protection 
provides important but flexible guidance to member states in building such social protection 
floors that cover as many people as possible. Paragraph 5 of the Recommendation outlines four 
basic social (protection) security guarantees that should be provided to ‘at least all residents and 
children, as defined in national laws and regulations’.87  These guarantees include access to 
essential healthcare, income security for children, persons in active age who are unable to earn 
sufficient income, and for older persons.88 However, coverage for migrants and their families, 
particularly irregular migrants, will be dependent on a country’s international obligation and its 
national laws.89  
 
5.3 Continental and Regional Framework: The AU and SADC Standards on Migrant 
Workers 
While migration management at an international level is necessary, the regional development of 
legal and policy frameworks on labour migration is equally important. Available data suggest 
that Africa alone accounts for about 7.1 million of the total global migrant population.90 On the 
African continent specifically, intra-regional labour migration is not a rare occurrence. The 
increasing movement of migrants from other troubled economies to relatively more affluent ones 
on the continent has necessitated a need for multi-governmental coordination in developing an 
integrated approach to labour migration policing.  
Framework developments at continental and sub-regional levels become increasingly 
necessary because South Africa is yet to ratify any of the core international conventions for 
migrant workers. Moreover, it is virtually impractical, tedious even, to expect multiple nations 
(in this case, 53 diverse independent states) to conclude labour migration treaties individually. 
Therefore, consideration of legal efforts or developments towards labour migration policing 
                                                          
87 Paragraph 6 of Recommendation 202 of 2012. 
88 Wouter van Ginneken ‘Social protection for migrant workers: National and international policy challenges’ 
(2013) 15(2) European Journal of Social Security 209 at 211. Also, see paragraph 5 of Recommendation 202 of 
2012. 
89 Op cit note 86.  
90 International Labour Organization Facts on labour migration (2006) 1.  
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within relevant regional bodies — the African Union (AU) 91  and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC)92 — is equally necessary for the purpose of this chapter. 
 
5.3.1 Labour migration and social protection (related) instruments of the AU 
At a continental level, Africa seemingly lags behind in the adoption of any meaningful labour 
migration framework that offers protection to migrant workers, especially in the field of social 
protection. Unlike their European or American counterparts (the European Union and the 
Organisation of American States respectively), the AU has yet to adopt any useful binding 
instruments on migrant workers, let alone develop any significant jurisprudence in the area of 
labour migration. 
While it is outside the scope of this chapter, it is important to note that regional human 
rights courts in both Europe and America are developing jurisprudence that addresses the 
substantive rights of unauthorised migrant workers in host countries, something that is yet to 
emerge in the African context.  
For instance in 2003, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights established a 
progressive jurisprudence for the international legal protection for unauthorised foreign 
workers.93 In its Advisory Opinion on the legal status and rights of undocumented migrants, the 
Inter-American Court held that ‘neither States nor private employers are obligated to employ 
undocumented migrants…[but] once they choose to engage them, their irregular migratory status 
may not be used as a basis for discrimination with respect to labour rights, including social 
security.’94 Based on general principle of equality and non-discrimination in international law, 
                                                          
91 The AU succeeded the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), established by agreement of 32 independent African 
states in 1963. 
92 SADC is a regional organisation consisting of 15 Member States: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
93 Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 (17 September 2003), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_18_ing.pdf 
94 Doug Cassel ‘Equal Labor Rights for Undocumented Migrant Workers’ in Anne Bayefsky (ed) Human Rights and 
Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Migrant Workers: Essays in Memory of Joan Fitzpatrick and Arthur 
Helton (2005) 477. 
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the Advisory Opinion is a significant progress as it transcends any official provisions of 
customary international law pertaining to irregular foreign workers.95 
Similarly, the European Union (EU) has developed significant labour migration policies, 
albeit fragmentary, and jurisprudence on migrant workers. One of the four key freedoms of the 
EU is the right to free movement of workers.96 In this respect, articles 45-48 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, ex Articles 39-42 EC) grants union citizens ‘the 
right to move freely across the EU to seek and take up work in other Member States on the same 
terms as nationals’.97 Underscoring this free movement of labour from one state to another 
within the region is the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers, which 
regulates the movement and working conditions of workers within the EU. Note, however, that 
both the provisions in the TFEU and the European Convention apply to EU nationals only. 
 Moreover, there are two significant measures intended to regulate the position and 
facilitate the intra-EU movement of non-EU migrant workers.98  These measures include the 
Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-
term residents, and the Council Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of 
third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment (Blue Card Directive). 
However, both directives favour the movement of highly skilled migrants, are contingent on the 
passage of time, and apply solely to legal Third-Country Nationals (TCNs) or those involved in 
regular migration.99 The EU response to irregular migrants is restrictive policies intended to deter 
clandestine migration. Additionally, both the European Court of Justice and the European Court 
of Human Rights have been instrumental in developing the European jurisprudence on migrant 
workers, the latter significantly recognising the right that unauthorised foreign workers hold in 
host nations, albeit slightly concentrated on family life or unity.100 
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99 Ibid at 117.  
100 Berg op cit note 3 at 23. See MSS v Belgium and Greece (2011) 53 EHRR 2, and Bigaeva v Greece App No 
26713/05 (ECtHR, 28 May 2009). 
162 
 
Whatever the case, the AU has effectively adopted a human rights instrument that subtly 
speaks to the protection concerns of migrants on the continent. The African [Banjul] Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR),101 adopted by the Organisation of African Unity, is the 
relevant regional human rights instrument as far as the protection of international human rights 
standards on the continent is concerned. Modelled on existing core international and other 
regional human rights instruments,102 the ACHPR encompasses all the recognisable international 
human rights principles, albeit imbued with a distinctly African flavour.103 
Like most human rights instruments, anti-discrimination features prominently as a 
fundamental right in the Banjul charter.104  Article 2 of the ACHPR expressly provides that 
‘[e]very individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognised and 
guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, 
birth or other status.’105 Thus it can be deduced that the enjoyment of all the rights and freedoms 
recognised and guaranteed in the ACHPR extends to every individual, migration status 
notwithstanding. 106  Moreover, Article 12 of the ACHPR contains a comprehensive list of 
protection for foreign nationals, including protection from arbitrary expulsion and mass 
expulsion. 
Although the ACHPR includes many of the important civil, cultural, economic, political, 
and social rights; it fails to address social protection directly or explicitly. 107  Instead, the 
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haphazard declarations in articles 16, 108  18(1), 109  and 18(4) 110  of the ACHPR can only be 
construed as a guarantee of social (security) protection-related rights.111 Social protection is too 
important a right for policymakers to relegate it to an ancillary. For this reason, the Banjul 
Charter fails to address adequately an important socio-economic right at a continental level. 
Nonetheless, recent developments have resulted in the adoption of two very 
comprehensive policy documents addressing migration at a regional or continental level: namely 
the Migration Policy Framework for Africa and the African Common Position on Migration and 
Development (both adopted in 2006). The Migration Policy Framework112 is perhaps the AU’s 
real effort at regional integration in migration as it seeks to promote standardisation and 
harmonisation of rules and principles relating to migrants.113  
Accordingly, the Framework provides guidelines and recommendations on various 
migration issues to assist governments and Regional Economic Communities (RECs).114 One of 
the nine key thematic migration issues that the Framework addresses is irregular migration. In 
this regard, the Framework recommends strengthening of policies to combat trafficking as well 
as developing regional countermeasures that encourage more legal channels and orderly 
migration.115 
Similarly, the African Common Position on Migration and Development116 outlines 11 
priority issues as well as several recommendations for national, continental, and international 
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levels aimed at addressing migration issues.117 It recommends, at a continental level, the creation 
of legal frameworks to fight irregular migration, as well as the conclusion of cooperation 
agreements to manage migration.118 
Although the adoption of both migration frameworks is seemingly a step in the right 
direction, they unfortunately serve as facade as far as substantial protection for migrant workers 
and their families is concerned. For all the potential they hold, both instruments are non-binding, 
and therefore they do not impose legal responsibilities on member states, and are not legally 
enforceable. In summation, the lack of a significant binding instrument on labour migration at 
the continental level means that migrant workers are at the mercy of independent national 
practices and policies as per protection instruments. 
Despite the absence of any meaningful binding continental labour migration framework 
that effectively addresses the protection concerns of migrant workers, the AU has adopted other 
instruments that seek to draw attention to the human rights, and social protection interests of 
migrants. As previously indicated, the ACHPR contains some provisions that allude to the 
defence of social protection rights.  
Another of the AU social protection-related instruments of relevance here is the Social 
Policy Framework for Africa (SPF). 119  The principal aim of the SPF is ‘to provide an 
overarching policy structure to assist member states to strengthen and give increasing priority to 
their national social policies and hence promote human empowerment and development’.120 One 
of the eighteen key thematic social issues addressed in the SPF is social protection. Social 
protection under the SPF includes social security measures and furthering income security.121 
The SPF also provides for a minimum package of essential social protection, including essential 
health care and benefits for children, informal workers, the unemployed, older persons and 
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persons with disabilities.122 However, the SPF is neither legally binding nor does it impose any 
obligations. 
 
5.3.2 Southern African Development Community initiatives  
In the absence of a binding continental labour migration framework, many African states have 
resorted to multilateral and bilateral agreements and/or the formation of economic integration 
blocs (Regional Economic Communities (RECs))123 that focus on their circumstances and needs. 
South Africa is a prominent member of one such RECs, namely the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). SADC aims, among other things, to foster socio-economic, 
political and security cooperation and integration among fifteen neighbouring Southern African 
States124 and eradicate poverty within the sub-region.125 
 Until 2014, the SADC had no clear regional migration policy to speak of.126 That is to 
say, there was no clear common or agreed immigration approach or protocol on cross-border 
migration in the SADC;127 in its place was a collection of various immigration laws and policy in 
SADC countries.128 The relatively newly adopted SADC Labour Migration Policy Framework 
provides a regional response to labour migration challenges faced by Member States. The Policy 
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Framework seeks to promote sound management of intra-regional labour migration.129 It also 
seeks to promote the protection of migrant workers’ rights.130  
 Additionally, SADC has adopted twenty-seven legally binding Protocols aimed at co-
ordinating, harmonising and rationalising policies and strategies of Member States on a number 
of issues. 131  Two of these Protocols, namely the Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of the 
Movement of Persons and the Employment and Labour Protocol, have some bearing on 
migration and migrant workers.132 
 The SADC Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of the Movement of Persons comes close to 
addressing cross-border regulation within the region. Despite initial oppositions by the major 
migrant-receiving countries in the region (i.e. South Africa, Botswana and Namibia),133 the Draft 
Protocol was finally adopted in 2005, albeit after much negotiation and compromise. Modelled 
on a similar, but much stronger, instrument adopted by the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), the Draft Protocol envisages an unobstructed migration by 
individuals into and within the territories of state parties. 134  Article 3(c) of the Protocol 
establishes the right of a citizen from one member state to live and work in the territory of 
another member state. Article 7 requires member states to harmonise their various national laws 
(including statutory rules and regulations) so they are aligned with the objectives of the Protocol. 
Article 20 further requires member states to extend residence and establishment rights and 
privileges to citizens of another member state should they acquire residence in a host state.  
 However, the Draft Protocol is deficient in that the envisaged protection seemingly 
extends only to regular migrants and not those in an irregular situation. Further, the Protocol 
does not directly regulate social security issues; it can potentially have significant impact on 
social security in a broad sense. 
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 The SADC Protocol on Employment and Labour on the other hand, aims to 'create a legal 
and policy framework for labour migration within SADC through harmonised labour and social 
security legislation....'135 It specifically addresses labour migration and migrant workers. Article 
19(c) explicitly calls on State Parties to accord foreign nationals fundamental rights, including 
employment and social protection rights. Article 11.1(a) calls for Member States to ensure that 
every worker, regardless of status or type of employment, enjoys adequate social (protection) 
security benefits. Article 11 seems promising for unauthorised migrant workers within the 
region. 
 Regionally, in comparison to the AU, SADC has made developments that are more 
promising as far as the promotion of social protection in the region goes. Beyond the Protocols, 
SADC has adopted key social security-related instruments specifically envisaged to regulate the 
social protection position of foreign nationals. In this respect, the Treaty of the Southern African 
Development Community (the SADC Treaty), Charter of Fundamental Social Rights in SADC, 
and the Code on Social Security in the SADC all contain provision for social protection either 
directly or indirectly relevant to migrant workers. The cornerstone of the SADC social protection 
framework is perhaps the SADC Treaty.136  
 Although it does not spell out social protection directly, the Treaty contains specific 
social protection-related objectives. For instance, SADC aims to ‘alleviate poverty, enhance the 
standard and quality of life of the peoples of the region and support the socially disadvantaged 
through regional integration’.137 Regional integration will be through the development of policies 
directed at the ‘progressive elimination of obstacles for the free movement of capital and labour, 
goods and services, and for the peoples of the region generally’.138 According to Nyenti and 
Mpedi, the SADC Treaty objectives ‘envisage a regional collaborative approach, as they can be 
achieved only through the development of regional social security mechanisms’.139 
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 Similarly, the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights in SADC (SADC Social Charter)140 
is significant as it has vital social and labour protection provisions relevant for foreign 
workers.141 Regarding labour rights, the SADC Social Charter requires member states to comply 
with all the basic employment rights similar to those found in the eight core ILO Conventions.142 
However, of crucial importance are the provisions relating to social protection contained in the 
SADC Social Charter. Note that it provides social protection for both the employed and the 
unemployed, but more comprehensively for the former.143  Under the SADC Social Charter, 
member states (in this instance, South Africa) are bound to: 
create an enabling environment such that every worker in the SADC Region shall have a right to 
adequate social protection and shall, regardless of status and the type of employment [including 
potentially irregular migrant workers], enjoy adequate social security benefits. Persons who have 
been unable to either enter or re-enter the labour market and have no means of subsistence shall be 
able to receive sufficient resources and social assistance.144 
 
This phrasing draws no distinction between nationals and foreign nationals. In fact, it is unlikely 
that the provision contemplates such distinction because the harmonisation of social security 
schemes is central to the Charter.145  
 Additionally, the complementary Code on Social Security in the SADC (the SADC 
Code)146 contains equally important provisions for social security protection. The Code offers, as 
broad objectives, strategic direction and guidelines, a set of general principles and minimum 
standards, a framework for monitoring, as well as an instrument for co-ordinating and 
harmonising social security in SADC.147 Article 4 of the Code expressly recognises the right to 
social security, with distinction drawn between social insurance and social assistance.148 The 
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Code goes much further concerning the development of social protection in SADC than the 
Charter in addressing the social protection position of select marginalised groups.149  
 Migrant workers, including irregular or unauthorised migrants, are among the 
marginalised groups identified and specially regulated under the Code. Foreign workers 
theoretically enjoy equal treatment alongside citizens within the social security system of the 
host country as the Code prohibits the disparate treatment of non-nationals.150 It goes a step 
further in mandating member states to provide or extend basic minimum social security 
protection and coverage to unauthorised foreign workers in their territories.151  
There is no doubt that both the SADC Social Charter and the SADC Code are an 
indication of progressive commitment as far as developing a sub-regional social protection 
framework. The main concern, however, has to do with what is typically the disparity between 
the formal approval of such instruments and the actual implementation and practice thereof.152 
Predictably, some states may oppose the provisions available for irregular migrants contained in 
both policy documents, particularly the major migrant-receiving states. While this is a 
presumption at best, it still demands attention, given the fact that both documents impose no 
legal obligations on member states. The simple fact is that if something imposes no legal 
demands nor requires active responsibility it is easier to ignore it altogether.  
 
5.4 Impact of international law on the protection position of irregular migrants  
Scholars agree that international law can be a natural source of rights protecting migrant 
workers, including unauthorised migrant workers.153 The premise is that international law might 
be better positioned to provide a progressive direction on the treatment of migrant workers 
because it is ‘somewhat insulated from domestic debates over immigration policies’.154 This 
chapter further examines the extent to which this proposition is accurate by looking at the actual 
protection these international instruments offer to unauthorised foreign workers. 
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 The preceding analysis has categorically revealed that there are substantive international 
and regional instruments that seek to protect the rights of non-nationals in general and their right 
of access to social security in particular. However, these instruments affect the position of 
migrants in varied ways. Moreover, different categories of migrants appear to enjoy different 
degrees of protection in international law. The level and substance of the protection offered tend 
to be contingent on two factors: the legitimacy of the migration status of the individual involved 
on the one hand, and the legal character of the instrument in question on the other. Therefore, an 
analysis to ascertain the extent to which these existing international and regional mechanisms 
offer adequate protection to unauthorised foreign workers is necessary. 
 
5.4.1 International instruments dealing with fundamental rights of migrant workers 
Examination of a select number of international legal instruments (by both the ILO and UN) 
reveals that there are existing instruments that seek to deal with the protection concerns of 
foreign workers. However, the available international standards that confer rights to migrant 
workers vary in respect to their scope of application and lawful enforceability. It is evident that 
international law afford foreign nationals a range of fundamental rights in two distinct ways; 
either based on their personhood (deemed equal by virtue of their humanity) or specifically as a 
protected class because of the vulnerability associated with their migratory status.155  
Under the general human rights framework, the protection offered are universal and 
primarily based on the ‘equal personhood’ doctrine, where all migrants enjoy certain rights by 
virtue of their shared humanity. Hence, most of the international protection norms that fall under 
the human rights framework are of general application, i.e. apply to all people, irrespective of  
residential or immigration status.  
In this respect, both the UN International Bill of Human Rights and the ILO Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work are relevant as they confer much-needed 
fundamental core human and labour rights to all (migrant) workers. Protection offered by both of 
these instruments is through general application and founded on the principle of universality. As 
a rule therefore, nationality, residential or immigration status cannot limit the application of the 
rights or protection covered by these two instruments. For this reason, unauthorised foreign 
workers, as human beings generally and specifically as workers, are entitled to the protection 
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conferred by these instruments as they apply to all human beings, regardless of nationality or 
legal status.156  
For instance, the ILO Declaration guarantees to unauthorised migrants protection against 
all forms of forced labour and discrimination in employment as well as the recognition and 
promotion of their right to associate freely and bargain collectively. Similarly, the instruments 
contained in the International Bill of Human Rights ostensibly protect unauthorised migrant 
workers from discrimination and exploitation on grounds other than their non-national status.157 
In summation, these universalistic instruments tentatively guarantee to unauthorised foreign 
workers minimum standards of protection, including their basic human rights.  
Note, however, in spite of protecting core human and labour rights, careful scrutiny of the 
UN’s universal human rights treaties exposes an inherent contradiction. As instruments premised 
on the universality of human rights, they pronounce equality of treatment between the rights of 
nationals and non-nationals, including no distinctions based on immigration status.158 Yet, in 
another breath, they give states’ territorial sovereignty weighty prominence over the rights of 
migrants. Meaning that although the rights conferred by these instruments apply to all people 
without discrimination, national laws can limit them as far as the limitation promotes general 
welfare. An obvious example is article 2(3) of the ICESCR, which allows developing countries 
scope to limit the rights of foreign nationals to economic rights.159 Section 5.5 of this chapter 
explores in detail the interplay of these two principles of international law (non-discrimination 
vis-à-vis territoriality).  
 
5.4.2 International migrant-specific and social protection (related) instruments 
Aside from the instruments dealing with the fundamental/universal rights of migrant workers, 
there are select international standards that directly address the human treatment of labour 
migrants generally and their social protection interests specifically. Here, the international legal 
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conventions developed by both the UN and ILO shape the protection position of irregular 
migrant workers. 
The UN’s ICRMW leads the way in advancing the substantial human rights protection of 
unauthorised foreign workers as a recognised vulnerable group.160 It transcends the guarantee of 
equal treatment (protection of the right to equality) to include much needed special protection for 
migrants. Yet this instrument is void of one crucial factor to be effective in the progressive 
protection of migrants, i.e. country support in the form of ratifications. The Convention enjoys a 
very low ratification rate (only 41 states) as compared to that of other core UN human rights 
treaties.161 Moreover, a survey of the list of the countries that have ratified the ICRMW indicates 
a clear divide between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries, with strong support for 
the instrument mainly coming from major migrant-sending countries.162 Records indicate that 
only a small group of states have ratified it to date and Argentina is the sole major migrant-
receiving nation to endorse the instrument.163  
Although South Africa is yet to sign, ratify and formally acknowledge this instrument, it 
is still necessary to examine the degree of protection this supposedly significant instrument 
offers to unauthorised migrants. The ICRMW is perhaps the only instrument that truly recognises 
the acute vulnerability attached to clandestine migration, as it recognises and extends significant 
human rights to all migrants and their families, status notwithstanding.164 Generally, all migrant 
workers can enjoy equal treatment regarding equal pay and conditions of work and the right to 
join trade unions, to receive emergency medical care, and to transfer their earnings out of the 
country upon termination of their stay.165  
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In the field of social protection specifically, the ICRMW is particularly important as it 
seemingly extends the right of access to social security to all migrants, including the 
unauthorised. Article 27(1) specifically states:  
With respect to social security, migrant workers and members of their families shall enjoy in 
the State of employment the same treatment granted to nationals insofar as they fulfil the 
requirements provided for by the applicable legislation of that State and the applicable 
bilateral and multilateral treaties. The competent authorities of the State of origin and the 
State of employment can at any time establish the necessary arrangements to determine the 
modalities of application of this norm. 
 
Despite existing UN human rights instruments aimed at ensuring the humane treatment of 
migrant workers, it must be noted that the development of appropriate instruments targeted at the 
most vulnerable group of migrants (unauthorised migrants) is inadequate compared to other 
categories of international migrants, such as refugees. Careful assessment of the ICRMW reveals 
a number of paradoxes. Although it is symbolically significant as far as the inclusion of 
unauthorised migrants in the human rights framework is concerned, it has a number of 
limitations that are likely to impinge on its envisioned goal.166 First, there seems to be confusion 
as to what constitutes social protection. For instance, though art 27(1) of the ICRMW seemingly 
extends substantial social security rights to irregular migrants, it goes no further than a mere 
statement of general principles as it does not clearly define the scope of social security.167  
Secondly, and vagueness notwithstanding, the ICRMW appears to differentiate between 
different categories of migrant workers and addresses their corresponding rights separately. The 
ICRMW distinguishes between migrant workers in irregular situations (unauthorised migrants) 
and those with regular status to the detriment of the former. It does so by conferring basic and 
non-derogable human rights to all workers but reserves additional specific rights only to 
regular/authorised migrant workers.168  
For example, access to social services, unemployment benefits, training, and housing are 
exclusively available to only lawful migrant workers.169 These presumably innocent differential 
entitlements accorded to the two groups of migrants under the Convention effectively create two 
                                                          
166 Jakubowski op cit note 32 at 517.  
167 Dupper op cit note 20 at 233.  
168 Available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cmw.htm.  
169 Olivier op cit note 131 at 91.  
174 
 
classes of human rights protection.170 Such dualism, intended or not, has the potential to produce 
loopholes for governments to discriminate against unauthorised migrants since they are deemed 
less worthy of international protection than other migrant groups. Since the ICRMW allows 
nation states the scope to differentiate between regular and irregular migrants, it is conceivable 
that policymakers in destination countries will be drawn to take advantage of (or even exceed) 
such claw-back clauses and afford unauthorised foreign workers lesser protection as is their 
prerogative.  
Lastly, the ICRMW preserves the right of states (territoriality principle) to pursue any 
preferred immigration control policies in order to govern the entry and expulsion of foreigners 
from their land,171  as well as their right to adopt control measures to eliminate clandestine 
migration and the employment of unauthorised migrants.172 Further, the Convention does not 
impose any obligation on contracting states to legalise the status of unauthorised migrants.173 In 
fact, unauthorised migrants have to contend with immigration laws of any country of transit as 
well as country of employment, which are often harsh.174 As will be detailed in section 5.5.2 of 
this chapter, the partiality towards authorised migrant workers over unauthorised migrant 
workers is an illustration of the conflicting relationship between states’ territorial sovereignty 
and human rights at play in the migration discourse.  
As already indicated, the ILO has instituted a range of Conventions and 
Recommendations offering substantive protection to foreign workers. Most of the relevant 
international norms and standards concerning the social protection of migrant workers are 
unclear on the extent to which they should apply distinctively to regular or irregular migrants.175 
An analysis of the ILO framework dealing with social security specifically and the plight of 
migrants generally reveals little to no protection as far as unauthorised foreign workers is 
concerned. The reality is that ILO social security instruments (with the exception of one or two) 
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tend to be silent concerning the social protection of unauthorised foreign workers.176 Only two of 
the four core instruments on migrant workers — Convention No. 143 and Recommendation No. 
151 — under the ILO framework overtly attempt to address the situation of unauthorised migrant 
workers.  
Convention No. 143 is perhaps the sole ILO instrument that offers binding standards in 
support of unauthorised migrant workers. Convention No. 143 guarantees equal treatment to 
unauthorised migrant workers pertaining to remuneration, social security, working conditions, 
and other benefits for past employment.177 Further, art 1 mandates the safeguard of the basic 
human rights of ‘all migrant workers’, including unauthorised migrants. Functioning as a 
supplementary instrument, Recommendation No. 151 reiterates similar principles contained in 
Convention No. 143. Both Convention No. 143 and Recommendation No. 151 establish the right 
to equality of treatment   between regular and irregular migrant workers in the field of social 
protection.178 However, this right to equal treatment is limited and applies retrospectively (for 
work they have already performed), and consequently does not cover the duration of continued 
employment of unauthorised migrant workers. In theory therefore, unauthorised migrant workers 
can enjoy, albeit subject to certain limitation, equal treatment on par with nationals as regards 
social security benefits.  
Although protection conferred by Convention No. 143 and its supplementary 
Recommendation No. 151 cover authorised and unauthorised migrant workers alike, Convention 
No. 143 is still restrictive in the protection it offers unauthorised foreign workers. It extends 
basic human rights protection to all migrant workers, including the unauthorised, but affords 
additional and better protection to authorised or regular migrants.179 What is more, states can 
choose to exclude either Part I or Part II from their acceptance of the Convention.180 Granted, the 
goal may be to encourage regular migration. However, the option to choose which parts to 
exclude defeats the whole purpose of ensuring that all foreign workers, even when employed 
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‘illegally’, enjoy a basic level of employment, human  and social rights. The instrument should 
not give with one hand and take with the other; it becomes confusing and ineffective. 
In conclusion, it is important to note that the ratification rate of core migrant worker 
conventions is dismal to say the least. Böhning avers that these ‘global comprehensive migration 
conventions concerned with labour migration tend to suffer from a ratification deficit or, more 
precisely, from a great reticence to ratify on the part of migrant-receiving countries’.181 South 
Africa has failed to commit to any of the instruments incorporated in the international charter on 
migration; it has ratified neither the ICRMW nor the two ILO Conventions (No. 97 and 143). 
Considering that it is a major migrant-receiving country on the continent and within the sub-
region, this is disconcerting because it has significant implications for migrants (particularly the 
unauthorised). Undoubtedly, South Africa occupies a unique position in the migratory flow in 
the sub-Saharan African region. In the South African case, the flow of migrant workers is 
unidirectional;182 this perhaps explains its resistance in formally committing to any instruments 
that arguably offer very little incentive.  
 
5.4.3  Regional prospects for labour and social protection 
Regionally, analysis of existing sub-regional norms and standards suggest a gradual, albeit slow, 
movement towards a ‘special SADC-wide social security coverage regime’. 183  This special 
SADC-wide regime is relevant for foreign workers in the region, particularly those within South 
Africa, as they will ideally be able to enjoy similar adequate social protection;184 and if need be, 
benefit from social assistance should they have no means of support owing to an inability to gain 
or regain employment.185 However, this equal treatment of nationals and non-nationals in the 
field of social protection provided for in terms of the Social Charter and the SADC Protocol on 
Employment and Labour may be reasonably restricted to those migrating legally.  
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That said, none of the regional instruments, with the exception of the provisions of the 
SADC Code, offer any real or meaningful protection for unauthorised foreign workers in relation 
to social security. 186  The SADC Code modestly protects the social security position of 
unauthorised migrants. It extends significant social security protection to unauthorised migrants 
based on equality. Given the provision of article 17.3 of the Code then, unauthorised migrants in 
South Africa, specifically SADC member citizens, are entitled to a basic minimum social 
security protection and/or coverage. Whilst this extension of minimum social protection to this 
category of foreign nationals may be progressive, it must be noted that the provisions of the 
Code, unlike the Social Charter, are not binding norms and therefore not legally enforceable.187  
 
5.5 Competing concerns: Questions of status and power 
Analyses of applicable transnational standards intended to prescribe the appropriate treatment for 
unauthorised migrants reveal two pressing issues that warrant brief consideration. Both issues 
point to a seemingly conflicting relationship between human rights obligations and two key 
principles in international law. The first issue relates to the meaning and application of the 
general principle of equality and non-discrimination, more specifically, the equality of 
opportunity or treatment of irregular migrants vis-à-vis regular migrants and nationals. The 
second issue concerns the scope of the international legal principle of territorial sovereignty, 
where the appropriate treatment of unauthorised migrants is concerned.  
 
5.5.1 Equality and non-discrimination in international law 
The right to equality and non-discrimination is a recognised and well-established core principle 
in international human rights law.188 The right to equal treatment or opportunity requires that all 
persons be dealt with equally in law and practice (equal before the law); that is, without 
distinction or discrimination. The notion of non-discrimination cannot be detached from equality 
inasmuch as they are inseparably connected and often interchangeable.  
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However, only a few international instruments have attempted to define non-
discrimination. In this regard, article 1(1)(a) of ILO Convention No. 111 189  provides that 
discrimination includes ‘any distinction,  exclusion or preference made on the basis of race, 
colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin, which has the effect of 
nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment in employment or occupation’.190 
Similarly, most of the human rights instruments prohibit discrimination on analogous listed 
grounds. For instance, article 2 of both the UDHR and ICESCR prohibit discrimination on ten 
illustrative grounds: race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth, or other status.  
Despite the prominence of equality and the overt prohibition of discrimination in 
international law, there appears to be a confusing conundrum. International law seemingly 
protects the rights of all workers irrespective of citizenship; yet the status of the individual 
determines the rights international law grants. 
On the one hand, the right to equality and non-discrimination is a crosscutting issue of 
concern in international law. Almost all the international instruments surveyed in this chapter, 
thus far, provide to migrants equality of treatment in the workplace on par with national workers, 
including core human rights such as non-discrimination. In this respect, both article 2 of the 
UDHR and article 2(2) of the ICESCR recognise the right to equality and non-discrimination. 
Similarly, the UN ICRMW and ILO Conventions No. 97 and 143 all maintain that there should 
be equality of treatment and non-discrimination.  
More precisely, the ICRMW articulates non-discrimination (articles 1(1) and 7), equal 
treatment between nationals and non-nationals as regards employment conditions and 
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remuneration (art 25), and equal access to social protection (art 27).191  To this end, art 88 
prohibits ratifying states from excluding any part or any category of migrant worker from its 
application. In the same way, both ILO Conventions No. 97 and 143 seek to ensure non-
discrimination and equality of treatment between nationals and migrant workers.192  In fact, 
Convention No. 143 takes the equality concept further to include equal opportunity.193 
On the other hand, international instruments regulating the position of migrant workers 
seemingly apply distinctively to regular and irregular migrants. The reality is that these 
international instruments of direct relevance to migrant workers tend to differentiate between the 
categories ‘national’, ‘regular migrant’, and ‘irregular migrant’. These categorisations become 
problematic when they result in differing classification of rights for those concerned. The very 
instruments that promise equal treatment of nationals and non-national simultaneously provide 
for some restrictions on the principle of equality.  
Hence, the ICRMW and ILO Conventions No. 97 and 143 fall into this trap. The broad 
conception of the equality principle contained in Part II (specifically art 10) of Convention No. 
143 applies only to regular migrants. Article 10, among other things, provides that members 
undertake to promote and guarantee ‘…equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of 
employment and occupation, of social security…for persons who as migrant workers or 
members of their families are lawfully within its territory’. Similar provision is contained in art 6 
of Conventions No. 97. Thus, both ILO Conventions restrict the equality of treatment principle 
to regular migrants, indirectly excluding irregular or unauthorised migrants. 
As previously indicated, the ICRMW is in four parts, with Parts III and IV being of 
particular relevance to the current equality discussion.194 Despite the fact that the ICRMW avers 
that there should be equality of treatment,195 Parts III and IV assert two parallel classifications of 
equal treatment for migrant workers. In this regard, it provides for equality of treatment between 
                                                          
191 Also see Marius Olivier ‘Enhancing access to South African social security benefits by SADC citizens: The need 
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nationals and all migrant workers and their families (Part III), and equality of treatment between 
regular migrants and irregular migrants and their families (Part IV).  
Essentially, the ICRMW permits states to distinguish between regular and irregular 
migrants, allowing for differential treatment to the detriment of the latter group.196 The two 
categories of equality of treatment translate into two sets of rights protection: protection of all 
migrant workers (Part III) and a relatively higher protection for regular migrant workers (Part 
IV). This differentiation and ensuing dual classes of human rights protection is superfluous and 
unwarranted.  
It is understandable why no right is absolute and that not every differentiation of 
treatment or distinction between individuals or groups will amount to discrimination. 197  In 
certain conditions, attaining equality will require taking actions that cause or perpetuate 
discrimination. In fact, general international law permits such (affirmative) actions. However, 
such actions should not violate the principle of non-discrimination. For this reason, regional 
supervisory bodies, such as the European Court, Inter-American Court, and the Human Rights 
Committee, sanction distinction or differentiation as far as they are justified, reasonable and 
objective, and there is proportionality between the aim and means of the differentiation.198  
While there are certainly legitimate reasons for differentiating between irregular migrants 
and those in a regular situation, the restrictions embedded in these instruments still negate the 
equal treatment principle (prohibition of all discrimination based on nationality). Determining 
the right to equality of migrants should not be solely a question of status. Evidently, people treat 
unauthorised migrant workers differently because of their irregular status. Their irregular 
immigration status, an undesirable and prohibited characteristic, supposedly renders 
unauthorised migrants undeserving of equal treatment or access on par with regular migrants 
with regard to certain basic rights.  
This approach to rights protection is problematic in that it fails to see the interconnection 
between immigration and labour law and the compatibility of their goals. Sole reliance on status 
in determining rights essentially esteems immigration law objectives at the expense of labour law 
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objectives.199 Such an approach fails to recognise that migrant workers (both the authorised and 
unauthorised) encounter various forms of discrimination and exploitation in host countries,200 
and the vulnerability is more severe for unauthorised migrants who do not possess the necessary 
legal authorisation.201  
In light of this, any differential treatment in the enjoyment of a right solely on the basis of 
the migratory status of a worker goes contrary to the basic human right philosophy assumptions 
‘that equality, as a human right, is an entitlement and not a benefit, and like every other human 
right, must be legally enforceable’.202 The premise is simple: migratory status per se should not 
deprive migrant workers of certain rights, particularly their human rights.  
In any case, migration itself should not grant or deny any form of status.203 The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, in an Advisory Opinion in September 2003,204 has ruled to 
this effect.205 In a request to the court, Mexico averred that harmfully distinct treatment (either 
between regular and irregular migrant workers or between nationals and non-nationals) should 
not be permitted in the implementation of the fundamental labour rights recognised in 
international human rights instruments.206 The court settled this assertion reasoning that ‘the 
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regular situation of a person in a state is not a prerequisite for that State to respect and ensure the 
principle of equality and non-discrimination’.207  
The court further held, and correctly so, that a person in employment, irrespective of the 
migratory status, ‘acquires labour rights in the state of employment because respect and 
guarantee of the enjoyment and exercise of those rights must be made without any 
discrimination’.208 In summary, the court conclusively declared:  
The migratory status of a person can never be a justification for depriving him of the 
enjoyment and exercise of his human rights, including those related to employment. On 
assuming an employment relationship, the migrant acquires rights as a worker, which must 
be recognised and guaranteed, irrespective of his regular or irregular status in the state of 
employment. These rights are a consequence of the employment relationship.209  
 
This excerpt from the Advisory Opinion suggests, and rightly so, that immigration status does 
not impinge on the rights and responsibilities stemming from the employment relationship.210 
Consequently, the right to equality and non-discrimination is and cannot be definitively a 
question of status. To this end, the position taken in this chapter and throughout the research is 
that the categories ‘national’, ‘regular migrant’ and ‘irregular migrant’ must be treated in the 
same way, at least as far as fundamental labour rights are concerned.  
 Advocacy for the equality of treatment or opportunity for irregular migrants does not 
suggest that they should be beyond the reach of the law. The first option, and perhaps the 
primary goal, is to encourage or gear efforts towards legal or regular migration. This will require 
more and user-friendly channels of entry. However, should such efforts fail and they do fail, the 
right of access of (unauthorised) migrants to social protection should not be exclusively 
dependent on their legal or migratory status. They should be entitled to a basic level of social 
protection by virtue of their shared humanity, if not for their vulnerability or marginalisation.211 
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5.5.2 International norms of human rights vs state territorial sovereignty  
International law allows states to determine and organise the potential entry or refusal of migrant 
workers. Underlining this right is the principle of territoriality. However, when considered in the 
context of clandestine migration, there appears to be a tension between the two domains: i.e. 
between a state’s immigration-regulatory powers to exclude foreigners and its general human 
rights obligations to unauthorised migrants. 212  Bosniak argues that the debate between 
proponents and opponents of human rights protection for unauthorised migrants involves a 
pertinent question about the reciprocal effect between ‘human rights protection for irregular 
migrants and the sovereign exclusionary powers of nation-states’.213  
The argument, as put forward by Bosniak, is essentially a structural debate about the 
conflicting interplay between state territorial sovereignty, and international human rights. The 
conflict lies at the boundary where the sovereign right of a state to control its territory must give 
way for its international obligations to protect irregular migrant workers as individuals. 214 
Framed differently, when should human rights issues fall squarely within states’ national 
jurisdiction and when can such issues be reasonably scrutinised by outside parties?  
In order to prevent the abuse of sovereign discretionary powers, the international 
community has formulated a set of norms and standards to guide and synchronise various 
national legislation, policies, and practices in order to protect the interests of both the state and 
migrant workers.215 At the heart of this international effort is the conception of human rights 
centred around principles of dignity and equality based on our shared humanity. These 
international norms, among other things, temper states’ territorial sovereignty by imposing 
certain limitations on their use.216 Hence, if the protection of unauthorised migrant workers’ 
rights in agreement with international human rights principles intersects with states’ sovereign 
rights to determine the structure of national membership, tension ensues,217 tension about either 
protecting individual rights or preserving national sovereignty.  
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The tension between states’ territorial sovereignty and human rights is an indication of 
the inextricable connection between immigration law and other areas of law such as social 
security law. When considering unauthorised foreign workers in international law, human rights 
norms will always appear to be in competition with the conception of state sovereignty. This 
conflict ensues because predominant belief suggests that migration issues are wholly under the 
state domain and so the treatment of non-nationals falls within the varied authorities of the 
state.218  
Some scholars, a position also taken in this paper, aver that ‘the tension between human 
rights principles and states' immigration powers have largely been resolved in favour of the state’ 
because they essentially maintain their sovereign rights to make it a crime for irregular migrants 
to enter their borders or for employers to hire them.219 
Presently, unauthorised foreign workers are not guaranteed all fundamental rights under 
international law because of the principle of state sovereignty. 220  Likewise, they are not 
guaranteed all fundamental labour rights in customary international law. 221  Although the 
preference given to states’ discretion is by no means absolute, it must be noted that when states’ 
sovereign prerogatives (particularly in immigration matters) are held superior to substantive 
protection in other areas of law (e.g. human rights, labour or social security), it stand to threaten 
the spirit and goal of the instruments in question and ultimately defeat their enforceability.  
Given South Africa’s security-focus immigration policy, if the country was to ratify an 
important instrument like the ICRMW, the anticipation is that the Department of Home Affairs 
will greatly favour the discretionary power to exercise control over its borders accorded by the 
Convention, and even unscrupulously control the entry and expulsion of ‘undesirable’ foreign 
nationals.222 There is the expectation that South Africa, like any major migrant-receiving states 
confronted with clandestine migration, is likely to be excessively abusive in exercising its power 
against irregular migrant workers under certain circumstances.223 In that respect, there is the 
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prospect that these migrant workers would lose any degree of employment-related social 
protection because states’ national sovereignty would greatly limit such protection in the end.224 
The use of sovereign discretionary powers to restrict irregular migrant workers 
concerning equal treatment with regular migrants or citizens in the field of social protection 
defeats the whole object and function of social protection. As noted by the UN Commission: 
The ultimate purpose of social protection is to increase capabilities and opportunities and 
thereby, promote human development. While by its very nature social protection aims at 
providing at least minimum standards of well-being to people in dire circumstances 
enabling them to live with dignity, one should not overlook that social protection should 
not simply be seen as a residual policy function of assuring the welfare of the poorest – but 
as a foundation at a societal level for promoting social justice and social cohesion, 
developing human capabilities and promoting economic dynamism and creativity.225 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
In view of often-hostile domestic laws and political rhetoric surrounding discussions about the 
rights protection of unauthorised migrant workers, scholars suggest that international law is an 
optimistic avenue for sourcing guidance (precedents) on the better treatment of migrant workers. 
However, the extension of substantial protection to unauthorised migrants under international 
law tends to be problematic. This is because most international human right instruments vaguely 
allude to the protection of unauthorised migrants, while some overtly rule them out from certain 
rights offered to citizens or authorised/regular migrants. Even when these instruments are 
seemingly intended to extend substantial rights to unauthorised migrants, the fulfilment of such 
legal principles are often extremely problematic.  
Emerging problems associated with the actual realisation of international human rights 
legal principles often link to the interplay between immigration law (states’ territorial 
sovereignty) and other areas of law. Human rights principles seem to be at odds with 
immigration law seeing that the prevailing view suggests that states have a broad authority over 
their borders and as such, the treatment of migrants falls directly under the discretionary powers 
of individual sovereign states. In this respect, development in international law on the rights of 
unauthorised foreign workers has been less than progressive. 
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Simply put, the protection of social security rights for migrants (both the regular and 
irregular) cannot be limited to statements of general application as is the case with the universal 
human rights framework. The need for more substantive protection (under labour and anti-
discrimination laws) for this vulnerable category of workers has perhaps been realised, given the 
plethora of international instruments that relate specifically to the special protection of migrant 
workers. 
Yet the realisation of these instruments in the lived experience of this vulnerable group is 
still tentative. Subtle differentiation, restrictions, or limitations embedded in international 
instruments concerning migrant workers suggest some uncertainty on the part of the international 
community about the treatment of irregular migrant workers.226  
Accordingly, current international human rights instruments are inadequate to protect 
these workers. Therefore, there needs to be a re-interpretation of international protective 
provisions or norms, if these international legal instruments are to achieve their intended 
purposes. A progressive reformulation of international instruments will provide better domestic 
guidance on the treatment of all foreign workers, since international instruments are designed to 
guide and synchronise various national legislation, policies, and practices. 
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CHAPTER VI SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL PROTECTION REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK 
 
‘When development policies pay no attention to the human beings who move within migration 
flows, they contribute to inequality, injustice and incoherence in policy responses to migration.’1 
 
6.1 Introduction 
It is well-established that the international community, under the auspices of the UN and ILO, 
collectively recognises the many deprivations that foreign workers (particularly the 
unauthorised) put up with in host nations. This global recognition of the plight associated with 
clandestine migration is made evident by the select employment-related human rights protection 
made available to these workers under the international human rights regime. Since a number of 
the available labour-related human rights protection form part of treaty law, certain principles of 
international human rights law are only effective once they are formally endorsed by individual 
nation states and executed into relevant domestic law. Additionally, because access to social 
protection differs across individual states (not at all integrated),2 foreign workers often have to 
rely solely on social protection laws in host countries. Consequently, the position of foreign 
nationals (particularly the unauthorised) in the social protection mechanisms of destination 
countries, in this case South Africa, deserves careful analysis. 
 In the domestic domain, the concern becomes primarily whether unauthorised foreign 
workers can resort to constitutional and other relevant statutory provisions for rights protection. 
In South Africa, the supremacy of the Constitution is such that it underpins other pieces of 
legislation promulgated to give effects to its principles and spirit. Sometimes when the 
constitutionality of certain provisions in other pieces of law and/or actions is questioned, the 
Constitution is strongly relied on to settle such matters. In respect to disputes of a socio-
economic nature involving foreign nationals, particularly the unauthorised, the constitutional 
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equality provision (s 9) is often indirectly invoked. When the courts are called to interpret the 
rights of foreign nationals — for instance to assess whether a measure or action limiting the right 
of unauthorised foreign workers is reasonable, necessary or proportionate — the basis of 
grounding the interpretation becomes increasingly important. What is more, it is common 
practice for South African courts to make use of principles of international human rights law to 
interpret and bridge gaps in domestic law where necessary. This infusion of domestic law with 
international norms is necessary for the desirable interpretation of what is often considered 
ambiguous domestic provisions. While the primary focus of this chapter is on the South African 
experience, comparison is made to the situation in the United States and (to a lesser extent) 
Europe. 
 Accordingly, this chapter examines unauthorised foreign workers’ entitlement to 
domestic social protection rights, at least a basic form, against existing international instruments. 
In embedding human rights principles in the migration context, it examines the extent to which 
domestic protection regimes comply with applicable international, continental, and regional 
instruments that seek to protect the right of access to social protection of foreign workers.  
 The argument here is that policymakers ought to move away from emphasising punitive 
immigration control measures to an approach that effectively deals with clandestine migration 
and is at the same time cognisant of the human rights of the most vulnerable role players of the 
clandestine migration phenomenon, unauthorised foreign workers. There needs to be a move 
away from absolute security-centred approach to a more human rights approach to migration 
management if principles of fairness and social justice are to be upheld or achieved in any 
democratic society. 
 Section 6.2 of the chapter surveys possible sources of domestic law, including available 
case law, in order to provide an understanding of the general difficulties and obstacles associated 
with social protection provision in the country. It does so by giving a brief overview of the South 
African legal framework providing employment-related social protection.  
 Sections 6.3 and 6.4 of the chapter then analyse the protection measures, if any, put in 
place to address unauthorised foreign workers within the domestic framework. It does so by 
measuring domestic provisions against the existing international norms and standards explored in 
preceding chapter in order to ascertain the extent of the adequacy of the domestic protection 
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offered to unauthorised foreign workers in light of these international norms. This comparative 
exercise assists in revealing domestic deficiencies in the field of social protection.  
 Finally, sections 6.5 and 6.6 the chapter examine how improvements could be made in 
terms of domestic legal reform so as to improve the social protection of unauthorised migrants. 
In doing so, it surveys relative best practices from countries that offer comparably better 
protection for this class of workers. Through examining how other (similar) jurisdictions have 
successfully developed available international protection norms, it makes a case for how 
policymakers can reinterpret these international norms to suit South Africa’s socio-economic 
context.  
 
6.2 Overview of domestic legal framework providing labour and social protection  
The nature and state of the South African social protection (and labour) framework warrants a 
brief account as it severely impacts on the position and treatment of unauthorised foreign 
workers as regards their right of access to social protection. There has been a fair progress in the 
adjudication of the right to social security in South Africa. The Constitutional Court has 
intervened where necessary in advancing the jurisprudence in a number of groundbreaking 
judgments, as it pertains to socio-economic rights.3  
 However, there is little to no case law setting the scope of the rights of unauthorised 
foreign workers in this respect. Hesitation on the part of unauthorised migrants to invoke the 
domestic judicial protection to improve their position out of fear of drawing attention to their 
immigration status may explain, in part, the present dearth of judicial scrutiny into the rights of 
unauthorised migrants in the country. 4  Hesitancy notwithstanding, there are some existing 
constitutional principles and statutory provisions that can be used to protect the rights of these 
vulnerable class of workers.  
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v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC); Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others 
2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC); and Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others; Mahlaule and 
Others v Minister of Social Development and Others 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC).  
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6.2.1 Constitutional provision 
The South African Constitution is supreme and influences all areas of domestic law and the 
wider South African society.  In Lawyers for Human Rights v The Minister of Home Affairs,5 the 
court established that the rights in the Constitution also protect ‘illegal’ foreigners at ports of 
entry. Given this liberal precedent, all issues pertaining to the plight of irregular foreign workers 
should be considered in light of constitutional principles, including the rights contained in the 
Bill of Rights (Chapter 2 of the Constitution). In this respect, the Constitution is a fitting 
departure point for understanding the domestic regulatory framework protecting work-related 
and social rights of foreign nationals in South Africa.  
 Despite the South African Constitution having been lauded as one of the most 
progressive in the world, the question still remains as to whether unauthorised foreign nationals 
can invoke the Constitution in domestic settings. The general language of relevant provisions 
already suggests that the Constitution, for the most part, can provide an adequate legal 
framework for protecting the rights of foreign workers. 6  That is, unauthorised migrants, as 
included in the notion of ‘everyone’ within the natural language of the Constitution, can turn to 
the Constitution to secure protection against unfair discrimination and the right to fair labour 
practices, as well as the right of access to social security.7 However, it is arguable whether the 
general application of these fundamental rights is consistent with the Bill of Rights when 
unauthorised foreign nationals are particularly concerned. 
 
(a) Equality of treatment 
Contemporary South African society presupposes a foundation built on the democratic values of 
human dignity, equality and freedom of all people.8 In Khosa and Others v Minister of Social 
Development and others; Mahlaule and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others,9 
the court established that socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution are closely 
                                                          
5 2004 (4) SA 125 (CC).  
6 DJ Meyer ‘Migrant workers and occupational health and safety protection in South Africa’ (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 
831 at 833.  
7 S 9 (the equality clause), s 23, and s 27 of the Constitution respectively. 
8 Sections 1(a) and 7(1) of the Constitution.  
9 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC). 
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connected to the constitutional founding values of human dignity, equality, and freedom.10 In 
consequence, the constitutional principle of equality, as an envisaged fundamental value and 
right, 11  becomes an increasingly salient correlative provision when looking at the rights of 
unauthorised foreign nationals, particularly their right of access to social protection.  
 The equality clause of the Constitution, specifically s 9(1) reads: ‘[e]veryone is equal 
before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.’ The word ‘everyone’ 
suggests that unauthorized foreign nationals are included in the scope of protection, and can 
therefore enjoy the same right to equal protection under labour and anti-discrimination laws as 
do their legal and local counter-parts. In this respect, the Constitutional Court, in Larbi-Odam 
and Others v Member of the Executive Council for Education (North-West Province) and 
Another, 12  endorsed the equal treatment of foreign workers when it established that the 
differential treatment between foreign teachers and their local counterparts was unfairly 
discriminatory as it had the potential to impair the dignity of the foreign nationals.13 Besides, the 
right to equality for all is not simply treating everyone equally in the hopes of eradicating 
inequalities. It transcends mere formal application of the right (form) to include its context and 
impact (substance), as the constitutional equality jurisprudence has often reiterated.14 
 In Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Tsebe and Others,15 the Constitutional Court 
reaffirmed its ruling against the deportation of foreign nationals suspected of crimes to death 
penalty jurisdiction. In this judgement, the majority of the court held that the human rights 
provided for in the Constitution applied to everyone, therefore even ‘illegal’ foreigners accused 
of a crime are equally protected.16 This is consistent with an earlier precedent-setting judgment 
on a similar issue handed down by the same court.17 The case affirmed equality of treatment 
                                                          
10 Ibid para 40.  
11 Sections 7 and 9 of the Constitution respectively.  
12 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC), hereafter referred to as Larbi-Odam.  
13 Supra note 9 para 24.  
14 See discussions in chapter 2.  
15 2012 (5) SA 467 (CC). This case concerned the obligations of the South African State regarding the deportation of 
foreign nationals who are also a fugitive of justice to a State where they are at risk of being subjected to the death 
penalty. 
16 Ibid para 65.  
17 See Mohamed and Another v President of the RSA and Others 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC).  
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between citizens and foreign nationals regarding the rights to life, human dignity, and the right of 
protection from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.  
 The provisions of the equality clause, as it reads currently, seemingly provide a blanket 
protection that conceivably reads wide enough to include protection for unauthorised foreign 
workers. In spite of this progressive doctrine, the limitation clause (s 36) of the Constitution 
leads us to understand that equality is not an absolute right and is therefore capable of 
permissible restriction. Moreover, since the meaning of the equality clause is reasoned on an ad 
hoc basis per individual cases,18 it is doubtful that discrimination against unauthorised foreign 
workers regarding their right to equality cannot be justified. 
 
(b) Fair labour practices 
The right to fair labour practices is vital in employment law.19 Yet, the concept is too broad and 
imprecise, making it rather difficult to delineate the precise boundaries of what in fact constitutes 
unfair labour practice.20 Whilst it is impossible to give an exact definition of this right, the CC 
has stated that ‘what is fair depends on the circumstances of a particular case and essentially 
involves a value judgment’.21 
 Section 23(1) of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to fair labour 
practices (emphasis added). The term ‘everyone’ could broadly imply an extension of the right to 
all people. However, subsections (2) to (4) of s 23 qualify the scope of the right by limiting it to 
four beneficiaries: workers, employers, trade unions, and employer organisations. 22  The 
conventional view is that the provisions in subsections (2) to (4) restrict the concept to the 
‘relationship between the worker and the employer and the continuation of that relationship on 
                                                          
18 Ralph Mathekga ‘The Formulation of Equality Clause in the South African Constitution: a Juristic question, or a 
Political Point of Departure’ (2003) at 3 available at 
http://www.clearcontent.co.za/storage/files/prev_Formulation_of_equality_clause.pdf, accessed 18 February 2015. 
19 Avinash Govindjee & Adriaan van der Walt ‘Labour law and the Constitution’ in AJ van der Walt, R le Roux and 
A Govindjee (eds) Labour law in context (2012) 4. 
20 Meyer op cit note 6 at 846.  
21 See National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town & Others 2003 (3) SA 1 
(CC) para 33.  
22 Rochelle le Roux ‘The new unfair labour practice’ in Le Roux & Rycroft (eds) Reinventing Labour Law: 
Reflecting on the first 15 years of the Labour Relations Act and future challenges 2012 Acta Juridica 41 at 43. 
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terms that are fair for both’.23 Thus, the correct interpretation of s 23 is one that seemingly 
guarantees the right to fair practices to individuals involved an employment relationship or a 
similar relationship only. Whether this approach is correct or not is not at issue here; the real 
question is whether the term ‘worker’ in subsection (2) can also include irregular migrant 
workers. 
 There is, however, certainty in the law that this protection extends to migrant workers. 
Both the decisions of the Constitutional Court in Larbi-Odam and the Labour Court in Discovery 
Health are evident of the extension of this right to foreign nationals. Moreover, the Discovery 
Health decision meant that the right to fair labour practices extends to workers engaged in 
‘illegal’ employment contracts. Perhaps these judgments coupled with the presumably blanket 
protection offered by s 23(1) could be read wide enough to provide work-related social 
protection for unauthorised foreign workers because access to employment-related social 
protection can be a form of fair labour practice.  
 
(c) Access to social protection 
Social security is a protected human right in the South African Constitution of 1996.24 South 
Africa is currently the only country in SADC that specifically references social security as a 
distinct constitutional and justiciable right.25 It enshrines socio-economic rights by providing for 
the right of access to social security, including the right to social assistance, as well as other 
social protection-related rights such as housing and education.26  
 Section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution explicitly reads that ‘[e]veryone has the right to have 
access to social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their 
dependents, appropriate social assistance’.27 The use of the term ‘everyone’ suggests no limiting 
                                                          
23 Ibid.  
24 Section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution. Some SADC constitutions, such as those of Botswana, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe, do not make mention of social security (protection). Others, the Zambian Constitution of 1996 and 
Tanzanian Constitution of 1998, allude to social security rights as ‘principles of state’.  
25 Charles M Fombad ‘An overview of the constitutional framework of the right to social security with special 
reference to South Africa’ (2013) 21 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 1-31 at 21. 
26 Sections 27, 26, and 29 of the Constitution respectively.  
27 Section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution.  
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criteria such as citizenship, migration status or legality of work.28 However, s 27(2) defines the 
nature of the government’s mandate by providing that ‘[t]he State must take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the realisation of this 
right’. A broad interpretation of s 27(1)(c), read together with s 27(2), suggests that unauthorised  
migrants are entitled to the constitutional protection of their social protection rights, provided the 
state has sufficient resources to meet the rights. In Khosa,29 the court expressed that: 
[s]ection 27(1) vests a right of access to social security in “everyone”. The constitutional 
reference to “everyone” implies that all in need must have access to the social welfare 
scheme that the state has put in place. Where some who are in need are excluded, everyone 
does not have access to the scheme. The word “everyone” is a term of general import and 
unrestricted meaning. It means what it conveys. Once the state puts in place a social 
welfare system, everyone has a right to have access to that system.30 
 
The Khosa case presented an excellent opportunity for the CC to extend crucial social 
security benefits to both regular and irregular migrants. 
 
6.2.2 Statutory law provisions 
 Aside from the Constitution, unauthorised foreign workers may also look to statutory 
provisions, particularly those legislation regulating employment conditions, for rights protection. 
As previously indicated, the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2 of the Constitution) applies to all area of 
the law.31 In order to give effect to the employment rights enshrined by the Constitution, the 
government has enacted various legislation. Some of these legislation deal extensively with 
equality as it pertain to the workplace,32 whilst others give expression to the constitutional rights 
to fair labour practices,33 and access to social security. 
 
                                                          
28 Bruno Paul Stefan van Eck and Felicia Snyman ‘Social Protection Afforded to Irregular Migrant Workers: 
Thoughts on the Southern Africa Development Community (with Emphasis on Botswana and South Africa)’ (2015) 
59(2) Journal of African Law 294 at 310.  
29 The case involved a constitutional challenge lodged by Mozambican migrants, with permanent resident statuses in 
South Africa.  
30 Supra note 9 para 111.  
31 Section 8(1) of the Constitution.  
32 See the Employment Equity Act. 
33 Both the Labour Relations Act and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act contain provisions in that respect.  
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(a) Labour Relations Act 
The Labour Relations Act (LRA), the centerpiece of South African employment law, aims at 
realising and regulating the fundamental employment rights in the Constitution in order to 
promote economic development, social justice, labour peace, and a democratisation of the 
workplace.34 In doing so, it entrenches a number of fundamental labour rights including the all-
ambiguous right to fair labour practices. 
 Up until 2008, South African labour law repeatedly excluded unauthorised foreign 
workers from its scope. This meant that unauthorised migrants had their constitutional right to 
fair labour practices habitually denied. Interpretations as to who qualified for protection under 
the LRA and BCEA often short-changed unauthorised migrants because they lacked ‘employee’ 
status as defined by s 213 of the LRA since their employment contract breached the Immigration 
Act, making it illegal.35  
 Pre-2008 jurisprudence, the conventional view was that a person working without a valid 
work permit is not an ‘employee’ under labour law because there is no existing valid 
employment contract. This conventional view is parallel with the approach adopted by the US 
Supreme Court in Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. National Labor Relations Board,36 where the 
majority of the court denied unauthorised migrants labour law protection because their 
employment was in contravention of immigration laws. 
 However, the South African Labour Court has purposively interpreted the definition of 
‘employee’ to incorporate irregular migrants into the legislative scope. In Discovery Health Ltd v 
CCMA & Others,37 the court ruled that an employment contract in violation of the Immigration 
Act is not necessarily invalid and unenforceable because s 213 of the LRA does not necessarily 
fix eligibility for ‘employee’ status on an employment contract.38  
 Consequently, individuals who are engaged in work without a valid employment 
contract, as are unauthorised foreign workers, now qualify as employees and eligible for 
                                                          
34 See s 1 of the LRA.  
35 See judgments in the following CCMA cases: Moses v Safika Holdings (Pty) Ltd (2001) 22 ILJ 1261 (CCMA), 
Vundla v Millies Fashions (2003) 24 ILJ 462 (CCMA), and Georgieva-Deyanova v Craighall Spar (2004) 9 BALR 
1143 (CCMA). 
36 535 U.S. 137 (2002).  
37 (2008) 29 ILJ 1480 (LC).  
38 Ibid para 49.  
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protection under the LRA and BCEA, and can have their constitutional right to fair labour 
practices protected. The conclusion drawn in Discovery Health is similar to that of the Advisory 
Opinion (OC-18) by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 39  Although the Discovery 
Health judgment primarily concerned the definition of ‘employee’ in terms of the LRA, it has the 
potential to impact on other areas (like social security) that make use of similar classifications. 
 However, it is worth noting that the government has introduced an Employment Services 
Act (ESA)40 as an attempt, among other things, to regulate the employment of foreigners.41 The 
ESA adopts the same stance as the Immigration Act regarding the employment of foreign 
nationals.42 It prohibits an employer from employing a foreign national unless the employer can 
prove that the foreigner holds an applicable and valid work permit issued in terms of the 
Immigration Act prior to employment.43 Moreover, the employer must ensure that there are no 
South African citizens or permanent residents suitable for the vacancy before hiring a foreign 
national.44  The ESA may further require employers to prepare skills transfer plans for any 
position occupied by a foreign national. 45  The above provisions of the ESA regarding the 
employment of foreigners ostensibly appear protectionist and restrictive. Nonetheless, s 8(4) 
grants an employee who is employed without a valid work permit (i.e. an unauthorised foreign 
worker) the right to enforce ‘any claim that s/he may have in terms of any statute or employment 
relationship against his or her employer or any person who is liable in terms of the law’. 
 
                                                          
39 See Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 of 17 September 2003 requested by the United Mexican States, Juridical 
Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Series A No. 18. Available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opinions/seriea18 ing.pdf. 
40 Act 140 of 2014 
41 Andre van Niekerk, Nicola Smit, Marylyn Christianson, Marie McGregor & Stefan van Eck (eds) Law@work 
(2015) 73. See also s 2(1)(h) of the ESA. 
42 A foreign national, in terms of s 1 of the ESA, is a person who is not a South African citizen or does not have a 
permanent-residence permit. 
43 Section 8(1) of the ESA. The Act does not explicitly provide for criminal penalties for hiring foreign nationals 
who do not possess a valid work permit; it (s 9) merely prohibits the act. 
44 Section 8(2)(a) of the ESA. 
45 Section 8(2)(c) of the ESA. 
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(b) Social security legislation 
The South African social security system provides for all the nine classical risks contained in the 
ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention 102 of 1952.46 Social security in South 
Africa encompasses four main elements: social insurance, social assistance, private savings, and 
social relief.47 The state-funded social assistance (or social grants) and employers-employees 
contributory social insurance schemes make up the two common forms. Additionally, two other 
forms of social security are available; they include private savings, voluntarily done in the event 
of certain employment contingencies, and non-contributory needs-tested social relief should 
emergencies arise.  
 For the purpose of this study, the chapter will mostly focus on the two common sub-
categories of social security, namely social assistance and social insurance. It is only feasible to 
assess the common forms of social security provisions because they are more relevant, relatively 
better developed, and more accessible. It is also worth noting that the South African social 
security system is rather fragmented across government departments, with little coherence or 
integration.48 
 
(i) Social insurance 
Social insurance typically relates to benefits earned by workers (and their families) and often 
tends to presuppose formal employment.49  Moreover, social insurance usually necessitates a 
‘reciprocal insurance relationship between an insured person and a social insurance institution.’50 
South Africa has three main statutory social insurance mechanisms: Unemployment Insurance 
                                                          
46 Letlhokwa George Mpedi & Avinash Govindjee ‘Social protection for workers posted to and from South Africa: 
A critical assessment’ (2009) 30(2) Obiter 774 at 775. The nine branches include medical care, sickness benefit, 
unemployment benefit, old-age benefit, employment injury benefit, maternity benefit, family benefit, invalidity, and 
survivors’ benefits.  
47 Marius Olivier ‘Critical issues in South African social security: The need for creating a social security paradigm 
for the excluded and the marginalized’ (1999) 20 ILJ 2199 at 2200.  
48 MP Olivier & ER Kalula ‘Scope of Coverage’ in M P Olivier et al (eds) Social Security: A Legal Analysis (2003) 
137.  
49 Ockert Dupper ‘The human rights of (irregular) migrants: An international, regional and South African 
perspective (Part 2)’ (2011) 3(1) International Journal of Social Security and Workers Compensation 55 at 56.  
50 Ibid at 55.  
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Fund (UIF), Compensation Funds, and the Road Accident Fund.51 The relevant employment-
based social insurance schemes, the product of the intersection of employment and social 
security laws, are the UIF and the Compensation Funds. The Unemployment Insurance Act 75 of 
1966 (UIA) regulates the UIF, whilst the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases 
Act 30 of 1993 (COIDA, amended in 1997) and the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works 
Act 73 of 1973 (ODIMWA) both regulate compensation funds. 
 The UIF offers temporary income relief in the event of the loss of a job, illness, 
maternity, adoption, and death; the Compensation Funds offers medical care and wage 
reimbursements to workers for employment-related disease or injury. 52  These schemes are 
mandatory contribution schemes regulated and administered by the State.  Coverage of the social 
insurance system, however is limited to people in formal employment as entitlement is restricted 
to persons who fit the ‘employee’ concept or a similar term used in the applicable legislation.53  
 In addition to the statutory funds, workers may rely on voluntary insurance schemes or 
private savings to insure themselves against work-related risks. Voluntary insurance 
arrangements such as private medical schemes, private pensions, and provident funds are a 
common feature in South Africa.54 However, the state also regulates private funds. For instance, 
the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 and Medical Scheme Act 131 of 1998 regulate private pension 
and provident funds, and private medical schemes respectively.55  
 However, legislation does not legally require workers to belong to a pension or provident 
fund. This lack of a legal obligation to participate coupled with high levels of unemployment 
prevalent in the country suggests that many economically active individuals are without 
protection against certain inevitable social risks. Consequently, the workers who do not belong to 
                                                          
51 The Road Accident Fund is the only social insurance that is not employment based. It aims to compensate a third 
party for any loss or damage suffered because of any bodily injuries or death, caused by the negligent driving of 
motor vehicles. 
52 National Planning Commission (NPC) ‘Chapter 11: Social protection’ in National Development Plan: Vision 
2030 (2011) 330.  
53 Olivier op cit note 47 at 2205. 
54 Ibid.  
55 Van Eck & Snyman op cit note 28 at 312. 
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any pension or provident fund scheme, and are ineligible for the statutory funds, become reliant 
on state social assistance mechanisms.56  
 
(ii) Social assistance 
Unlike social insurance, social assistance presumably implies a ‘notion of unilateral charitable 
obligation’ because taxes wholly finance such measures. 57  Social assistance provisions are 
exclusively the responsibility of government and are means tested.58 Social assistance in South 
Africa is often synonymous to social grants and encompasses five main social relief provisions: 
the Old-Age Pension, the Disability Grant, the Child Support Grant, the Foster Care Grant, and 
the Care Dependency Grant. The Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 and the Aged Persons Act 81 
of 1967 regulate social welfare in South Africa.  
 Social assistance measures are by their nature limiting because they are State-provided 
non-contributory and income-tested benefits targeted at identified vulnerable groups. 59  For 
instance, policy specifically provides social grants for the aged (old age grant), the disabled 
(disability grant), and children (childcare grant). Coverage is subject to availability of funds 








                                                          
56 Olivier op cit note 47 at 2205. 
57 Gijsbert Vonk Migration, social security and the law: Observations on the impact of migration policies upon the 
position of migrants in social security law in Europe (2001) available at 
https://www.rug.nl/research/portal/files/14631876/Migration_and_social_security.pdf, accessed 26 March 2015.  
58 Ibid.  
59 NPC op cit note 52 at 329. 
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Table 1: Overview of the forms and nature of social security in South Africa60 







Offers temporary income relief in the event of wage-related 
risks such as job loss, illness, maternity, adoption and death.  
 
Contributory: joint contributions by employers and employees. 
 




Offers medical care and wage reimbursements to workers for 
employment related disease or injury. 
 
Regulated through the Compensation for Occupational Injuries 
and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (COIDA) and the Occupational 
Diseases in Mines and Works Act 73 of 1973 (ODIMWA)61. 
Road Accident 
Fund 









Individuals voluntarily save for unexpected contingencies.  
Voluntary contribution, e.g. private medical schemes, private 
pensions and provident funds.  
 
Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 
Medical Scheme Act 131 of 1998 
Social assistance  
(Social grants) 
Safety net for impoverished individuals. Non-contributory; 
means-tested 
 
Old-Age Pension Disability Grant  Child Support Grant 
Foster Care Grant  
Care Dependency Grant. 
 
Regulated and administered through the Social Assistance Act 
13 of 2004 and the Aged Persons Act 81 of 1967.  
Social relief  Offers temporary relief for major disasters e.g. floods, fire.  Non-contributory, means-tested  
 
                                                          
60 Table adapted from Jean Triegaardt Accomplishments and challenges for partnerships in development in the 
transformation of social security in South Africa (2005) 2 available at 
http://www.dbsa.org/en/AboutUs/Publications/Documents/Accomplishments, accessed 10 October 2014. 
61 The ODIMWA applies only to the mining industry and compensates for mineral related occupational diseases like 
pneumoconiosis, tuberculosis, permanent obstruction of airways and progressive systemic sclerosis. 
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Evidence presented in Table 1 is indicative of the fact that there are existing domestic public and 
private measures intended to offer protection ‘in the event of an individual’s earning power 
permanently ceasing, being interrupted, never developing, or being exercised only at 
unacceptable social cost...’.62 However, the extent to which these available legal mechanisms 
adequately protect is arguable. The reality is that the South African social security system is not 
very inclusive. Since social security in South Africa predominantly focuses on the formal wage 
economy, 63  people locked out of the formal sector are consequently out of reach of social 
protection, despite their willingness and ability to work.  
 
6.3 Rights of unauthorised foreign workers to the South African social security system 
Foreign nationals (particularly unauthorised migrants) face a plethora of social, economic, and 
political barriers to get to their destination countries and even worse hardships once they are 
inside.64 The uncertainties associated with labour migration, particularly the clandestine kind, 
raise the question of the adequate protection of migrant workers, specifically their right of access 
to social security. 
 It is therefore important to assess critically the social protection of migrant workers for at 
least two reasons. First, most foreign nationals, with exception of permanent residents, do not 
qualify for equal treatment with citizens in the field of social protection as far as policies in host 
nations are concerned. Secondly, migrant workers have specific interests in obtaining equal 
access to coverage and entitlement to benefits as national workers.65 
 
6.3.1 Access to coverage 
When considering foreign workers’ right of access to social protection, the issue of coverage 
becomes important. When assessing the social protection status of migrant workers in South 
Africa, this question of coverage plays out in two ways. The first relates to personal scope of 
coverage, and the second to territorial scope of coverage. Typically, various pieces of applicable 
                                                          
62 Department of Welfare The White Paper for Social Welfare (1997) 49.  
63 Triegaardt op cit note 60 at 2.  
64 International Labour Organization (ILO) International labour migration: A rights-based approach (2010) at 36.  
65 Nilim Baruah & Ryszard Cholewinski Handbook on Establishing Effective Labour Migration Policies in 
Countries of Origin and Destination (2006) 6-7.  
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regulating legislation define the personal scope of coverage (i.e. who is or should be covered) 
and territorial scope of coverage (i.e. territorial reach and exportability of benefits).66  
 Underlining the subject of coverage is yet another issue that speaks broadly to access: 
that is the availability of both legal and physical or actual accesses. While legal access speaks to 
either restrictions or equal treatments embedded in the actual laws and regulations, physical 
access relates to the lived reality outside of the law or legislative provisions. The idea is that 
legal access (what is in the law) does not automatically assure or translate into physical access 
(practice or lived experience).  
 In South Africa, like in many other destination countries, migrant workers encounter 
particular difficulties in the field of social protection. This is because the law typically links 
social protection rights to periods of employment, contributions, or residency.67 Thus, South 
African social policy tends to exclude some people on the principle of territoriality, nationality, 
migration status, and/or other statuses.  
 
(a) Social insurance 
The scope of coverage of social insurance in South Africa has both personal and territorial 
dimensions. In South Africa, different pieces of legislation define who is or should be covered by 
the various applicable social insurance scheme(s). However, the personal scope of coverage of 
social insurance in South Africa is restricted to persons who qualify as ‘employee’ or other 
similar term used in the relevant pieces of legislation.68 In this respect, both the UIA and the 
COIDA, the pieces of social insurance legislation key to the discussion, rely on the definition of 
‘employee’ or similar term in defining who is or should be included in their protective ambit.  
 An ‘employee’, for the purposes of the UIA, is ‘any natural person who receives 
remuneration or to whom remuneration accrues in respect of services rendered or to be rendered 
by that person, but excludes any independent contractor’.69 This definition of ‘employee’ in the 
                                                          
66 Mpedi & Govindjee op cit note 46 at 776-77. 
67 Baruah & Cholewinski op cit note 65 at 6. 
68 Olivier & Kalula op cit note 48 at 137.   
69 Section 1 of the UIA.  
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UIA, although different, does not substantially differ from those provided in the LRA and 
BCEA.70  
 However, sometimes the reliance on ‘employee’ or a similar term in setting out the 
personal scope of coverage of social insurance scheme(s) is problematic because it usually 
necessitates the existence of a valid employment contract.71 The resulting outcome is often the 
exclusion of those who do not fall within that ambit of the definition of ‘employee’. A case in 
point is the description of an ‘employee’ in the COIDA.  
 For the purposes of the COIDA, an ‘employee’ is ‘a person who has entered into or 
works under a contract of service or of apprenticeship or learnership, with an employer, whether 
the contract is express or implied, oral or in writing and whether the remuneration is calculated 
by time or work done, or is in cash or in kind’.72 The COIDA definition of ‘employee’ is 
substantially different to those provided in labour relations policy and other social security 
legislation.73 The COIDA description of an ‘employee’ is too narrow as it explicitly necessitates 
the existence of a valid employment contract.74 This means that foreign workers who do not 
possess valid work permits, such as unauthorised migrant workers, are statutorily and 
categorically excluded from the protection scope of COIDA because they do not fit the concept 
of ‘employee’.  
 This is perhaps where the Discovery Health judgment falls short in its possible extension 
to the field of social protection. While the progressive interpretation in Discovery Health can be 
equally beneficial in the area of social security, in that case a contract was not required to show 
the existence of an employment contract, a prerequisite for assessing certain branches of social 
insurance. The current reality is that the statutory definitions of ‘employee’ in the UIA and 
COIDA differ from the definition in the LRA and BCEA.75 Therefore, policymakers need to 
reassess and realign the statutory meaning of ‘employee’ in social security and occupational 
                                                          
70 Van Niekerk et al op cit note 41 at 66.  
71 Meyer op cit note 6 at 837.  
72 Section 1(xix) of the COIDA 
73 Van Niekerk et al op cit note 41 at 66. 
74 Meyer op cit note 6 at 837.  
75 Van Niekerk et al op cit note 41 at 66.  
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legislation with that of labour law, in order to harmonise the fragmentation and limit 
interpretational problems.76 
 In some instances, the regulating legislation explicitly excludes certain categories of 
migrants from the scope of coverage and benefit entitlements. For example, the UIA does not 
apply to people who enter South Africa to carry out a contract of service, apprenticeship, or 
learnership if a law or contractual agreement or undertaking requires them to leave the country or 
repatriate once the contract ends or expires.77 Consequently, the UIA deliberately excludes from 
its protection foreign workers requiring repatriation or returning home at the end of their 
employment engagement in South Africa,78 such as migrants on contracts or seasonal workers.79 
By implication then, the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) does not require those migrant 
workers to contribute. 
 In other instances, the exclusion and marginalisation of some persons from the ambit of 
social insurance is a result of their position in the economy, whether the formal or informal 
sector. Informal sectors are often outside the purview of labour laws. Social protection 
mechanisms generally tend to exclude or marginalise workers in the informal economy.80 Social 
insurance mechanisms fail to reach those outside standard formal employment because they are 
restricted to those who make up the formal workforce.81 It is unsurprising that the UIF covers 
less than half of the South African workforce.82  
 The concentration of coverage in the formal sector has led some people to liken social 
security to the protection of the interests of the working elite.83 In view of that, foreign workers 
who operate on the periphery of the formal economy (thus informally employed migrants), as is 
the case with many unauthorised migrants, are categorically excluded from the South African 
social insurance system. Social protection through contributory schemes, such as the UIF and 
                                                          
76 Ibid at 67. 
77 Section 3(1)(d) of the UIA. 
78 This includes all categories of foreign nationals with the exception of Permanent residents. 
79 See s 2(2) of the UIA.  
80 Olivier op cit note 47 at 2205.  
81 Ibid.  
82 Triegaardt op cit note 60 at 5.  
83 Marius Olivier Regional overview of social protection for non-citizens in the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) (2009) (Report prepared for the World Bank, 2009) 42.  
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COIDA, is limited to workers who are or have been formally employed and contributed to the 
fund. 84  Hence, atypically employed foreign workers or those active in the informal sector, 
particularly the unauthorised, are vulnerable in the event of loss of work and work-related 
injuries and diseases.  
 Finally, the territorial scope of coverage of South Africa social insurance scheme(s) 
differs across laws.85 For instance, application of the UIA is limited to the geographical borders 
of the country. COIDA applies to persons who are ordinarily employed in the South Africa but 
are working outside the country on a temporary basis by an employer who carries on business 
chiefly in South Africa, 86  provided the employees do not work outside the country for a 
continuous period of more than 12 months.87 The degree of the territorial scope of coverage of 
the social insurance scheme(s) has a bearing on the provisions of benefits. 
 
(b) Social assistance 
Access to social assistance for migrants generally tends to be more problematic than their access 
to social insurance.88 This is because social assistance measures are by their nature limiting since 
benefits are government financed through tax revenues. Since they are non-contributory schemes 
(i.e. no contribution from beneficiaries or their employers), the government sets the scope of 
coverage and condition of entitlement to the relevant benefits. As a result, South African social 
assistance is means-targeted at specific vulnerable groups or categories of the population.  
 However, the South African Constitutional Court has aided in attempts to extend the 
scope of social assistance policy to some categories of foreign nationals. In the landmark duo-
judgment of Khosa,89 the court expanded the constitutional right to social security, particularly 
                                                          
84 Francie Lund ‘Work-related social protection for informal workers’ (2012) 65(4) International Social Security 
Review 9-30 at 26. However, a 2001 amendment of the UIF extended coverage to some informal workers, notably 
domestic and seasonal workers. 
85 Mpedi & Govindjee op cit note 46 at 777.  
86 See s 23(1)(a) of COIDA.  
87 Section 23(1)(c) of COIDA. 
88 Gijsbert Vonk ‘Migration, social security and the law: Observations on the impact of migration policies upon the 
position of migrants in social security law in Europe’ in Berghman, J. et al (eds) Social Security in Transition (2002) 
80.  
89 Supra note 9.  
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social assistance, to include foreigners permanently residing in South Africa. The Khosa court 
held that ‘the Constitution vested the right to social security in ‘everyone’…,90 though the social 
assistance inquiry did not proceed further as it stopped short of legally residing foreign workers. 
The start of the pronouncement was a promising sign of what could have been a vital purposive 
interpretation that could have extended an important constitutional coverage to unauthorised 
foreign workers.  
 Nevertheless, the court failed to do so when the majority of the court opted to limit the 
right to social (security) assistance to some foreign nationals reasoning that the barring of 
permanent residents from enjoying social assistance was not an equitable means to achieve the 
realisation of the right to social security.91 Therefore, the Constitutional Court failed to take 
advantage of an excellent opportunity and instead interpreted the meaning of ‘everyone’ in the 
Constitution to exclude unauthorised migrants, consequently precluding these vulnerable people 
from any social assistance protection.92 In summation, coverage of social assistance in South 
Africa, like in most places, is subject to conditions such as nationality, residency, and/or lawful 
immigration status.93 
 
(c) Labour security 
As already indicated, the labour security status of foreign workers in South Africa is determinant 
on the definition of ‘employee’ contained in the applicable labour laws. South African labour 
laws, such as the LRA, BCEA and EEA, apply to employees and their employers.94 Post the 
Discovery Health judgment, unauthorised migrant workers in South Africa are included in the 
                                                          
90 Ibid para 85.  
91 Ibid para 84.  
92 Ingrid Palmary & Loren Landau ‘Citizenship, human rights, empowerment and inclusion, and the implications for 
social protection and social security harmonisation/coordination policies in SADC’ in Mpedi & Smit (eds) Access to 
Social Services for Non-Citizens and the Portability of Social Benefits within the Southern African Development 
Community (2012) 151. 
93 Sections 5(1)(c) and 5(1)(b) of the Social Assistance Act. Letlhokwa George Mpedi, Nicola Smit & Mathias 
Nyenti ‘Access to social services for non-citizens and the portability of social benefits within the Southern African 
Development Community: A synthesis’ in Mpedi & Smit (eds) Access to social services for non-citizens and the 
portability of social benefits within the Southern African Development Community (2012) 57.  
94 Mpedi & Govindjee op cit note 46 at 779.  
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personal scope of coverage of labour laws because they fall within the ambit of the definition of 
‘employee’.  
 The Labour Court based its reason to extend labour rights to irregular foreign workers in 
South Africa primarily on the constitutional right to fair labour practices (i.e. s 23(1) of the 
Constitution). 95  This progressive jurisprudence differs from other similar jurisdictions. In 
Australia, the United Sates, and the United Kingdom the irregular immigration status of an 
employee disentitle the employee to the labour law protection of the host nation,96  simply 
because the employment contract violates immigration laws and is therefore void ab initio and 
unenforceable.97 
 Even so, the South African position as it currently stands is that unauthorised migrant 
workers can refer employment disputes, in terms of the LRA, to the Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration (CCMA) for adjudication. The court in Discovery 
Health held that the CCMA has jurisdiction to determine an unfair dismissal dispute brought by 
an unauthorised migrant worker.98 This is contrary to and overturns previous CCMA decisions 
that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain such matters.99 Thus, an irregular migrant worker has locus 
standi to approach the CCMA in circumstances of an alleged unfair dismissal and to pursue the 
processes and remedies envisaged in the LRA. 100  However, the CCMA cannot award 
reinstatement or reemployment of the migrant, should the migrant successfully proves his or her 
dismissal unfair.101 
                                                          
95 Dawn Norton ‘Workers in the shadows: An international comparison on the law of dismissal of illegal migrant 
workers’ (2010) 31 ILJ 1521 at 1525.  
96 Ibid at 1551. 
97 Ibid at 1553. 
98 Supra note 37 para 33.  
99 See Moses v Safika Holdings (Pty) Ltd (2001) 22 ILJ 1261 (CCMA), Vundla v Millies Fashions (2003) 24 ILJ 
462 (CCMA), and Georgieva-Deyanova v Craighall Spar (2004) 9 BALR 1143 (CCMA).  
100 Norton op cit note 95 at 1550. 
101 CCMA Practice and procedural manual 7 ed (2014) para 2.5.5, available at 
http://www.ccma.org.za/UploadedMedia/CCMA%20Practice%20and%20Procedure%207th%20Edition%202014, 
accessed 10 December 2015.  
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 Additionally, South African employment law operates with reference to the lex loci 
laboris (legislation of the place of employment) and is thus territorial in nature.102 In a recent 
case, Monare v South African Tourism and Others,103 the LAC had to address the issue of 
territorial jurisdiction of the CCMA and the applicability of the LRA.  
 The brief facts of the case are as follows: Mr Monare worked in the London office of the 
South African Tourism Board as Finance and Administration Manager. His employer charged 
him with misconduct relating to dishonesty and fraud and subsequently dismissed him following 
a disciplinary hearing. Monare then referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA. At the 
CCMA, the Commissioner found his dismissal to be procedurally fair but substantively unfair 
and ordered his reinstatement with back pay. The employer applied to the Labour Court (LC) for 
reviewing and setting aside of the Commissioner’s arbitration award. The LC concluded that the 
LRA has no extra territorial application and consequently the CCMA lacked jurisdiction. On 
appeal, the LAC held that the lower court erred in its review of the Commissioner’s award. The 
court found that the London office is not in fact separate but intricately linked to the South 
African undertaking. Consequently, the court concluded that the CCMA had jurisdiction to hear 
the matter and the award made by the Commissioner was reasonable.  
 The Monare judgement by no means refutes the lex loci laboris principle. The courts 
have reaffirmed their position on the territorial jurisdiction of the CCMA and the applicability of 
the LRA. 104  In both instances the answer is the same; the CCMA has no extraterritorial 
jurisdiction and the LRA has no extra territorial application, unless the overseas business is 
functionally and operationally reliant on the South African office.  
 The court has consistently emphasised that the primary consideration in determining the 
territorial application of the LRA is the location of the undertaking carried on by the employer. 
Thus, labour security is limited to persons employed within the territory of the country or those 
employed outside the country by a South African-based employer. In this respect, migrant 
                                                          
102 Mpedi & Govindjee op cit note 46 at 780.  
103 (JA45/14) [2015] ZALAC 47; [2016] 2 BLLR 115 (LAC); (2016) 37 ILJ 394 (LAC).  
104 See Astral Operations Ltd v Parry (2008) 29 ILJ 2668 (LAC); Chemical & Industrial Workers Union v Sopelog 
CC (1993) 14 ILJ 144 (LAC); Kleynhans v Parmalat SA (Pty) Ltd (2002) 23 ILJ 1418 (LC); and MECS Africa (Pty) 




workers can enjoy the labour law protection provided in the LRA, BCEA, and EEA, provided 
they work within South African borders. 
 
6.3.2 Access or entitlements to benefits 
The reach of coverage of national social protection systems affects the level of access to its 
benefits and ultimately the social protection status of the interested individuals. Owing to the 
conditionality of social security coverage, access or entitlement to its benefits is equally 
conditional. 
 Regarding social insurance scheme(s), legislation extends benefits only to people who 
qualify as ‘employee’ or a similar term. For instance, most foreign workers, with the exception 
of those with permanent residence status, do not qualify for unemployment insurance benefits 
since they fall outside the personal scope of coverage of the UIA. Supposing the law permitted 
unauthorised migrants and their employers to make monthly contributions to the UIF because 
they qualify as ‘contributor’ in terms of s 1 of the UIA,105 they would be unable to benefit from 
such contributions owing to other restrictive clauses embedded in the Act. The law obviously 
connects unemployment benefits to lawful work.106 Even if they could contribute to the scheme, 
the prospect of them actually being able to claim its benefits is tenuous because of their legal 
position. Legal access in this instance will not automatically translate into physical access.  
 In any case, residency is a requirement for accessing benefits under the UIA. 107  In 
addition, a beneficiary must be present in South Africa in order to draw benefits. Therefore, 
foreign workers with temporary residence status, who stand to be repatriated or deported out of 
the country, are unable to access benefits. Thus, social insurance schemes in South Africa often 
presuppose a contract of employment or nationality.108  
                                                          
105 A ‘contributor’ in terms of s 1 of the UIA is defined as 
‘a natural person –  
(a) who is or was employed; 
(b) to whom this Act, in terms of section 3, applies; and 
(c) who can satisfy the Commissioner that he or she has made contributions for purposes of the Act’.  
106 Ockert Dupper ‘Migrant workers and the right to social security: An international perspective’ (2007) 2 
Stellenbosch Law Review 219-254 at 220.  
107 Meyer op cit note 6 at 838. See also s 56(1)-(3) of the UIA.  
108 Dupper op cit note 49 at 55. 
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 COIDA, on the other hand, does not necessarily preclude any foreign nationals from 
claiming from the compensation fund. In fact, employees who suffer injuries during the course of 
their job or contract work-related diseases because of their job are entitled to no-fault 
compensation under COIDA.109 However, the documentation requirement of COIDA tends to 
create obstacles for most foreign nationals regarding the submission of claims for compensation. 
 For instance, s 41(1) of COIDA requires any employee reporting work-related diseases, 
injuries, or deaths to produce certain particulars and documentation, including a valid South 
African ID or passport.110 Failure to meet such a requirement would mean inaccessible relief 
from health and safety claims. Consequently, foreign workers who are unable to produce such 
documents, as is the case with all unauthorised migrants, cannot claim compensation and are 
inevitably left defenceless against work-related injuries or diseases. 
 Similarly, almost all social assistance benefits virtually preclude most non-nationals,111 
despite the fact that citizenship is no longer the sole eligibility criterion for assessing South 
African social assistance benefits. The reality is that unauthorised foreign workers and foreigners 
with temporary residence permits simply have no recourse to short-term relief (social assistance 
measures) except for emergency healthcare or treatment, as far as the Social Assistance Act 13 of 
2004 is concerned.112 This is because access to social assistance in South Africa is limited to 
citizens and foreign nationals and their children who have permanent resident status.113 
 The exclusion of unauthorised migrants from accessing social assistance benefits is not 
exclusive to South Africa. Some countries in the global north contain similar exclusionary 
provisions in their national policy.114 However, the exclusion of some foreign nationals from 
South African social assistance not only threatens the spirit of the Constitution; it ignores the fact 
                                                          
109 Marius Olivier ‘Enhancing access to South African social security benefits by SADC citizens: The need to 
improve bilateral arrangements within a multilateral framework (Part I)’ (2011) 1 SADC Law Journal 121 at 131.  
110 Meyer op cit note 6 at 837.  
111 Mpedi, Smit & Nyenti op cit note 93 at 10.  
112 Meyer op cit note 6 at 839. 
113 Supra note 9 para 59. 
114 Child grants are limited to citizens and migrants in possession of a residence permit in Germany. Similarly, 
migrant workers cannot access non-contributory benefits in the UK. See also Gijsbert Vonk ‘Migration, social 
security and the law: Some European Dilemmas’ (2002) 3 European Journal of Social Security 315 at 319.  
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that migrants too are co-contributors to the financing of the social security system owing to the 
fact that they pay taxes.115  
 Given that general taxes and the VAT levied on the goods and services consumed by 
people typically funds social assistance, 116  irregular migrants do contribute indirectly to the 
South African social assistance coffers through VAT paid on food and other goods.117 The 
exclusion of some contributors from profiting from their contributions raises issues of fairness 
and social justice.  It is posited here that any partial or complete exclusion of irregular foreign 
workers from tax-funded benefits is unjust as such denial can adversely affect their human 
dignity. These migrants, at the very least, should qualify for social relief as citizens do during 
times of crisis or and dire need such as the event of a natural disaster. This discretionary 
assistance, albeit not a claimable right for migrants, is conceivable in terms of the Social 
Assistance Act of 2004.118 
 Moreover, the scope of application of welfare legislation is generally limited to South 
African territory, consequently restricting the legal access to benefits or rights acquired. The 
legal restriction of access through the principle of territoriality negatively affects nationals and 
foreign nationals alike.119 In the case of nationals working out of the country, they lose coverage 
and benefits they would otherwise accrue. Similarly, foreign nationals without permanent 
residence status lose their right to claim insurance benefits once they leave the country because 
South African social insurance legislation does not make provision for the exportability or 
transferability of benefits.120 These workers stand to lose out doubly as they are often ineligible 
to benefits at home owing to their work abroad. Additionally, some social insurance scheme(s) 
                                                          
115 Dupper op cit note 49 at 62. 
116 Black Sash Social assistance: A reference guide for paralegals (2010) 13. 
117 This is unlike the billions of dollars in taxes into state and local coffers contributed by irregular immigrants in the 
United States. 
118 Sections 5(1)(c) and s 13 of the SAA.  
119 Wouter van Ginneken ‘Social protection for migrant workers: National and international policy challenges’ 
(2013) 15(2) European Journal of Social Security 209 at 213.  
120 Meyer op cit note 6 at 838.  
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exclude all domestic workers, including migrant domestic workers, from its ambit and 
subsequent benefits.121 
 The conditionality, especially those based on the territoriality principle, attached to social 
security coverage in South Africa poses barriers for some foreign workers to access social 
security benefits, both in the legal and physical sense. In view of that, South African law and 
practices do not recognise the rights of irregular migrants to benefit from the socio-economic 
rights entrenched in the Constitution. 
 
6.4 Adequacy of domestic social protection for unauthorised migrant workers 
Evidently there are a number of laws intended to safeguard the social protection right of workers 
in South Africa. However, the present inquiry turns to the extent to which these laws protect the 
rights of unauthorised foreign workers. In this regard, analysis of domestic social protection 
framework reveals obvious gaps in the protection of foreign workers and their families in the 
current context.  
 Migrants, as a category of workers, generally have tenuous claims to social protection 
rights in South Africa. Foreign workers, particularly the unauthorised, compared to citizens 
experience differential treatment in the field of social protection to the detriment of the former. 
In South Africa, unauthorised foreign workers’ right of access to the formal social security 











                                                          
121 Olivier op cit note 47 at 2203. See also s 1 of COIDA. This seems to be at odds with article 14 of ILO 
Convention No. 189 (decent work for domestic workers).  
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Table 2: Metric on access to formal social security (protection) in South Africa.122 




Citizens  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Permanent residents Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Temporary 
residents 
No  Yes  No  Yes 
Refugees  Yes  No  Yes Yes 
Asylum seekers No  No  Yes Yes 




Table 2 is evidence of the fact that there is indeed discrimination in both law and practice in the 
formal social protection system based on its exclusionary nature. The analysis, thus far, shows 
gaps and shortcomings in the South African formal social security system as far as foreign 
nationals are concerned. For this reason, perhaps the responsibility for social protection provision 
should not fall solely on the state. Where the formal state-regulated system is not responsive or 
protective of their rights, migrants will need to consider alternative avenues for protection.  
 In this respect, foreign workers may need to organise, or where they already exist, rely on 
informal social protection arrangements to survive.123 Unauthorised foreign workers in South 
Africa could perhaps organise social networks from which they can draw support and monetary 
transfers. 124  This informal social network can constitute community members in their area, 
                                                          
122 Table adapted from Letlhokwa George Mpedi & Nicola Smit (eds) Access to Social Services for Non-Citizens 
and the Portability of Social Benefits within the Southern African Development Community (2012) 26-7. 
123 Informal social security is a form of social security provided by family and/or community members. While this 
thesis does not intend to go into depth about informal social protection, it is worth a brief look as it is often the only 
alternative source of protection for those excluded from the scope of the formal social security system.  
124 Adriette Hendrina Dekker ‘Mind the gap: suggestions for bridging the divide between formal and informal social 
security’ (2008) 12(1) Law, Democracy & Development 117 at 119.  
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ranging from other foreign nationals to empathetic South Africans, with a shared social 
solidarity.  
 Although informal social security has ‘only recently been identified in South Africa as a 
new “strand” to the traditional concept of social security’ and therefore under-researched,125 it 
manifests as a useful form of neighbourhood-based mutual aid schemes that can help reduce 
poverty and vulnerability.126 However, the reliance on informal systems of social protection 
alone is not feasible. In Khosa, the court acknowledged both the existence and limitation of 
informal networks of social protection organised by migrants.127 
 Nonetheless, the reality is that access to social protection for unauthorised foreign 
workers is limited both legally and physically. The inherent conflict between immigration and 
social security laws perhaps explains this lack of both legal and physical access to formal social 
protection rights as it relates to unauthorised foreign workers. There appears to be a direct 
connection between immigration policy and access to social (security) and labour protection.128 
As Olivier and Govindjee suggest, ‘the level of protection enjoyed by migrants in social security 
law can be explained by the immigration policies in operation’.129  
 In South Africa, the immigration status of the worker is often linked to benefit 
entitlements.130 That is to say, the legal status of foreign workers, to some extent, determines the 
degree of access to social protection. So the more tenuous one’s immigration status is the more 
barriers to access to social security.131 This is because social security rights in South Africa are 
generally linked to nationality, residency, contributions, or periods of employment.132  These 
                                                          
125 Adriette Hendrina Dekker ‘Informal social security: A legal analysis’ unpublished LLD thesis, University of 
South Africa, 2005 at 6.  
126 Redson Edward Kapindu ‘Social protection for Malawian migrants in Johannesburg: Access, exclusion and 
survival strategies’ (2011) 11 African Human Rights Law Journal 93 at 96.  
127 Supra note 9 para 76.  
128 Dupper op cit note 106 at 222.  
129 129 Marius Olivier & Avinash Govindjee ‘Labour rights and social protection of migrant workers: In search of a 
coordinated legal response’ Paper presented at the Inaugural conference of the Labour Law Research 
Network (LLRN), Barcelona, Spain, 13-15 June 2013, 1-40 at 9.  
130 Olivier op cit note 83 at 50.  
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restrictive conditions or provisions, according to Olivier, ‘adversely affect social security rights 
of non-citizen workers’.133 
 Consequently, the legal criteria used in deciding who is deserving of rights protection 
under South African law are unwarranted given that the broad aim of social protection is to 
reduce poverty and inequality in society.134 The incongruity of such differentiation is emphasised 
by the High Commissioner for Human Rights in the following statement: 
Policies that deny access of irregular migrants social security on an equal basis with 
citizens often fail to take into account the fact that migrants, even when in an irregular 
situation, participate in the workforce and economy of States of employment, and thus 
contribute to social security schemes. Even when they do not participate directly in 
contributory schemes, they still pay into to social protection schemes through the payment 
of indirect taxes.135 
 
The overt exclusion and marginalisation of such a vulnerable group brings to the forefront the 
tension between immigration, labour, and social security laws. 
 Where the Constitution seems promising in providing an adequate legal framework or 
guide for protecting the rights of migrants, the Constitutional Court has not always taken 
advantage of opportunities to create a progressive jurisprudence as far as unauthorised migrants 
are concerned. It is conventional practice for fundamental rights — in terms of s 36 of the 
constitution (the limitation clause) — to be limited in terms of law of general application, if said 
limitation is sound and defensible in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality, and freedom.136 It is understandable that rights of some non-citizens under the Bill of 
Rights can be limited in so far as such limitation is justifiable and reasonable taking into account 
certain relevant factors.137  
 However, it is submitted that even after careful consideration of the various factors 
provided in the general limitations inquiry under s 36(1)(a) of the Constitution, the exclusion of 
some migrants from social protection cannot be deemed constitutionally reasonable or justifiable.  
 First, the Constitutional Court has held that the limitation analysis is a test of 
proportionality. A court must balance the nature and importance of the right and the impact of 
                                                          
133 Olivier op cit note 83 at 48.  
134 Ibid at 44.  
135 OHCHR op cit note 1 at 11.  
136 Section 36(1) of the Constitution.  
137 Ibid.  
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the limitation on one side, and the purpose and importance of the limitation on the other.138 It is 
suggested that it cannot be said that denying vulnerable migrants of certain forms of social 
protection is more compelling than protecting other marginalised members of society.  
 Secondly, the limitation must be reasonable in a democratic society based on 
foundational values of human dignity, equality and freedom. Considering the historical, social 
and economic context of labour migration in South Africa and the plight of irregular migrants,139 
their exclusion from social protection cannot be deemed to be constitutionally reasonable. 
Unauthorised migrants should be counted among those vulnerable people ‘whose ability to enjoy 
all rights is most in peril’.140  
 Essentially, the proposition here is that any further permissible limitation of the rights of 
unauthorised migrants, however justifiable, serves to exacerbate the plight of these individuals. 
Taking into account the spirit of the Constitution and the much-documented plight of irregular 
migrants globally, any limitation or differential treatment that unbearably affects the lives of 
these migrants cannot be compatible with the spirit and letter of the Constitution.  
 The proposition is that a limitation on their fundamental rights (be it equality, fair labour 
practices, or access to social security) will not in fact help reduce clandestine migration, and 
since there are no current protection against abuse, any limitation will destroy the very essence of 
the Constitution. Public policy debates that suggest otherwise, i.e. that rights extension will 
encourage immigration, are not entirely accurate. It is highly improbable that irregular migrants 
will exploit the South African social security system. Contrary to public discourse, irregular 
foreign nationals are unlikely to claim benefits, out of fear of detection.141 
 
6.4.1 Compromised protection and questions of equality 
Domestic laws and practices offering access to social protection discriminate between categories 
of workers. The differential treatment of nationals and non-nationals, and even among non-
nationals, in accessing social protection is a form of inequality of opportunity. This unequal 
opportunity, treatment, or access to social protection hampers the capabilities or freedoms of 
                                                          
138 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).  
139 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para 43. 
140 Ibid. 
141 See detailed argument outlined under section 4.6 of chapter 4. 
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foreign workers to choose the life they desire to live in host nations. As commented by Owen 
Fiss, ‘laws imposing social disabilities on immigrants are at odds with constitutional guarantees 
of equality, which bar not just discrimination, but also laws that create or perpetuate caste-like 
social structures’.142 
 South African social protection policies do not confer on everyone equal opportunity to 
participate. South African law and practices, except for a few cases like emergency care, deny 
some people access and entitlement to the social rights entrenched in the Constitution. Irregular 
foreign workers are constrained from accessing work-related social protection due to restrictive 
migration policies that deny them the right to work. Their status as ‘unauthorised’ or ‘irregular’ 
automatically precludes them from any considerations as their very presence is in direct 
contravention of immigration law. They are least likely to qualify as ‘citizens’ or ‘residents’, a 
defining prerequisite for most benefit entitlement. 
 What is more, most of them do not have the means to make payments towards 
contributory schemes through savings, since they operate in the informal labour market living 
from hand to mouth, unable to migrate to the formal economy.143 Thus, in South Africa, work-
related social protection coverage is concentrated in the formal economy (i.e. reserved for formal 
sector workers). In the event that it is not, nationality or residency is a key eligibility requirement 
for accessing social security benefits. This and other similar legislative provisions unfavourably 
affect the social protection rights of foreign workers in the country. The adverse impact is 
particularly severe for the irregular migrants since legal coverage categorically precludes them 
because to their precarious legal position in the country. This exclusionary national regulatory 
framework invariably leaves many vulnerable workers open to exploitation and social 
marginalisation. 
 Inequalities embedded in the legislative framework, in part, enforce the labour 
exploitation, human right abuse, and general maltreatment of foreign nationals in South Africa, 
particularly the unauthorised. Most domestic welfare provisions tend to limit coverage and 
benefits to nationals and permanent residents, essentially denying access to (exclude) many 
foreigners. The legal exclusion of foreigners coincidentally legitimises their social exclusion. 
There needs to be some expansion of freedoms so that irregular migrants are able to choose one 
                                                          
142 Owen Fiss ‘The Immigrant as Pariah’ (1998) 23 Boston Review.  
143 NPC op cit note 52 at 333.  
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type of life over others, should they desire.144 The removal of the systematic social deprivation of 
these people is imperative in order for this human development to occur. 
 In any case, it is rather contradictory to profess to establish a society based on democratic 
values, social justice, and fundamental human rights,145 while enacting policies that habitually 
exclude and marginalise this small but significant segment of the society. Given the lack of 
progressive domestic doctrine where unauthorised migrants are concerned, perhaps the courts 
should consider importing some principles of international human rights law to interpret and fill 
gaps where deficiencies exist in domestic law.146 
 
6.5 Policy directions for enhancing social protection for migrant workers 
Chapter 5 of this study reveals that there are existing international developments on the rights of 
migrant workers, particularly unauthorised foreign workers, which can be instructive for the 
improvement of the domestic legal system. However, the impact this international protection 
regime for migrant workers has on the domestic legal system is only as strong as the relationship 
between the two spheres. 
 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, helps explain better the 
relationship between international norms and any domestic legal system. In terms of the Vienna 
Convention, an international treaty binds states only if they have expressed consent to it through 
ratification, accession, or signature.147 Only when the treaty is ratified, acceded to, or signed, do 
states accept a duty to implement the provisions of the treaty in good faith. In addition to 
implementing the provisions, states then agree to avoid doing anything that may defeat the 
objectives of the treaty in question.148 As part of the relationship, the treatment and application of 
international treaties in the domestic legal system becomes significant. 
 
                                                          
144  Mathias Risse ‘Immigration, ethics and the capabilities approach’ (2009) 34 Human Development Reports 
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145 See preamble to the Constitution.  
146 Friedman op cit note 4 at 1736.  
147 See articles 13, 14 and 15.  
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6.5.1 Infusing domestic law with transnational norms to enhance protection 
In the South African context, the Constitution makes allowance in a number of provisions for the 
use of international law in interpreting and closing gaps in domestic law. Three sections of the 
Constitution, i.e. ss 39, 232 and 233, express the need for the infusion of domestic law with 
international standards. Section 39(1) explicitly states: 
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum— 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law. 
 
Sections 232 and 233 further emphasise the interpretational function of international norms.149 
 What is more, the South African Constitution has domesticated a number of provisions of 
international treaties, particularly those found in International Bill of Human Rights, through the 
Bill of Rights. For instance the language of sections 27(1)(c) and 27(2) of the South African 
Constitution and Articles 9 and 2(1) of the ICESCR are rather similar.150 Whilst the wording of 
the relevant provisions may be similar, their practical application is questionable. 
 Although the Constitution mandates the consideration of international treaties and 
standards where domestic law is lacking, the question remains whether these international 
instruments are suitable for bridging these gaps. It is important to reiterate that South Africa is 
yet to ratify any of the major international treaties on labour migration, namely the ILO 
Conventions 97 and 143 and the UN ICRMW. Since South Africa has failed to endorse this 
international charter on migration,151 the provisions of those instruments are not legally binding 
and the government is not required to implement them. Nonetheless, the court might still 
consider the terms of a non-ratified Convention when interpreting domestic legislation. For 
                                                          
149 Section 232 provides that ‘[c]ustomary international law is law in the republic unless it is inconsistent with the 
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instance, in S v Makwanyane,152 the Constitutional Court affirmed that both binding and non-
ratified international instruments could serve as tools of interpretation in South African law. 
 In spite of the domestic difficulties in accessing social protection benefits, it is unlikely 
that international human rights standards related to migrant workers and their families will help 
improve the social protection position of unauthorised foreign workers.153 Van Ginneken argues 
that these human rights standards have had little impact on the social protection situation of most 
migrants.154 International law is rather vague on the issue of social protection, where it concerns 
unauthorised migrant workers. The previous chapter has established that the international 
protection regime for migrant workers remains ambivalent to the social protection rights of 
unauthorised migrants. 
 Even if South Africa was to ratify these important international instruments on labour 
migration, it is questionable whether the position of unauthorised foreign workers in the country 
would improve. The truth of the matter is that although these important international instruments 
may offer significant protection, they are also indirectly contradictory and discriminatory. On the 
one hand, unauthorised foreign workers are beneficiaries of some economic, social, civil, and 
political rights under international law.155  
 On the other hand, these rights are inconspicuously limited. The indirect limitation of the 
rights of unauthorised migrants in international law is evident in provisions that give countries 
the scope, in their national laws, to determine conditions of benefits. 156  Thus, the strong 
recognition of states’ sovereignty over migration matters in international law, i.e. the sovereign 
right of nations to determine their own labour migration policies, is damaging to unauthorised 
foreign workers. In effect, such internal limitation provisions embedded in most of these 
international norms do little to improve the legal position of these vulnerable workers.157 
 Despite the lack of ratification of binding migrant workers instruments by the 
government, South Africa is still a member of both the UN and ILO organisations, and therefore 
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has a responsibility to uphold their institutional values. Besides, South Africa has agreed to a 
number of fundamental international labour and human right norms that apply to all foreign 
workers. These fundamental international labour and human right norms make up the 
international normative framework for the protection of migrant rights.158  
 Consequently, the South African government is required to bring all domestic law, 
policies, and practices in line with this international normative framework. The implementation 
of the provisions of this international framework into domestic policy would mean that access of 
foreign workers to social protection measures would not be exclusively dependent on their legal 
status. At a policy level, unauthorised foreign workers would secure social protection rights, in at 
least a basic form, by virtue of their shared humanity if not for their vulnerability or 
marginalisation.159 
 At a regional level, regional best practice reveals that unauthorised foreign workers can 
and should benefit, albeit limitedly from social insurance in host nations. The Council of Europe 
recognises that unauthorised migrants who have contributed to social insurance schemes should 
benefit from their contributions or at the least have their contributions refunded.160 This limited 
entitlement adopted by the Council of Europe finds support in international law. Article 27(2) of 
the UN ICRMW, article 9(1) of ILO Convention No. 143 and paragraph 34(1)(c)(ii) of ILO 
Recommendation 151 all lend support to the right of unauthorised migrants to reimbursement of 
any social security contributions. Importing these international and regional norms and standards 
into domestic interpretation would mean unauthorised foreign workers who have contributed to 
the South African unemployment insurance coffers, however indirectly, should at least be 
entitled to a reimbursement of their contributions. 
 Additionally, at a sub-regional level, unauthorised foreign workers could rely on the 
SADC Code on Social Security for the substantive protection of their rights. The Code expressly 
calls for the provision of a basic minimum protection to irregular migrants in host countries.161 
Infusion of the SADC Code with domestic law would mean that unauthorised foreign workers in 
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South Africa are constitutionally entitled to basic social assistance benefits, even if it is a non-
monetary service or benefit such as food, clothing, or vouchers.162 Such an interpretation would 
not only promote the spirit of the Constitution, but also bring South Africa in line with 
international and regional best practices. 
 The Council of Europe, for instance, calls on its members to offer needed social 
assistance to irregular migrants in order to ‘alleviate poverty and preserve human dignity’.163 An 
extension of constitutional entitlement to basic social assistance would also mean a realisation of 
the African Charter for South Africa, specifically art 15 that mandates the provision of equitable 
and satisfactory working conditions to everyone. 
 
6.6 Realistic options for policy reform 
Evidently, the above discussions and previous chapters confirm that there are gaps in the 
protection of foreign workers, particularly in the South African context. In this respect, the 
responsibility for the social protection of foreign workers should not fall squarely on the state or 
regional and/or global authorities. There needs to be a joint effort by all stakeholders if there is to 
be real change. 
 Where current efforts fail or are too weak in improving the social position of 
unauthorised foreign workers in South Africa, other possible directions for change must be 
considered. In this regard, scholars have identified three options that may prove useful for South 
African policymakers in improving the social and labour position of unauthorised foreign 
workers. 
 First, the South African government could unilaterally amend national laws or policies to 
bring unauthorised foreign workers into the social protection fold. Secondly, the government 
could enter into coordination (bilateral) agreements with other SADC states. Thirdly, it could 
enter into multilateral social security agreements with other countries. Each of these options is 
examined individually in order to determine how these possible policy directions can improve 
the social protection situation of unauthorised migrants in South Africa. 
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6.6.1 Unilateral government action 
Research suggests that the ratification and implementation of international and regional 
instruments relating to labour migration and social protection best provide protection to migrant 
workers.164 However, ratification often fails, as evident from the low ratification rate of relevant 
transnational instruments. In the absence of ratification, unilateral efforts have proven to secure 
the protection of migrant workers. In this respect, some countries (both countries of origin and 
destination) have instituted unilateral measures granting some measure of social protection rights 
to migrant workers.  
 In this regard, the Philippines stand out as a case of best practice in extending a level of 
domestic protection coverage to their citizens working abroad. 165  The Memorandum of 
Agreement of 1988 in the Philippines essentially secures the social security of Philippine seamen 
working abroad. In terms of the Agreement, all recruitment agencies which hire and place 
Philippine seamen on foreign ships must pay quarterly contributions to the national social 
security system.166 This contribution then goes toward the medical care, compensation, and other 
social security needs of the workers.  
 Although the example of the Philippines do not necessarily relate to or address the 
precarious position of irregular migrant workers, it suggests that unilateral measures or actions 
can prove effective in securing rights protection for all migrant workers. Also, it is further 
acknowledged that the Philippines is not directly comparable with South Africa — South Africa 
is a migrant-receiving country and the Philippines, a migrant-sending country. However, the 
example illustrates that government is capable of unilateral action that can shape the position of 
foreign nationals. 
 Even so, migrant-receiving countries are still capable of unilateral government action. 
For instance, in April 2009, the Department of Home Affairs proposed the ‘special dispensation 
permits’ in response to the large number of Zimbabweans residing illegally in South Africa.167 
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This special permit would allow its holders to live, work, conduct business, and study in South 
Africa on a temporary basis for the duration of the permit.  
 Cabinet approved this proposal in August 2014 and will run till 2017. The objectives of 
the exemption are to:168 
 Regularize Zimbabweans residing in South Africa illegally 
 Curb the deportation of Zimbabweans who were in SA illegally 
 Reduce pressure on the asylum seeker and refugee regime, and 
 Provide amnesty to Zimbabweans who obtained SA documents fraudulently 
The special concessions for Zimbabwean nationals was made in terms of s 31(2) of the 
Immigration Act 13 of 2002.  
 The Minister of Home Affairs can take advantage of the discretionary power conferred 
by s 31(2) to extend to other unauthorised foreign workers similar concessions. The special 
permit can be issued for duration of twelve or eighteen months depending on circumstances, 
allowing irregular migrants the right to legally live and work in South Africa. During this period, 
these migrants should be encouraged to seek the necessary legal documentation and apply for the 
relevant visas and permits under the Immigration Act, before the expiration of their special 
dispensation permits.  
 Although the example of special concessions may grant a right to work and not 
necessarily social security, it is an encouraging step nonetheless. As argued in chapter 4, the right 
to work is an extension of social protection for these vulnerable migrants. Moreover, it is 
foreseeable that similar arrangements can be made in term of social security. 
Unilateral measures or action are also necessary because the responsibility for domestic 
legislation that regulates access to and conditions of formal social protection schemes belongs 
solely to the individual state.169 The willingness of government to adopt or amend domestic 
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policies to protect certain groups of people, for example low-skilled migrant workers, is 
dependent on and indicative of strong commitments to rights protection and ultimately to social 
justice.  
 Domestically, the South African legislature or parliament, coupled with other arms of 
government, develop and pass national laws that dictate provisions for the needs of the people in 
the country.170 As indicated above, ratification of treaty law or instruments is the first goal. Thus, 
the South African government should first look to ratify and implement the relevant social 
security, human rights, and labour migration conventions or instruments of the ILO and UN. In 
the absence of ratification, parliament can unilaterally amend existing national laws and/or pass 
new policies — to extend social protection to all categories of migrant workers — in line with 
international human right norms.  
 A useful unilateral measure will be for the South African government to adopt a human 
rights approach to migration and social protection regulation. As discussed in chapter 4, the 
current approach to labour migration is less than effective. It is too restrictive and control-
focused. Adopting a human rights approach to migration is particularly important because 
immigration law often intersects with other policies aimed at regulating the affairs of foreign 
nationals. Irrespective of the domestic measures the government chooses to develop in 
addressing the rights position of irregular migrants, it needs to be mindful of the interplay 
between immigration and labour law.   
  
(a) Policy intervention: marrying immigration goals with labour objectives 
The government will need to amend existing policies or promulgate new labour and social 
policies providing rights to irregular migrants. However, it is simply not enough to legislate; 
there needs to be adequate enforcement of implemented mechanisms. Any policies put in place 
need to be practically enforceable to be effective. Enforcing the fundamental rights of all 
workers, irrespective of status, highlights tensions of a jurisdictional nature between immigration 
and labour laws. 
 Thus far, the central theme of this study has been that migrant workers, irrespective of 
their status, are best protected from mistreatment when they are included in and covered by 
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national protective regimes — both in law and practice — on par with local workers.171 In 
practice migrant workers are typically clustered in those economic sectors of host countries (e.g. 
agriculture, construction and domestic work) completely unregulated or under-regulated by 
employment legislation.172 This is particularly true for unauthorised migrant workers who are 
often employed in sectors where labour law violations are more frequent. The rights protection 
and equality of treatment of these migrant workers vis-à-vis regular migrants or national workers 
becomes challenging when state’s sovereign prerogative to police foreign nationals (i.e. 
immigration enforcement) interferes with the protection of workers’ rights. 
 The two approaches (immigration enforcement and workers’ rights) need not be 
antagonistic. In fact, it is the tendency for policymakers to treat the two as opposing duties that 
causes problems. Indeed a state has the right to enforce immigration laws in the workplace, as 
part of its broader sovereign right to determine the conditions of admission and employment of 
foreign nationals within their borders. But a state equally has an important duty to protect the 
fundamental rights of workers inside its borders. These two seemingly opposing obligations need 
to be carefully balanced. Where immigration enforcement takes precedence over workers’ rights, 
irregular migrants are disentitled to the protection of labour laws to enforce their rights.173 In this 
instance, policymakers not only fail in their legislative mandate but give unscrupulous employers 
the incentive to undermine employment laws and workers’ rights. It is a known fact that most 
national immigration enforcement policy requires labour inspectors to report irregular migrant 
workers to immigration authorities, potentially resulting in deportation. 174  This risk of 
deportation creates fear, preventing workers from reporting employers who do not comply with 
employment regulations. This policy approach essentially delineates immigration law and labour 
law as mutually exclusive with unrelated or incompatible goals.175 Such an approach fails to 
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capture the extent of the labour exploitation or even human right violation these workers endure 
daily. 
 The polar opposite of the debate also holds true. Prioritising the labour rights of workers 
(labour law) over immigration enforcement creates the risk of perversely incentivising or 
encouraging clandestine migration. 176  However, there cannot be a policy that grants labour 
protection to irregular migrants but the enforcement of those rights will mean detection and 
potential detention or deportation. Such an approach is as good as nothing at all because the 
consequences of enforcing their labour rights for the migrants undermine the right itself.177  
 It is from this premise that the study proposes and supports the establishment of a 
‘firewall’ between immigration and labour laws, to ensure that irregular migrant workers can 
access the courts to seek redress against abusive employers without fear of detection and/or 
removal by immigration authorities. 178 A ‘firewall’, as a unilateral measure, is particularly 
important for the protection of the rights (including the right to non-discrimination and equality) 
of irregular migrant workers vis-à-vis regular migrant or local workers by enforcing workers’ 
rights without regard to immigration status. Such a measure has proven to be particularly 
effective in addressing the balance between immigration and labour law enforcement in the 
United States jurisdiction.179 
 In the United States, the Department of Labour’s (DoL) Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) with the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (INS, now ICE)180 creates a firewall 
between DoL inspections and INS enforcement actions, in an attempt to balance immigration and 
labour law enforcement.181 The two agencies, per the MoU, agree to collaborate in their work 
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except in instances where the collaboration ‘would have either the purpose or the effect of 
placing immigration enforcement in a position to trump labor law enforcement, because the DoL 
has recognised that immigrant workers will be reluctant to bring complaints about abusive 
employers to its attention if the situation were otherwise’.182 Similarly, an internal immigration 
policy, INS Operating Instruction 287.3(a),183 sets the boundaries of immigration enforcement 
during labour disputes by cautioning non-interference in such instances. Both the MoU and 
Operating Instruction have proven useful in protecting the rights of workers, immigration status 
notwithstanding, in encouraging unauthorised migrant workers to bring labour law violations-
related complaints.184 
 In South Africa, there is an overlap between immigration and labour laws. Immigration 
law is often superimposed on labour law, undermining the goals of the latter. This practice has 
proven ineffective in realising the distinct purposes of the two areas of law. Accordingly, there 
needs to be a measure to ensure that the enforcement of one set of laws complement the goals of 
the other.185 To this end, the effective enforcement of labour and social rights of migrant workers 
will require the removal of any threat of retaliation or deportation. To this end the South African 
government will need to adopt a status-blind enforcement regime. Like the United States, the 
South African Departments of Labour and Home Affairs will need to adopt a policy agreement 
in which they commit to coordinate their work without compromising the operations and goals of 
the other. A ‘firewall’ agreement will ensure that South African employers who employ irregular 
foreigners do not abuse the enforcement powers of immigration authorities or the DHA for their 
financial gains. 
 A simple scenario helps justify the rationale for a ‘firewall’. Some employers hire 
irregular migrant workers contrary to legislative prohibition for the obvious reason that they are 
cheap. However, should the migrant become a nuisance, all the employer has to do is simply call 
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or threaten to call immigration authorities. An enforcement approach too focused on immigration 
status at the expense of employment standards fails to address the real perpetrators of clandestine 
migration.186  
 In reality, an immigration-focused enforcement approach only serves to perpetuate 
clandestine migration and reward unscrupulous employers doubly. Fixating on workplace 
immigration enforcement by means of immigration prosecutions of unauthorised migrant 
workers, instead of those who employ them, perversely encourages some employers to 
continuously hire and abuse irregular migrant workers. Moreover, those employers who employ 
irregular migrants benefit from the competitive advantage gained by operating outside the law, 
and escape criminal prosecution for economically exploiting vulnerable workers.187 
 In consequence, enforcement solely focused on immigration status does little for workers, 
particularly those trapped in abusive employment relationships. The impact of increased labour 
standards enforcement on clandestine migration is uncertain; nonetheless the enforcement of one 
set of laws should not undermine the goals of the other. To this end, policymakers need to ensure 
an appropriate balance between both enforcement systems. In this respect, a ‘firewall’ between 
the two areas of law in terms of enforcement is perhaps a good option for unilateral action. 
 
(b) Judicial intervention: using the courts to advance migrants’ position 
Policy intervention to address the current protection position of irregular migrants in South 
Africa is definitely a priority. However, commitments by the legislature alone will not suffice in 
effectively addressing the social protection concerns of these vulnerable foreign workers. There 
will need to be some judicial activism from the courts to complement any legislative intervention 
because the courts possess the authority to ensure the conformity of legislation and executive 
conduct with the Constitution.188 More importantly, the courts are suitably positioned to provide 
the momentum or stimulus needed for policy changes.  
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 In South Africa, social protection is a judicially enforceable human right.189 Initially, all 
foreign nationals were exempt from accessing socio-economic rights (mainly social security 
rights) on the same basis as South Africans. The exclusion was owed to the fact that citizenship 
or nationality was the main eligibility criterion for assessing most social benefits. However, the 
Constitutional Court has been instrumental in extending social protection rights to some foreign 
nationals, specifically those permanently residing in South Africa.190  
 In the Khosa case,191 the court adopted a purposive interpretation of the Bill of Rights and 
found the exclusion of permanent residents from social assistance to be unconstitutional.192 This 
extension of access to social assistance to permanent residents was a welcome change to the 
Social Assistance Act that sought to preclude all foreign nationals from important socio-
economic rights. Likewise, the Labour Court has taken a liberal stance and willingly extended 
employment rights to foreign workers deemed ‘illegal’ and previously undeserving of labour 
protection.  
 In the Discovery Health case, the Labour Court similarly adopted a purposive 
interpretation of the concept of ‘employee’ in extending labour law protection to unauthorised 
migrant workers. The extension of labour rights to unauthorised migrant workers meant an 
improvement in their labour market conditions and labour security, an important component of 
social protection.  
 It is evident from the above emerging jurisprudence that the courts are a crucially 
important mechanism for the enforcement of socio-economic rights for foreign nationals in 
South Africa. Therefore the judicial system is perhaps a good alternative avenue for irregular 
migrant workers in their quest to improve their position. The Constitution grants to everyone 
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(‘everyone’ can be read to include irregular migrants) the right to access the courts to have any 
dispute that can be resolved by application of law decided in a fair public hearing.193 This access 
to the courts may be difficult for many migrants, particularly irregular migrants, due to expensive 
litigation costs and a real fear of detection and possible deportation.194  
 However, for the courageous few who can overcome the barriers to access, there are two 
possible ways they could seek judicial redress. They can either allege a violation or threatened 
violation of any of their fundamental rights (e.g. equality, human dignity, fair labour practices, or 
social security) in the Bill of Rights. Alternatively, they can inquire into the constitutionality of a 
specific Act, part of an Act or conduct of another party. In both scenarios, the litigant is 
essentially framing the dispute as a ‘constitutional matter’.195 
 In the first option, an alleged violation or threatened violation of any fundamental rights, 
the dispute relates more to the interpretation, application, or enforcement of the Constitution.196 
Here, the litigant can strongly rely on the positive duties of the state to realise the rights 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2 of the Constitution).197 This approach will involve 
direct reliance on constitutional provisions or values.  
 However, direct reliance on the Constitution is not really an option if there is an existing 
legislation giving effect to a constitutional right.198 This is particularly true in this instance where 
there is a variety of legislation giving effect to the constitutional right to social (protection) 
security. Consequently, a litigant alleging a violation or threatened violation of any social 
security-related fundamental rights cannot simply circumvent legislation and instead directly rely 
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on the constitutional provision; the principle of subsidiarity still holds.199  The aggrieved person 
will need to challenge the constitutionality of any of the legislation and/or specific provisions 
within the relevant legislation.  
 For example, an irregular migrant could challenge the constitutionality of the whole or 
parts of the COIDA. So taking s 1 of COIDA as a specific example, the definition of ‘employee’ 
in terms of s 1 explicitly prescribes a valid contract of employment as a prerequisite for 
accessing protection. Following from this narrow description of the ‘employee’ concept, all 
irregular migrant workers are categorically precluded from the coverage and benefits of COIDA 
because their immigration status does not qualify them as ‘employee’. The restrictive nature of 
the provision violates the equality rights of irregular migrants who, but for their lack of a valid 
employment contract, would qualify for important work-related social protection benefits. 
Therefore, the description of ‘employee’ in COIDA arguably discriminates unfairly against a 
vulnerable group.  
 Additionally, the Bill of Rights entrenches the right of ‘everyone’ to ‘have access to 
social security’.200 The framing of the word ‘everyone’ in s 27 could include all non-citizens 
because ‘everyone’ does not refer only to ‘citizens’.201 COIDA is seemingly lenient regarding the 
right to compensation. Section 27 of COIDA grants special circumstances in which the Director-
General of the Department of Labour may make an award. Section 27 explicitly states that ‘[i]f 
in a claim for compensation in terms of [COIDA] it appears to the Director-General that the 
contract of service or apprenticeship or learnership of the employee concerned is invalid, he may 
deal with such claim as if the contract was valid at the time of the accident’.202 It is on these 
premises that an irregular migrant worker could attack the constitutionality of this provision on 
the basis that it violates his or her right to equality. 
 The option to challenge the constitutionality of a law or part thereof is broadly premised 
on the notion that the South African regulatory system protecting workers is not isolated from 
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the Bill of Rights which provides and protects certain employment and socio-economic rights. 
The Constitution provides the right context for understanding and interpreting other legislation. 
Therefore, scrutinising other laws using a constitutional lens will help with analysing the 
treatment of migrant workers.  
  A consideration for the courts in any allegation of an infringement of a right by law or 
the conduct of another person is the issue of limitation. The idea is that the rights in the Bill of 
rights are not absolute and can be limited. Subsequently, not all infringements of fundamental 
rights are unconstitutional.203 Some infringements may be reasonable and justifiable. Central to 
the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on the limitation of rights is an assessment of 
proportionality or balancing. A limitation must satisfy the following requirements of 
proportionality mandated by s 36 of the Constitution: importance of the purpose of the limitation, 
the relationship between the limitation and its purpose (rational connection requirement), the 
availability of less restrictive ways to achieve the purpose, and the proportionality of the 
limitation considering the extent of the infringement and the nature of the right.204 
 The reasonableness of any limitation is crucial to the justiciability of any socio-economic 
right in the Constitution. For instance, the social protection rights entrenched in s 27 of the 
Constitution impose both negative and positive duties on the state. On the one hand, the state 
must not impair or allow private individuals to interfere in peoples’ attempts to access social 
security.205 On the other hand, the state has a duty to ‘take reasonable legislative and other 
measures’ to achieve the ‘progressive realisation’ of access to social security.206 Therefore, even 
if a court should find that the interference of the state or a law or a third party in an irregular 
migrant’s access to social security is reasonable, there is still the question of whether the state 
has taken positive measures to ensure the progressive realisation of access to social protection. 
 Given the aim of social (protection) security and the vulnerability of irregular migrants 
generally, it can be argued that the exclusion of some vulnerable (if not the most vulnerable) 
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members from protective measures is unreasonable. If it is maintained that the right of access to 
social security is aimed at vulnerable members of society,207 and the Constitutional Court has 
formally acknowledged the vulnerability of non-nationals then how can access to one class of 
needy people and not to others be justified? Note, however, that although an in-depth analysis 
goes beyond the scope of this study, an infringement can be justifiable.   
 In any event, South African courts are mandated to interpret any legislation in line with 
international law, including customary international law.208 As previously indicated, international 
law proffers some substantive protection to migrants in an irregular situation. Interpreting 
legislation consistently with international law will require South African courts to adopt some 
pragmatism in their judicial interventions of cases involving irregular migrants in the pursuit of 
improving their protection position. 
 Given the progressive nature of South Africa’s constitutional democracy and its liberal 
substantive enjoyment of rights, it is possible for irregular migrants to lay strong claims to 
certain constitutional socio-economic rights. In this respect, Liebenberg and Goldblatt propose 
that ‘an interdependent interpretation of equality and socio-economic rights has significant 
potential to enhance the responsiveness of our jurisprudence to the complex causes and 
manifestations of poverty and inequality in South Africa’.209  
 However, this is not to overstate the transformative power of this avenue for change. It is 
acknowledged that the judicial route for claiming and/or enforcing socio-economic rights for this 
class of migrants is rather a weak one, but an option nonetheless. It is accepted that any 
successful constitutional challenge will make a symbolic rather than real contribution to 
improving the position of irregular migrants. This is because there is a variety of applicable 
legislation enacted to give effect to the socio-economic rights in the Constitution, any one of 
which could be constitutionally challenged. Going about changing the status-quo will likely be 
piecemeal requiring challenge to deficient legislation individually. 
 Nonetheless, the courts have a part to play in improving the protection position of 
vulnerable groups in society. Application of liberal judicial muscle that is sensitive to individual 
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circumstances will be necessary to bring all non-citizens, including irregular migrant workers, 
into the fold of South African social security law. As Mbazira aptly observes, the courts need to 
be open-minded and conscious of context when interpreting socio-economic rights in individual 
cases.210  
 
6.6.2 Bilateral social security agreements 
Where host governments are reluctant to commit independently to improving the social 
protection of migrant workers, bilateral social security agreements between countries of origin 
and destination can be useful in bridging the domestic gap. Bilateral social protection agreements 
usually include provisions of equal treatment of citizens and foreign nationals regarding social 
security and rules of cooperation between participating countries.211 Such arrangements present 
opportunity for migrant-sending countries to negotiate for better rights, especially for low-skilled 
workers, and to provide significant minimum rights for these migrants, including the export of 
benefits between the countries.212 
 Increasingly, governments are choosing to conclude international social security 
agreements with one another to share responsibility for and coordinate social security protection 
across national boundaries, instead of going at it alone. Countries like the United States, Canada, 
Australia, Ireland and those belonging to the EU have entered into bilateral treaties with other 
countries to secure benefit protection for their citizens who work abroad. Canada alone boasts 50 
such agreements.   
 In the South African context, legislation makes (limited) provision for the establishment 
of social security (reciprocal) agreements. For example, s 94 of COIDA permits the government 
to enter into arrangements with other states regarding compensation. Thus, the COIDA provision 
allows for limited portability of contributory schemes benefits. This means that workers could 
maintain and transfer some of their benefits from one job or country to another without losing all 
the social security rights acquired in the host country. 
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 Similarly, s 2(1) of the Social Assistance Act provides for the extension of coverage to 
other foreign nationals should there be an existing bilateral agreement. These legal provisions 
suggest reciprocity of treatment in coverage. Despite the legislative mandate to conclude 
bilateral social security arrangements, the actual execution and enforcement of this authority is 
absent or dismal to say the least. 
 Nonetheless, South Africa has entered into bilateral labour agreements with a number of 
neighbouring countries including Botswana,213 Lesotho,214 Malawi,215 and Mozambique.216 Most 
of these labour agreements contain conditions and obligations on issues related to recruitment, 
contracts, deferred pay, taxation, and the appointment of labour representatives into South 
Africa.217 
 Besides the absence of important provisions — such as equality of treatment with citizens 
of host nation in social protection, maintenance of acquired rights, and accumulation of 
insurance periods218 — the current bilateral regime cannot qualify as true reciprocal bilateral 
social security agreements for several reasons. First, evidence suggests that the government 
settled these agreements in an attempt to control the influx of foreign labour to South Africa 
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from those countries.219 Secondly, with the limited exception of the 1964 labour agreement with 
Mozambique,220 the government treats social (security) protection and related arrangements as a 
by-product of most of these agreements.221 Lastly, these agreements are limited in scope and 
effect because they are not reciprocal in nature in that they seek to regulate the position of 
nationals of only the sending countries.222 
 The available labour agreements between South Africa and the surrounding SADC 
countries, now obsolete,223 could do with renegotiations to improve the protection they offer 
foreign workers. Mpedi and Smit counsel that ‘efforts to modernise these agreements should 
include provisions geared at the (facilitation) of cross-border payment of social security 
benefits’.224 Although conclusion of bilateral social security agreements is a good avenue to 
guarantee the social protection of migrants,225 some scholars warn of it becoming a ‘highly 
complex and hardly administrable set of provisions on the portability of social security 
benefits’.226  
 Nevertheless, best practices in the Europe reveal that a solid legal foundation can help 
overcome these administrative complexities and hurdles. EU member states have managed to 
escape these supposed bureaucratic traps because all bilateral agreements center on one primary 
legal instrument, the EC Regulation 883/2004 of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social 
security systems.227 The EU regulation on the coordination of social security systems establishes 
common rules to protect social security rights when moving within the EU. Therefore, it 
essentially guarantees to beneficiaries their social security benefits regardless of where they 
move to within the EU.  
                                                          
219 Ibid at 134. 
220 South Africa Treaty Series 11/1964 regulating the employment of miners on certain South African mines.  
221 Olivier op cit note 109 at 147.  
222 Olivier op cit note 217 at 135. 
223 Olivier op cit note 109 at 146.  
224 Mpedi, Smit & Nyenti op cit note 93 at 32. 
225 Olivier (2012) at 158.  
226 R Holzmann, J Koettl & T Chernetsky ‘Portability regimes of pensions and healthcare benefits for international 
migrants: An analysis of issues and good practices’ (2005) World Bank Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 
0519.  




6.6.3 Multilateral social security agreements 
Where bilateral agreements may result in administrative red tape, literature suggests that a 
multilateral agreement concluded in the framework of regional economic integration can ease 
this bureaucracy as it set common standards and rules for implementing agreements.228 Aside 
from this moderating role, multilateral agreements have the added advantage of creating a 
standardised framework, i.e. the harmonisation of labour and social protection policies of 
member states.229 Here the role of regional integration becomes critical in the development of 
successful multilateral arrangements. 
 Currently there are no multilateral agreements in the SADC region. 230  However, 
comparative experiences from other jurisdictions reveal that multilateral agreements are effective 
in extending social protection. In this respect, best practices in Europe, Latin America and 
Caribbean, and most recently the East African Community (EAC) warrant brief mention. The 
European region has the most developed multilateral framework to date. All EU nationals have 
full access to all social benefits without discrimination, in addition to the portability of most 
social benefits.231 The EU system also grants equal treatment to third-country nationals after a 
period of residence, usually no longer than five years.232  
 Likewise, the multilateral frameworks of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)233 and 
the ‘Common Market of the South’ (MERCOSUR)234  contain social security protection for 
migrants in the Latin American and Caribbean region.235 In particular, the provisions of the 
CARICOM Agreement on Social Security of 1996 largely draw from the guidelines set out in the 
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ILO Maintenance of Social Security Rights Recommendation 167 of 1983.236 Countries to this 
Agreement essentially coordinate their social security systems. The reciprocal nature of the 
Agreement ensures and secures the benefits (mainly pension benefits) of individuals who are 
moving to work or have worked in any of the member states.237  
 It must be noted that the multilateral social security measures canvassed are not in respect 
of unauthorised migrants. It is submitted that these measures can contain provisions that address 
the position of irregular migrants. 
 Although it is not as advanced as the EU or the Latin America and Caribbean, a 
multilateral framework is currently underway within the EAC Common Market.238A similar 
approach to social protection across borders in the SADC context is required and reasonably 
possible. The current SADC Code on social security,239 albeit not a legally binding agreement, 
can be an optimistic start for the conclusion of regional social security agreements to improve the 
position of intra-SADC migrants. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
A review of existing sources of South African domestic law unsurprisingly reveals that foreign 
workers generally enjoy fewer social and legal rights because of immigration policies. Policies 
distinguish between different types of non-nationals and subsequently award differentiated social 
protection rights according to the legal strength of immigration status. Different foreign nationals 
with different immigration statuses translate to a succession of rights ranging from full equal 
treatment to total exclusion. 
 In South Africa, there is a visible social protection gap. Access to social protection by 
some foreign workers is limited because of exclusions in the legislation of the host country. The 
South African social security system exempts many categories or groups of people. The domestic 
social protection framework mostly bars foreign nationals, with the exception of those with 
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permanent residence status. This is because access to social protection rights usually relates to 
periods of employment, contributions, and/or residency.  
 This means that some migrants (mostly those with permanent residence status) enjoy the 
same rights as citizens,240  whilst others are left wanting. Granted that unauthorised foreign 
workers are at the bottom of the rights chain as far as typology of migrants go, this precarious 
legal status means they experience much restricted economic and social rights compared to other 
groups of non-nationals. Essentially, the differentiation embedded in the legal regime weakens 
the South African domestic protection framework. 
 Where domestic provisions are ineffective, the hope is that international norms and 
standards on migrant workers can help improve situations. To this effect, international legal 
instruments do little to improve the situation. The inadequacy of international instruments can be 
attributed either to the provisions themselves or inaction on the part of governments. In the case 
of South Africa, the latter point rings true. South African policymakers are reluctant to endorse 
formally important international instruments on labour migration. Non-ratification renders the 
instruments that pronounce better protection for this class of workers non-binding and 
ineffective. On the other hand, some of the instruments offering universal protection 
inadvertently limit the protection of unauthorised migrant workers because of the prominence 
given to principles of territoriality. 
 Nonetheless, research and comparative best practices reveal that it is possible to improve 
the protection position of unauthorised foreign workers. In this respect, three policy options — 
unilateral government action, bilateral, and multilateral agreements — are promising in 
enhancing the protection position of these migrants. 
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CHAPTER VII CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The study sought to address one of the most salient issues in the international migration 
discourse, i.e. the rights protection position of migrant workers in countries where they work. 
Particularly, it sought to examine the right of access to social protection of migrant workers in an 
irregular situation in South Africa. The broader underlying question was ‘To what extent do 
South African laws protect the rights of unauthorised migrant workers?’ The key question was 
broken down into the following specific inquires: 
 Do South African laws adequately safeguard the social protection rights of unauthorised 
foreign workers?  
 Is there any labour migration policy or framework in South Africa?  
 What is the nature of the existing labour migration policy?  
 What are the realistic options for policy reform? 
In determining their adequacy, the study employed a contextual policy and legal analysis in 
examining the domestic regulatory social protection framework, with references to international 
human rights norms and comparative best practices. Accordingly, this chapter provides general 
conclusions and some recommendations for resolving some of the issues raised.  
 
7.2 Summary of conclusions and observations 
Chapter 2 provided a literature review of the equality discourse generally and in South Africa 
specifically. It revealed the elusive and contested nature of equality as a theory. Generally, 
different schools of thought construct equality in a way that serves their purpose and needs. 
Nonetheless, the South African context indicates a substantial body of constitutional and 
legislative provisions promoting equality and non-discrimination. In South Africa particularly, 
equality, owing to the country’s oppressive history, takes two forms. Pre-and post-constitutional 
equality jurisprudence in South Africa employs both the form (formal equality) and substance 
(substantive equality) of the law. South African courts, committed to redressing the inequalities 
inherited from the apartheid regime, emphasise substantive equality. This form of equality links 
intricately with dignity.  
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 Since equality is a desirable ideal, the next logical consideration was how to measure the 
parameters of this concept. Chapter 3 sought to identify the best measure of equality by focusing 
on three conceptions of distributive equality (welfare, resource and opportunities). Both welfare 
and resource as metrics for equality failed because they were impractical and indefensible. The 
chapter settled on the equal opportunity theory coupled with the human capability approach as 
the best possible measure to explain and address inequalities embedded in South Africa law. The 
study then proceeded to use equal opportunity theory coupled with the capability approach as an 
evaluative tool to determine adequacy of domestic regulatory framework. 
 Chapter 4 delineated arguments on the need for protection of social protection rights from 
three dominant perspectives: namely migration, labour, and human rights. The chapter dealt with 
technical issues relating to the conceptualisation of social protection to arrive at a working 
definition of the concept for the study. It then proceeded to examine social protection from a 
migration perspective. In this respect, it discussed trends, patterns and the regulatory framework 
underlying the institutionalisation of international labour migration. It also surveyed existing 
policy and legislative framework regulating labour migration in South Africa. 
 The chapter also explored social protection from a labour and human rights contexts. In a 
labour view, wage work is an essential component in justifying entitlements to work-related 
social protection. Work is shown to be both a means to and a source of social protection. It then 
explored social protection from a human rights angle since the plight of migrants is inherently a 
human rights issue. 
 Regarding labour migration regulation, the discussion established that indeed there is a 
labour migration framework in South Africa. However, the nature of existing South African 
labour policy is too restrictive and security-centred, lacking the necessary human rights aspects 
to address sufficiently the labour migration issues in the country. The study observed a 
relationship between immigration, labour, and social protection laws in South Africa. However, 
policymakers give preference to immigration law over labour and social security laws. This then 
affects the employment and human rights position of irregular migrant workers. 
 In terms of employment, the legal channels to the South African labour market available 
to foreign nationals are very limited, which indirectly creates scope for clandestine migration. 
Moreover, the working conditions of migrant workers in general tend to be poor compared to 
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citizens. Compared to regular migrants, unauthorised migrant workers fare far worse concerning 
conditions of work.  
 Finally, the general treatment of migrants overall is dismal and raises human rights 
concerns. The study observed that South Africa’s harsh immigration discourse coupled with 
hostile anti-migrant sentiments and political rhetoric exacerbates the plight of non-nationals. 
Irregular migrants face and endure severe challenges as they are often relegated to the lowest 
legal position and treatment.  
 Chapter 5 examined a range of international, continental, and regional human rights 
instruments that relate specifically to the social protection of irregular migrant workers and their 
families. It reflected on relevant instruments for the protection of migrant worker developed by 
transnational bodies such as the UN, ILO, AU, and SADC. It particularly focused on provisions 
relating to the social protection of unauthorised migrant workers. It also examined the conflicting 
relationship between states’ sovereign territorial prerogative and human rights law.  
 The transnational instruments examined give an image of a body of international human 
rights law that theoretically adequately focus on the rights protection of migrant workers and 
their families. Both the UN and ILO have made considerable developments in promoting and 
protecting the rights of migrants, evident from existing standards regulating their treatment. 
However, detailed analysis revealed underlying problems in these transnational instruments that 
weaken the recognition of and access to fundamental rights.  
 The first of these problems relates to their content, viewed against the backdrop of an 
important common theme of international human rights law, namely equality of treatment. 
International, continental, and regional instruments dealing with migrant workers seemingly do 
not envisage parity of treatment between regular and irregular migrants. In fact, they tend to 
exclude irregular migrant workers from the scope of their content, thereby compromising the 
equal treatment principle. Where irregular migrants are included in the content of protective 
instruments, as is the case in the UN’s ICRMW, their protection is often limited and comparably 
inadequate.  
 The second problem relates specifically to social protection. Standards and norms 
instituted by both the UN and ILO acknowledge social protection as a human right. Yet, these 
transnational instruments tend to confine social protection rights of irregular migrants to 
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statements of general principles. This calls for a re-interpretation and re-formulation of these 
international standards, as they are important guideposts for improving national policies.  
 The last problem relates to ratification and implementation. Advancing the protection of 
vulnerable migrant workers requires ratification of relevant instruments, yet these instruments 
have poor ratification and implementation records. In the absence of state commitment to these 
instruments, international law does very little to improve the social protection position of 
irregular migrants.  
  Chapter 6 gave a comprehensive overview of the South African legal framework 
providing work-related social (security) protection. It evaluated sources of domestic law 
containing provisions, including constitutional, statutory, and case law. The overview yielded a 
substantial body of legal mechanisms intended to protect workers, including foreign workers.  
 It subsequently analysed the adequacy of those South African domestic protection by 
weighing them against international norms and standards. The comparative exercise revealed that 
South African social protection are deficient where unauthorised migrant workers are concerned. 
Domestic coverage, and by extension benefits entitlements, wholly or partially excludes 
unauthorised migrant workers. Irregular migrants lack both legal and real (physical) access to 
South African social security system owing to certain restrictions and conditions embedded in 
the relevant legislation.  
 Finally, the chapter examined possible avenues for improving the domestic legal 
framework. It highlighted three measures as relative best practices from countries that offer 
comparatively better protection. These measures included unilateral government action, bilateral 
or social security coordination agreements, and multilateral social security agreements. In order 
to improve the social protection position of irregular migrant workers specifically and their 
human rights generally, the study proposed the implementation of a ‘firewall’ between 
immigration and labour enforcement systems. It also recognised that judicial activism will be 
crucial to stimulate the necessary policy changes. Alternatively, South Africa should enter into 
bilateral social security agreements with other SADC members, particularly those major migrant-
sending sources. Moreover, SADC-wide coordination and arrangements are necessary in 




7.3 General remarks 
To reiterate, the study set out to answer one key question, ‘To what extent do South African laws 
protect the rights of unauthorised migrant workers?’ Mindful that this question raised a number 
of issues about the current disparities in access to social protection, both in law and practice, 
between different categories of migrant workers, it identified four specific questions for 
consideration in answering the main question.  
 In each of the chapters examining critical protection issues, the adequacy of the relevant 
provisions was measured against international norms and/or comparative best practices. Thus, 
South African domestic labour migration and social protection policies were examined in light of 
international norms and comparative best practices. It has been found that the South African 
regulatory framework is inadequate on both fronts, i.e. on labour migration and social protection. 
Equality, one of the foundational blocks of the South African Constitution and democracy, is 
seemingly limited to citizens and some categories of non-nationals.  The notion of equal access 
becomes problematic when the socio-economic rights of foreign nationals are concerned. 
Generally, most foreign nationals do not enjoy equal opportunity to socio-economic rights. The 
Constitutional Court has not been very helpful in giving life to the socio-economic rights in the 
Constitution as it limits the social protection rights of a significant group of vulnerable foreign 
nationals.  
 
7.4 Recommendations and strategies 
International labour migration is inevitable. It is a phenomenon that is bound to rise steadily, 
given the increasingly complex process of globalisation. South Africa is an attractive destination 
in the SADC region and the broader continent. This position as a major destination country for 
migrants is unlikely to change in the near future. Consequently, South Africa needs to embrace 
labour migration and take advantage of its benefits. In order to benefit from international labour 
migration, however, South Africa will need to make substantial changes to its current system, 
approach, and/or perception.  
 
7.4.1 Rights-based approach to labour migration 
Undoubtedly states have a broad right to regulate who they admit into their territories. However, 
migration management policies and systems must appropriately serve both domestic needs and 
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those of migrants. South Africa’s approach to migration management tends to be inward-looking, 
overly focused on security, control, and exclusion at the expense of development. A restrictive 
and control-oriented approach does very little to manage the challenges and social pressures 
associated with migration. This is evident in the increasing number of foreigners that enter, stay, 
and/or work in South Africa without formal authorisation from the government.  
 In order to manage migration and combat clandestine migration into the country, some 
important policy interventions are required. The first step in any effective migration management 
system is the availability of good and adequate data. The study has noted that domestic 
immigration figures, particularly those concerning irregular migrants, are unreliable. Migration 
statistics in South Africa are deficient as they tend to be grossly exaggerated and/or politicised. 
This is particularly true in the case of measuring the clandestine migration discourse where 
people contest the precise number of irregular migrants. In short, there is no reliable data about 
clandestine migration, let alone unauthorised migrant workers. Therefore, for developing an 
efficient regulatory framework that adequately addresses labour migration needs and concerns, 
the government will need to improve the collection of immigration data. It is recognised that 
measuring or quantifying accurately the number of foreigners in an irregular situation is difficult. 
Moreover, any measurement will have to be indirect. Perhaps researchers and policymakers will 
have to come up with a good proxy for clandestine migration since deportation data does not 
accurately capture the full reality of clandestine migration. The point is that measures that 
improve the collection of useful and accurate statistics as well as capacity-building of institutions 
(such as DHA or StatsSA) responsible for data collection are urgently needed. A policy that is 
built on up-to-date information is bound to direct efforts and resources into the right areas. It is 
better to design a good system than strongly enforce a flawed system. 
 Beyond acquiring good data, the current South African migration policy needs a 
complete immigration policy overhaul to produce a more progressive migration framework. The 
preceding discussions show how strongly migration policies govern the legal position of 
migrants in social protection. A progressive immigration regime will mean adopting a rights-
based approach to international migration, and creating more and simpler channels for regular 
migration.  
 First, South African policymakers should implement an immigration framework that 
carefully balances human rights and national development interests, instead of the current 
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control-oriented method. Discussions in chapter 4 have shown that certain sectors of the South 
African economy are dependent on foreign labour. More so, unscrupulous employers depend on 
the cheap exploitative labour of irregular migrants to gain competitive advantage. The benefit of 
an immigration approach that takes cognizance of the protection concerns of foreign workers is 
three-fold.  
 First, the national economy can garner the full economic contributions of all migrant 
workers.  
 Secondly, policymakers indirectly remove the element that makes vulnerable migrants 
attractive to unscrupulous employers.  
 Thirdly, the government can raise its human rights image.  
In any case, the traditional approach of control and exclusion has proven costly and ineffective. 
It is perhaps time policymakers shifted to a rights-based approach that focuses on the human 
aspect of migration. Here the ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration should prove 
useful in guiding the government towards formulating a balanced and human rights-friendly 
regulatory framework.  
 Secondly, the government needs to realign incentives of migrants and employers with the 
goals of its immigration policy. Currently, the government employs a protectionist approach to 
the domestic labour market as a way of preserving local jobs and curtailing national 
unemployment. This means an admission policy that makes it excessively difficult for people to 
migrate legally, inadvertently raises the rate of clandestine migration into the country. 
Unfortunately, South Africa’s stringent admission policy or procedure, often favouring migration 
of highly skilled migrants, makes it very difficult for low skilled migrants to migrate legally. The 
government will need to revise its admission policy and extend the avenues available for regular 
migration. It should create more and simpler opportunities for low-skilled foreign nationals to 
enter and work in the country through legal channels. This is by no means suggesting that South 
Africa become a borderless state. The government, while exercising its territorial discretionary 





7.4.2 Ratification and incorporation of transnational legal instruments 
International instruments, as concluded in chapter 5 of the study, are necessary for the guidance 
and synchronisation of various national legislation, policies, and practices. Regarding 
international labour migration, international instruments ‘provide a solid foundation for 
formulation of migration policies’.1 In this respect, the international community, through efforts 
by the UN and ILO, provides some standards or norms that can prove useful for the appropriate 
treatment of all migrant workers. Accordingly, the South African Constitution recognises the 
applicability of international human rights instruments in its domestic law.  
 Regrettably, South Africa has failed to ratify any of the main international instruments 
specifically applicable to migrant workers and their rights of access to social protection. Non-
ratification of existing standards setting benchmarks is a serious issue as it constrains migrants 
from fully enjoying the rights enshrined in them.2 The government should strongly consider 
ratifying and incorporating the international normative framework for protection of migrant 
rights, particularly ILO Conventions 97 and 143 and the UN’s ICRMW, into the national legal 
system. 
 Generally, ratification and subsequent incorporation and implementation of these 
international norms are good for alleviating the ‘tension between international law to protect 
human rights and national laws where the primary concern is to protect and promote the rights 
and welfare of citizens’.3 More importantly, ratified international norms are necessary for easing 
the exploitation of migrant workers, in particular irregular migrants. Aside from the general 
reasons for ratifying these norms, South Africa is a member of both the ILO and UN, and 
therefore its national policies and practices need to comply with and echo the principles of both 
international bodies.  
 However, the current international regulatory framework contains general principles 
regarding the protection of the rights of migrants. While it is advised that South Africa should 
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adopt international standards and instruments, it will need to re-interpret and adapt its principles 
to its specific situation or socio-economic context. 
 Additionally, international and regional bodies provide for the conclusion of bilateral and 
multilateral agreements to improve the protection position of migrants in party states. However, 
these agreements are only effective if the countries concluding them have compatible systems 
offering comparable protection. On a regional level, SADC should first create a proper 
framework for managing migration in the region. A regionally-coordinated approach to 
migration will ensure the alignment of goals and interests of participating states, promote more 
effective management of migration in the region, and lay the foundation for the harmonisation of 
social protection policies in the region.  
  
7.4.3 Rights-based approach to the right to social (security) protection  
The previous discussions noted gaps in the treatment of migrants in social protection, both 
internationally and domestically. The protection of migrant workers, particularly irregular 
migrant workers, is less than desirable. It is the main contention of this study that the differential 
treatment of irregular migrants vis-à-vis regular migrants in the enjoyment of social protection is 
legally unjustifiable. It has been argued that the migration status of unauthorised migrant workers 
places them in a precarious legal position, open to excessive exploitation and violation by 
unscrupulous employers that engage them economically. Their exclusion from protective 
measures like social protection policies only serves to exacerbate their plight.  
 South African policymakers have a constitutional obligation to promote and protect 
access to social security for everyone. South African courts have significantly advanced the 
realisation of this obligation by extending the scope of social protection instruments through 
liberal interpretation. However, realisation of the right of access to social protection in South 
Africa is far from adequate. South African social protection mechanisms, in law and practice, 
still exclude some categories of migrant workers. South African policymakers should consider a 
rights-based approach to social protection regulation which will require extending basic human 
and social rights to all migrants, independent of their immigration status. Additionally, 
policymakers should guarantee irregular migrants equality of treatment with regular migrants 
and citizens for human rights. 
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 Moreover, a liberal social protection framework will require carefully balanced 
enforcement systems by well-coordinated institutions. Currently, the South African government 
is too focused on immigration enforcement, control, and exclusion at the expense of workers’ 
rights. Both duties are equally important and need to be prioritised. In this respect, it is 
recommended that the government adopt a ‘status-blind’ approach to enforcement by erecting a 
firewall between its immigration enforcement and labour law enforcement. In this regard, labour 
inspectors will primarily enforce labour laws without regard for immigration status, leaving the 
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